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FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
AGE OF POUND: AN ESSAY ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Thomas A. Green*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of freedom has two main aspects: political liberty
and freedom of the will. I am concerned here with the latter,
although - as these two aspects of freedom are not entirely unre-
lated to each other - I shall touch also on the former. Enough has
been written from a philosophical perspective on the relationship
between free will and the law that it is not easy to justify yet an-
other such undertaking. But there may still be room for some in-
formal observations on the manner in which doubts about the
concept of freedom of the will affected discussion of criminal re-
sponsibility in early-twentieth-century America - room for reflec-
tions that might also serve as a backdrop to more presentist
concerns.
The occasion for this essay - the inauguration of the Dawson
chair at the University of Michigan Law School - has not com-
manded its subject matter.' Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
* John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1961,
Columbia; A.M. (History) 1962, Ph.D. (History) 1970, J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed. This essay
is drawn from my on-going work on the American criminal trial jury and concepts of freedom
(1800-present). I want to recognize here the generous support I have received in connection
with this long-range project from the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences
(and the Andrew W. Mellon Fund), the National Endowment for the Humanities, the John
Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and the William W. Cook Endowment Fund of
the University of Michigan Law School.
Many colleagues, here at Michigan and elsewhere, have read and commented upon ear-
lier drafts of parts of this essay. I thank them for their help and support. Special thanks are
due to Steven Croley, Phoebe Ellsworth, Kate Gilbert, Hendrik Hartog, Donald Herzog,
Diane Lehman, Margaret Sommers, and Peter Westen. And most of all, I thank Elizabeth
Clark for substantive and editorial criticism of the entire manuscript - labor well beyond the
call of duty. My principal research assistant, Erik McKee, and research assistants Warren
Rosenblum and Christopher Taylor, deserve special appreciation. Louis Anthes kindly re-
viewed the Speranza papers at the New York Public Library for me. Finally I thank my
secretary, Sharon Rice, for her extraordinary assistance and patience throughout the period
during which the constituent elements of the current essay evolved. No words can express
my appreciation to my wife, Ruth Brownell Green, whose support over the years has meant
everything.
1. The John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professorship of Law was established in 1990 to
commemorate Professor Dawson's years at the University of Michigan Law School (1927-
1915
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Professor Dawson touched upon the freedom question some forty-
odd years ago in his important article on economic duress.2 Daw-
son there pointed to doctrine that made evidence of consent a test
for whether there had been the complete destruction of the will that
the law of duress sometimes required: "[C]ourts had been slow to
realize that the instances of more extreme pressure were precisely
those in which the consent expressed was more real; the more un-
pleasant the alternative, the more real the consent to a course
which would avoid it.' 3 This tendency of thought - which Dawson
saw as paradoxical - was not of course universal. Progressive-era
courts, as Professor Dawson proceeded to show, came to focus on
the unfairness involved in the enforcement of contracts that re-
sulted from greatly unequal bargaining power. For these courts -
one infers - the legal presumption that the weaker party's choice
was freely made was indeed open .to question. That party's free-
dom - or lack of freedom - was, however, a purely relative mat-
ter. The more general issue of whether humans could ever act with
free will did not often arise. There were some doubts in the culture
at large about this ultimate capacity for human autonomy, but these
tended not to penetrate the legal sphere. There were a few excep-
tions to this, as we shall shortly see, but they rarely involved mar-
ketplace relations. For the most part, contemporaries saw the
problem of freedom in the marketplace as resulting solely from su-
perior bargaining power, and they thought that this problem could
be remedied by resettling the conditions that determined that
power - by restoring the dominated actor to relatively equal foot-
ing with the dominant actor.
The concepts of freedom and equality are thus close cousins. To
be on equal footing means, in our legal, political, and social culture,
to be free - at least this seems true on the surface, where the law
has long dwelled, and where perhaps it ought to remain. Barring
circumstances of gross inequality, freedom is the central presump-
tion of the law.
The most important exception is the domain of criminal juris-
prudence, where doubts about the ultimate capacity for human
freedom have penetrated both jurisprudence and the practical ap-
plication of the law. Even here, however, the extent of the incur-
58). Professor Dawson was one of Michigan's great scholars and teachers. I am honored to
be the first holder of the Dawson Chair.
2. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective, 45 MxcH. L. Rnv. 253
(1947).
3. Id. at 267.
1916 [Vol. 93:1915
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sion has been limited by the deployment of mechanisms of evasion.
Typically, we have entertained our doubts at the sentencing phase
of the criminal process, where the ultimate issue of responsibility is
less prominently involved, and allowed our "progressive" approach
in that context to disguise from ourselves how little we have con-
fronted the implications of our doubts at the trial stage, where re-
sponsibility is most directly involved. This largely unselfconscious
maneuver has led to a substantial degree of incoherence in both the
theory and the practice of our system of criminal justice, even as it
has borne testimony to our determination to uphold the underlying
concept of human free will.
Our approach to both trial and punishment has also evidenced
our concern with the other concept of freedom: political liberty.
For the progressive notion that those who have committed crimes
have done so as a result of circumstances over which they had little
or no control has vied with the progressive4 notion that limits on
state intrusion into the life of the individual quickly evaporate when
all human behavior is viewed in this fashion. Freedom from the
state presumes - even requires - that the law be premised upon
the possibility of human freedom.
The plan of this essay is as follows. I begin with a sidelong
glance at some features of fin de siecle criminal jurisprudence,
which I approach through a reading of a few papers written at the
outset of his career by a little-known New York lawyer, Gino Sper-
anza. Strongly influenced by the behavioral science of his day,
Speranza reflected a radical perspective shared by few contempo-
rary practitioners - or academic legal theorists. Speranza repre-
sented a movement that brought deterministic ideas from the
behavioral and social sciences into law. In that respect he stands as
a kind of missionary to lawyers from "scientists." But Speranza
soon discovered that the limits of common lawyers' own cultural
traditions largely prevented the assimilation of determinism into
law, and came to appreciate the conservative value of some of those
traditions. Speranza illustrates the limits beyond which few Ameri-
can lawyers of the day would proceed in assimilating the social and
behavioral sciences. He thus helps to define the scope of the prob-
lem that the legal profession confronted.
4. I use the term "progressive" (lower case) in its conventional sense. I use the term
"Progressive" (upper case) to refer to the ideas associated with the Progressive Era (roughly,
for my purposes, 1895-1920, though I refer to its early years as thefin de sidcle). Often, the
ideas associated with the two terms overlap, but some "progressive" ideas were not so clearly
in the mainstream of the Progressive program.
June 1995] 1917
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I turn in Part II, the main section of this essay, to a lengthy
odyssey: the evolution of Roscoe Pound's criminal jurisprudence,
from 1905 to 1923. Born in Lincoln, Neraska, in 1870, Pound was,
of course, a leading legal academic of the early twentieth century,
serving first as a member, then as Dean, of the Nebraska law faculty
and thereafter on the law faculties of Northwestern and Chicago.
He moved to Harvard in 1910, where he was Dean from 1916 to
1936. Pound continued to write until his death in 1964, although his
truly creative period had ended by the 1930s. With respect to crimi-
nal jurisprudence, Pound was potentially an odd man out, for he
appears in his own thinking to have rejected the concept of free will
as an element of mens rea. Pound nonetheless managed to retain a
resolutely juristic perspective, always keeping safe distance from
the hard-core determinism of much Progressive-era criminology
and penology. He was an avowed assimilationist, and his writings
reflect the strains that are the lot of the common lawyer who would
join the insights of law and science. In his own way, Pound sought
to meet the challenge of the fin de siecle, to resolve what Speranza
had deemed unresolvable. He looked forward to, but never clearly
articulated, a gradual reform of all aspects of criminal justice ad-
ministration that would meld the principles of social and behavioral
science with the imperatives of legal science and maintain respect
for the claim of human freedom. Pound's approach - eclectic, un-
systematic - sought to apply selectively the learning of the social
and behavioral science of his day in order to achieve overall coordi-
nation of ideas and institutions. He overlooked inherent contradic-
tions, unselfconsciously adopting an evasive approach to the most
difficult problems. Though his achievement was significant by the
standards of his times, as a foundational work in criminal jurispru-
dence it fell short of the leading accounts of the 1930s and beyond.
More history, impressionistic sociology, and commentary on con-
temporary legal practices than analytical jurisprudence, Pound's
contribution to modern criminal justice study has been largely for-
gotten - mined for aphorisms but not appreciated as the fine tap-
estry that it is. I tell Pound's story both for its own sake and as an
introductory foray into the history of early twentieth-century crimi-
nal jurisprudence. For the most part, I let Pound speak for himself.
(Indeed, the entire essay is largely devoted to recovering voices that
have long-since drifted away, been recorded-over by our own idiom
as we have addressed the same issues.) While I remain agnostic as
to whether Pound was representative, I see him as part of the pro-
gressive juristic vanguard and as a true Progressive. Few other
1918 [Vol. 93:1915
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American legal scholars of the pre-1923 period wrote much of a
sustained sort on the problem of criminal jurisprudence; generaliz-
ing from the random comments of the day is of limited help in this
regard. There is a fuller, far more contextual tale to be told of that
period, but that tale remains for a later occasion.
Part Ill recreates what might be called a conversation among a
number of commentators on criminal justice, from 1923 to 1930.
The "conversation" - of which I recount only some high points -
is meant to bring Pound's story to a close and to put Pound in per-
spective. It also serves to introduce what I see as the beginning of a
new era, one marked not so much by new issues as by new energy
and increased attention to those issues already within the legal
academy. From a presentist perspective, Pound's story matters be-
cause his work dealt with problems forced on lawyers by "scien-
tists" that remain at the foundation of our thinking about criminal
justice. Despite all that has happened since the mid-1920s, the era
toward which Part I points, Pound's story remains, in a special
sense, largely our own. Our analyses of criminal jurisprudence go
far deeper, and we are attentive to ultimate contradictions that
Pound seems not to have confronted. Nonetheless, we build on the
same shaky foundations, partly recognizing that it is the best we can
do; partly, but only indirectly, taking the infirmities into account;
partly forgetting along the way how much we rest matters of life
and liberty on theories that resist verification - indeed, that invite
strong skepticism.
I address by way of a brief Epilogue some aspects of the modem
context in which our own odysseys take place.
I. THE FIN DE SIACLE." SPERANZA
Writing in 1901, in the pages of a legal magazine, The Green
Bag, a young member of the New York bar named Gino Speranza
stated: "Law is one of the humanities."'5 So it is, but what caused
Speranza to say so in such an insistent tone in his article, The
Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility? Perhaps
Speranza's true audience was scientists whose specialization was the
science of human behavior and its application to the treatment and
cure of criminal offenders. Many of them had trained abroad or at
home on the writings of late nineteenth-century European criminol-
ogists and penologists, forming a large phalanx of Western students
5. Gino C. Speranza, The Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN
BAG 123, 125 (1901).
1919June 1995]
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of human behavior whose approach was decidedly deterministic.
Within this transnational movement there were, to be sure, distinct
schools: some gave primacy to hereditary factors, others stressed
environmental influences. Systems of classification of criminal
types abounded; not everyone agreed about what to do with incor-
rigibles. But the dominant approach to criminal behavior was de-
terministic. Indeed, for many of these scientists, all behavior -
like all events in nature - had its causes, and the will itself,
whether it gave in to desires or resisted them, was the plaything of
forces that it did not ultimately create or control. For these strong
determinists, whatever value the concept of free will had in more
speculative areas of life, everything that science could know about
human behavior could be understood without invoking that
concept.6
6. While much has been written on late nineteenth-century conflicts over the definition of
insanity and its relation to criminal responsibility, a comprehensive account of American
penology and criminology has not appeared in recent years. Nonetheless, it is by now a
familiar fact that American "scientists" began to develop deterministic theories of crime by
the first half of the nineteenth century. The development of American psychiatry and the
scientific exploration of responsibility, including the idea of moral insanity, is discussed in
CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THm TRLAL OF T-m AssAssN GurrEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW IN
=m GLnnDu AGE 61-74, 100-06, 243-58 (1968). See also Janet Ann Tighe, A Question of
Responsibility: The Development of American Forensic Psychiatry, 1838-1930, at 25-68
(1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania); NORMAN DAiN, CON-
CEPTS OF INsANITY IN T=E UNrrED STATES 1789-1865 (1964). ARTmUR E. FINx, CAUSES OF
CRnvm: BIoLOGicAL THmoRrEs IN THE UN=TED STATES, 1800-1915, at 1-19 (1938), notes the
early popularity of phrenology in America. British criminology exercised an enduring influ-
ence on American thought, and British developments are discussed in MART-n J. NVMNER,
RECONSTRUCrING THE CRIMINAI CULTURE, LAw, AND PoLICY iN ENGLAND, 1830-1914
(1990). Late-Victorian British criminology and penology are the focus of DAVID GARLAND,
PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEoS (1985). Continental crimi-
nal anthropology and criminological theories began to affect American thinking on crime by
the 1870s. Broadly speaking, the European influence centered on the Italian school's focus
on heredity, stemming from the work of Lombroso, Ferri, and Garofalo, and the role of
environment, generally associated with the French school of Tarde, Lacassagne, and others.
For a description of the development of each school and the relationship and tensions be-
tween them in Europe, see RtrrH HARRis, MURDERS AND MADNESS: MEDICINE, LAW, AND
SocmT IN Ti= FNDEStcLE 80-98 (1989); ROBERT A. NYE, CRIME, MADNESS, AND PoL-
ncs iN MODERN FRANCE: THm MEDICAL CONCEPT OF NATIONAL DECLINE 97-131 (1984);
GORDON WRIGHT, BETWEEN m Gtnu o AND LmERTY. Two CErTums OF THE
CRIME PROBLEM IN FRANCE 119-28 (1983). For their influence in America, see FRANCIs A.
ALUN, Tim DECLINE OF THE REHABILTATvE IDEAI: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PUR-
POSE 40-44 (1981); FINK, supra at 99-150. The classic early example of American theories of
crime and heredity is R.L. DUODALE, "THE JuKEs": A STUY iN CRIE, PAUPERISM, Dis-
EASE, AND HEREDrrY (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1877), which LAWRENCE M. FRED-
MAN, CRuE AND PUNISHMENT IN AmERiCAN HISTORY 140-42 (1993), correctly relates to the
development of eugenic theories. Though Dugdale also emphasized environmental influ-
ences, this aspect of his work was largely passed over by contemporaries. See also infra note
62. On specific European criminologists, see PzoNEERS IN CRIMINoLOGY (Hermann Mann-
heim ed., 1960). Not all observers of crime were strongly deterministic, in the sense of be-
lieving that "normal" individuals were also determined; some were and some were not. See,
for example, Craig Haney's important article, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century
Paradigm. The Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the 'Formative Era', 6 LAw &
HuM. BR-LAv. 191 (1982). Haney argues that the movement for individualization in the early
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1920 1994-1995
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There was nothing new about the concept of determinism. Men
had reasoned their way to it long before the late nineteenth cen-
tury. For some, the concept of an omniscient God had rendered the
notion of human free will logically impossible or even downright
blasphemous. For others, the general concept of cause and effect
led to determinism long before modem science reinforced that
view. Indeed, a deterministic, or "naturalist," position character-
ized various currents of thought regarding criminal justice in the
United States since at least the late eighteenth century.7 What was
new in fin de sikcle America was the pervasiveness of deterministic
theory among practitioners of applied behavioral science, and few
areas of social policy were so profoundly affected as were the fields
of criminology and penology. From these fields, the influence of
determinism spread to other domains of the law, though the impact
was greater in some areas than in others, and though - as we shall
see - the law ultimately fought off the worst ravages of the
disease.
In Speranza's day, behavioral science was recognized by the
legal profession - as by educated Americans generally - as a
Progressive period grew out of the longstanding focus in nineteenth-century America on in-
dividual responsibility. Haney's account suggests that for many fin de siecle criminologists
and penologists - as for psychologists as well - the ideology of "psychological individual-
ism" maintained a belief in free will by describing criminal behavior as the product of a moral
disease. These same criminologists and penologists, it seems to me, were nonetheless deter-
ministic in their methodology and in much of their analysis. Additionally, determinism was
sometimes applied to the study of race and other issues not directly related to crime. See,
e.g., STEi'mN JAY GOULD, T-m MIsmEAsuRE OF MAN 30-69 (1981). Nonetheless, among
scientists interested in criminals, the issue was not so much the debate over strong versus
narrow determinism, but over the specific "causes" of crime and the stigmata of criminals.
Thus, conflicts evolved concerning the relationship between brain structure and behavior, the
existence of physiological characteristics peculiar to criminals, the possibility of atavistic de-
generation through heredity and the consequent development of "born" or "instinctive"
criminals. The varieties of American deterministic thinking displayed in these debates, and
the generally deterministic assumptions of many scientists, are especially apparent in the
Medico-Legal Journal of the New York Medico-Legal Society, the published annual proceed-
ings of the National Prison Association, and in the increased participation of Americans in
international congresses on crime, criminals, and penology. For a discussion of determinism
in American studies of the causes of crime, see, for example, MERLE CURa, HUMAN NA-
TuRE iN AMERICAN THOUGHTr 273-312 (1980); Fin,, supra; LARRY K. HARTsFiELD, Tam
AmERiCAN RESPONSE TO PROFESSIONAL Camm, 1870-1917, at 149-88 (1985); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Progressive America, 57 NoTRE DAME
L. REV. 541 (1981); Tighe, supra, at 234-92.
7. Some of these currents are reflected in, for example, DAvm J. ROTHMAN, Tam Dis-
COVERY OF THE AsYLum: SoCzAL ORDER AND DIsoRDER IN TiHE RPmuc 59-78 (1971).
See also DAVID BRION DAVis, FROM HOMICIDE TO SLAVERY. STUIEs IN AMEmICAN CUL-
ruRE 18-26 (1986); FiNK, supra note 6, at 1-19; JON PA.HL, PARADox LosT. FREE WILL AND
PoaLrcAL LmnrTY IN AMERiCAN CULTURE, 1630-1760, at 6-9 (1992). Pahl describes a con-
tinuum of thought concerning theological and philosophical approaches to free will and de-
terminism in colonial America, and argues that these theological debates had direct ties to
visions of political liberty. See also ALLEN, supra note 6, at 3-16, 40-44.
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breakthrough of considerable importance. It held out the possibil-
ity of a solution to the problem of criminal behavior that greatly
concerned both Europe and America. Its principles, many thought,
would lead to the rehabilitation of those criminals who were not
biologically, or otherwise, beyond salvation: If one understood why
people behaved as they did, one might then design an environment
that would reform the behavior of most - perhaps even the major-
ity - of those persons with criminal tendencies. The implications
of the new penology that took root in the Gilded Age and flowered
in the Progressive Era were many, however, and among them was
the message that humans were not responsible for their. behavior, a
message that the legal profession and society at large were un-
willing to accept. For most Americans (I hazard the guess),
Progressive-Era penology came to stand for the idea that rehabilita-
tion involved a process of strengthening the will of persons who, by
reason of one or another social influence, had been unable to resist
the temptation to break the law." Thus, for society as a whole, the
new concepts of human behavior were made compatible with the
traditional notion of free will - a marriage that provided a lasting,
if uneasy, conceptual framework that has survived the decline of
the rehabilitative ideal.9
At the time that Speranza wrote, the major elements of
Progressive-Era penology were still in the theoretical stage; applica-
tion would soon follow. In Speranza's circles, optimism regarding
the new penology was guarded. The lay conclusions that most
Americans wanted to draw about the relationship between free will
and rehabilitation seem not to have concerned most behavioral and
medical scientists: For the moment, at least, it was the principles of
treatment that counted - and the question whether these were
headed for general acceptance and for the political support crucial
to obtaining funds for institutions and properly trained personnel.10
Speranza's 1901 article, however, had to do not so much with
penology as with a related matter: legal insanity. The principles of
the new science applied to one as they applied to the other, but the
two matters differed in what proved to be important ways. For law,
8. DAvID . ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: Trm AsYLum AND rrs ALTER.
NATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AmERuCA 50 (1980). For a more general discussion, see id. at 43-
81. Rothman does not venture the precise supposition I have made in my generalizing ac-
count. See also Haney, supra note 6. Haney would, I believe, apply a version of this perspec-
tive to many of the new scientists as well
9. See Au.EN, supra note 6, at 32-59.
10. See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 8 (discussing the political dynamics behind the
rise of the treatment ideal).
1922 [Vol. 93:191S
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for lawyers, and for the public at large, the science of human behav-
ior posed far greater problems with regard to the insanity defense
than with regard to the punishment - I should say, the treatment
and cure - of convicts, even though the insanity defense involved
far fewer persons. Why should this have been so?
It is important to understand that in American jurisprudence -
indeed, in Western jurisprudence generally - a fundamental bifur-
cation had long been emerging between the trial and punishment
stages of criminal administration. Progressive-Era penology was to
further this split, though the degree to which it did so remains one
of the great gaps in our knowledge of criminal justice administra-
tion. The phenomenon of bifurcation is a central feature of the ap-
proach we take to the criminal law, one of those developments that
tell us a great deal about who we are, or what we seek to be. The
tendencies of mind it reflects are general to our jurisprudence, not
special to the criminal law.
At the level of theory, the bifurcation of criminal process re-
flected the differing ways in which jurists and behavioral scientists
conceptualized criminal responsibility. Despite determinism's in-
roads, at the trial stage the traditional concept of guilt retained -
in intent-based crimes - most of its force, mens rea premised upon
free will. The defendant might have been buffeted by forces over
which he possessed little or no control, but he had - so the theory
ran - retained sufficient determination over his behavior to be
thought of as having acted freely. This idea, with which we are all
familiar, was expressed in various ways in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. In his influential Treatise on Criminal Law, Francis Wharton
put this pact with the angels as follows:
To responsibility (imputability) there are, we must remember, two
constituents: (1) capacity of intellectual discrimination; and (2) free-
dom of will. If there be either incapacity to distinguish between right
and wrong as to the particular act, or delusion as to the act, or inabil-
ity to do or refrain from doing the act, then there is no responsibility.
The difficulty is practical. No matter what may be our speculative
view as to the existence of conscience, or of freedom of action, we are
obliged, when we determine responsibility, to affirm both.'
[Footnote 1: The controversy which divides theologians as well as
metaphysicians as to the freedom of the will is not involved in the
discussion in the text. It may be possible that, from a high metaphysi-
cal point of vision, all acts are necessitated. With this, however, juris-
prudence, which is a practical science, has nothing to do. There have
been indeed leading jurists, such as Feuerbach, who have adopted the
principle of necessity, and have invoked the fear of punishment as a
counter-weight to the temptation to crime.... But this, as is well said
1923June 1995]
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by a leading German author.., takes not only from jurisprudence,
but from life, its moral dignity, making the former a mere marshalling
of mechanisms, and the latter, a mere mechanism of necessities.]"
As applied at trial, the concept of mens rea typically reflected
traditional ideas, long after those ideas had begun to give ground at
the post-trial stage. The conservatism inherent in the legal defini-
tion of criminal responsibility presents itself clearly: one has only to
consider the narrowness of the two legal categories that constituted
the main defenses of unfreedom - duress and insanity. Duress re-
quired a threat, or reasonable belief in the threat, of direct and dire
physical harm - a gun-to-the-head example would overstate the
case, but not by much. 12 Legal insanity generally required lack of
knowledge of what one was doing, or of the fact that it was wrong,
though by Speranza's time, a fair number of states allowed re-
course, under some circumstances, to the so-called irresistible im-
pulse test. The classic formulation of that test required a causal
nexus between a preexisting mental disease and the suspension of
the defendant's control over his behavior.13 Long-standing diseases
of the brain that did not obliterate one's cognitive capacities or re-
sult in severe delusion or destroy self-control did not meet these
tests; nor did many other mental states that medical scientists gen-
erally classified as insanity in the context of civil commitment. If
prevailing rules regarding legal insanity typically excluded the klep-
tomaniac, a fortiori they excluded the great mass of defendants who
had been indicted for property offenses and whose only claims in
11. 1 FRANCIs WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CnmnNAL LAW 51-53 (8th ed. 1880). This
formulation was retained in the 9th edition (1885) at Vol. 1, page 53; the 10th edition (1896)
at Vol. 1, page 49; the 11th edition (1912) at Vol. 1, page 65; the 12th edition (1932) at Vol. 1,
page 70. An editorial note in the American Law Review put the matter rather differently:
In the most general sense, no man can refrain from doing what he does. In an absolute
sense, no man is a free moral agent, any more than a grain of sand which drifts in the
wind is a free moral agent; but every act which a man does is, when done, the result of a
series of causes which have existed throughout all time. When men get sense enough to
understand this, then the right to punish crime will rest upon a different ground from
that upon which it is now placed.... The sheet-anchor in this conflict of opinion is this:
the foundation of will is intelligence, - knowledge, or the power to know; when that is
possessed, the law must conclusively presume that the power of self-restraint exists along
with it, and must act and punish upon this assumption.
19 AM. L. Rnv. 765 (1885).
12. 1 WHARTON, supra note 11, (8th ed. 1880) at 130; see also 1 id, (10th ed. 1896) at 117.
For the contemporary English rule, see Sm JAmas FrrznAM.S STEPtmN, A GENERAL VIEW
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 69-70 (2d ed. 1890). Stephen describes the rule as
"narrowly limited and somewhat capricious." Id at 69. He states that it does not cover a
murder defendant who shows that his own life was threatened if he did not commit the act,
for if it did: "Criminals might commit offences with impunity by threatening others." He
noted, however, that "the fact of compulsion may always be taken into account in reduction
of punishment." Id. at 70.
13. Parsons v, State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887). On the law of insanity at the end of the
nineteenth century, see 1 WHARTON, supra note 11, at 49-73 (10th ed. 1896).
1924 [V/ol. 93:1915
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mitigation - had they been allowed to make them - would have
been based on poverty, lack of education, the influence of evil asso-
dates, or other essentially social circumstances.
The criminal trial represented a first stage in the criminal pro-
cess at which the law, reflecting general social mores, insisted upon
the existence of free will; this stage, wherein guilt or innocence was
assessed, was, as always, a morality play that confirmed our deepest
longings about who we are as human beings. The trial took this
construction despite the fact that those found guilty were immedi-
ately turned over to a sentencing process wherein they were often
viewed largely (by no means entirely) as victims of biological or
social circumstances. At this second, "individualized" stage of the
criminal process (at least according to the ideal) information about
the convicted defendant's background, upbringing, associates, and
so on - matters rarely formally admissible during the trial - be-
came relevant. Progressive-Era penology aspired to the creation of
a large bureaucracy dedicated to gathering, sifting, and analyzing
such data and to a bench prepared to pass judgment regarding sen-
tence case-by-case on the basis of that information.14' Juries, aided
14. RoT-uMAN, supra note 8, at 43-81. Rothman's account reports contemporary ideals
rather more than actual practices.
One leading criminologist of the 1930s both criticized the half-hearted application of the
new penology and commented sardonically upon what I have termed the "bifurcation" of
trial and sentencing.
And so we witness the strange spectacle of a defendant being indicted and tried for a
specific offense, the only issue being whether or not the crime was committed, for which
the legislative prescribes a definite punishment, and a history of the background of the
offender furnished by the probation department which is generally irrelevant and may
not be introduced at the trial. The stark inconsistency in spirit between the criminal law
seeking to punish for guilt and the administrative device of probation seeking rehabilita-
tion of the offender is blurred by slipping the probation report to the judge before sen-
tence is imposed.
Nathaniel Cantor, Conflicts in Penal Theory and Practice, 26 . C0M. L. & CRIMINOLOoY
[hereinafter J.C.L.C.] 330, 334 (1935). I referred to the phenomenon of bifurcation at the
close of my study of the English criminal trial jury. See THOMAS ANDR.w GREEN, VERnicr
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-
1800, at 383 (1985). Others have noted the same or an analogous phenomenon. See, e.g.,
DAVID GARLAND, PunisHmrs r AND W YAE: A HSTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 190
(1985) (contrasting 'judicial' and 'administrative' processes in early-twentieth-century Brit-
ain); ALAN NoRRm, CRIME, REASON AN HIsroRY: A CR1 CAL INTRODUCrION TO CRnIM-
NALr LAW 46 (1993) (contrasting trial and subsequent mitigation of sentence in English
Practice). Norrie states:
The possibility of mitigation of sentence is a marvelous mechanism for allowing the crim-
inal process to "have its cake and eat it." Having convicted the accused by a strict,
unbending set of rules, the rule books are cleared away and judicial or governmental
discretion comes in to do "real" justice to the individual, or to temper legal justice with
mercy.
t Another example can be found in F.A. WHrmocK, CRIINAL RnsPONSmrY AND
MENrAL ILLNSS 71 (1963) ("It is, perhaps, in the realm of penology that the law is most apt
to fall back on determinist principles whereas the psychiatrist, with his concern for the indi-
vidual, is most likely to try by his own special methods to get the offender to accept the
responsibilities of the adult.").
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by clever lawyers or the defendant's "demeanor," often drew their
own inferences regarding such matters, achieving a kind of "individ-
ualization" that leavened the law and tracked the new penology in a
rough-and-ready fashion - serving unselfconsciously, one might
say, to mediate the conflicting paradigms of criminal justice. None-
theless, the point remains: The law of evidence regarding guilt or
innocence reflected one concept of human behavior; the new penol-
ogy - ideas about the appropriate treatment of offenders who
have run the gauntlet of our blaming instincts and have satisfied our
need that -they carry the stigma of criminal guilt - reflected quite
another. Perhaps we should not be surprised: The paradox exists
today, though a relatively small percentage of criminal defendants
opt for jury trial and though we now retain little of our earlier faith
in our capacities to cure convicts of the ills with which society has
endowed them.
If the law held fast against the onslaught of the new sciences, it
is nonetheless true that some jurists were troubled by peremptory
rejection of the new learning. Even Wharton's formulation may be
said to reflect underlying tensions; such inherently practical stances
must have occasioned tensions in all but the most orthodox. Whar-
ton himself was something of a pioneer among jurists on the ques-
tion of the insanity defense, though his views in this regard were
kept contained by his strong resolve to draw the line against signifi-
cant erosion of the concept of criminal responsibility.15
The complex juristic reaction to the intellectual currents of the
late nineteenth century, which has thus far received little scholarly
attention, can be witnessed in microcosm in a three-part article that
appeared in the Criminal Law Magazine in 1893. Here Omer Her-
shey, a practicing lawyer, addressed the subject of "Criminal An-
thropology. 1 6 Hershey's response to the new learning was, overall,
sympathetic, but presaging themes in both Speranza and Pound, he
criticized the overreach of some of its practitioners and concluded
that, in any case, its practical application to criminal responsibility
remained a matter for the future. 17 More striking is Hershey's ob-
15. See Janet A. Tighe, Francis Wharton and the Nineteenth-Century Insanity Defense:
The Origins of a Reform Tradition, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HmST. 223 (1983).
16. O.F. Hershey, Criminal Anthropology (pts. 1-3), 15 CiuM. L. MAO. & REP. 499, 658,
778 (1893).
17. Id. at 778.
It may well be doubted, however, whether criminal law, with all its shortcomings, has
much to hope from this new science which has come in with such a flourish of trumpets
and such an array of "newly-discovered" natural facts. Criminologists are loud in criti-
cism that is destructive, but silent as to much that is constructive. They offer few reforms
bearing on criminal law as a science or juridical system, and those offered frequently rest
1926 [Vol. 93:1915
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1926 1994-1995
Pound and Criminal Justice
servation that the new science had much to contribute to current
penal practice, if not to the concept of guilt: it exemplifies what I
have called the tendency toward "bifurcation.' ' 8
More striking still is Hershey's assertion that "[a] man without
any intention to commit a crime, may, nevertheless, have the crimi-
nal intent, the mens rea, necessary to make his act a crime. Crimi-
nal intent is determined from acts alone and not from any
psychologic tests."' 9 If the legally insane are not punished, Hershey
claimed, it is "because they have no mens at all."'20 In Hershey's
view, the "penological criterion" of the criminal law was "social ne-
cessity; its measure of justice the safety of society."21 Thus, he
stated, "Crime may be organic, but the only definite meaning a law-
yer or legislator can attach to it, is that it is an act or omission pun-
ishable by law." 22 A few others fended off the scientists' charge of
irrationality by denying the relevance of retribution and stressing
instead the purely utilitarian side of criminal justice as a social de-
fense, 2 which had long been one element in classical criminal juris-
prudence. But few invoked Hershey's theory of the core meaning
of mens rea when they addressed serious, intent-based harms - for
example, most forms of homicide, assault, or theft - the offenses
on bias and misconception. They fail to recognize the difference between a purely scien-
tific treatment of crime and the practical treatment which it must receive under the law.
Science and law cannot afford to be hostile, but neither can they hope to move arm in
arm. Science moves rapidly, its mistakes are easily corrected and its consequences are
remote. Not so law. It changes slowly and carries immediate responsibility. It must be
certain, and, therefore, more or less arbitrary.
Id.
18. Id. at 783-84.
If criminal anthropology is not likely to have much influence on the great body of
criminal jurisprudence, its value in the larger question of crime and criminals cannot be
over-estimated. Crime can best be combated by discovering and removing its causes. In
the penal reforms like those just mentioned the great practical value of the new science
is supposed to lie in its ability to discriminate between criminal and criminal and to apply
to each individual case its proper treatment. An anthropological examination is to de-
termine the status of the criminal, his proper treatment and the time and conditions of
his liberation. If the science can do this, criminal law has no fault to find. Whether it can
do more, time will show.
Id.
19. Id. at 780.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 779.
22. Id. at 778.
23. See, e.g., Charles Dudley Warner, Some Aspects of the Indeterminate Sentence 8 YALE
LJ. 219, 220 (1899) ("[N]o human discretion is adequate to mete out just punishment for
crimes; and it has come to be admitted generally, by men enlightened on this subject, that the
real basis for dealing with the criminal rests, firstly upon the right of society to secure itself
against the attacks of the vicious, and secondly upon the duty imposed upon society to re-
form the criminal if that is possible.").
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to which criminal anthropology primarily directed its attention.24
Despite the fact that punishment-as-deterrence might well imply a
deterministic understanding of human psychology, one suspects
that most late-nineteenth-century, deterrence-oriented social de-
fense jurists would have rejected a strong theory of determinism,
which they probably viewed as, at best, no more verifiable than
"free will," and defended the law's underlying "presumption" of
human freedom.
In truth, we do not yet know what most jurists thought regard-
ing all of the questions Hershey had raised. The legal profession as
a whole may well have mirrored society at large, translating the pre-
sumption of free will regarding responsibility into the justification
of retribution regarding punishment. (That is what the new scien-
tists charged and what, quite evidently, some of the leading Pro-
gressive legal academics came to believe.) To be sure, some judges,
law-trained penologists, and legal academics reflected varying levels
and aspects of the "scientific" perspective. By the time Hershey
wrote, cracks had appeared - and at some points widened - in
the legal monolith. The faults in the conventional bedrock legal
presumption of human freedom were no doubt a matter of common
knowledge in juristic circles. Yet, then as now, wisdom counseled
against head-on confrontation: witness Holmes's circumlocutions
of the preceding decade.25 Sometimes wisdom even counseled an
24. Hershey himself cited a recent article on mens rea which stated that mens rea "applies
only to persons legally capable of... acting voluntarily," and that
[s]ilence as to intent in the statutory definition of a crime, is itself to be construed as an
exclusion of it as an element of the crime, in enactments whose purpose is the establish-
ment and enforcement of police and sanitary regulations for the safety, moral and physi-
cal, of the public at large, provided that the purposes to be accomplished bear a
reasonable proportion to the penalties that may be inflicted upon innocent persons.
G.A. Endlich, The Doctrine of Mens Rea, 13 CiuM. L. MAG. 831, 844 (1891). For a discussion
of competing approaches to the role and meaning of mens rea in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, see Gerald Leonard, Public Wrong and Vicious Will in Nineteenth-Century Statutory
Rape Law: The Evolution of the Mental Element in the Age of the Codification of Criminal
Law (unpublished paper on file with author).
25. OUVER WENDELL HouEs, Tim COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881). I read Holmes as skeptical about human autonomy, as recognizing (with some diffi-
dence) the widespread notion of relative degrees of freedom, as when he suggests that: "If
punishment stood on the moral grounds which are proposed for it, the first thing to be con-
sidered would be those limitations in the capacity for choosing rightly which arise from ab-
normal instincts, want of education, lack of intelligence, and all the other defects which are
most marked in the criminal classes." Id. at 38. But there is support for reading Holmes's
apparent allusions to the true freedom of some persons as mere lip service in a still earlier
passage: "The desire for vengeance imports an opinion that its object is actually and person-
ally to blame. It takes an internal standard not an objective or external one, and condemns
its victim by that. The question is whether such a standard is still accepted either in this
primitive form, or in some more refined development, as is commonly supposed, and as
seems not impossible, considering the relative slowness with which the criminal law has im-
proved." Id. at 35. For an important related discussion of Holmes, see RicHARD A. POSNER,
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exaggerated insistence upon true orthodoxy: To take the most ob-
vious example, law tended to follow general social perspectives on
freedom of the will in the context of the trial of the assassin
Guiteau.26
From this remove, it is difficult to tell just how completely po-
larized the worlds of law and science were in the last decades of the
century. What we can discern in at least a general way is that in
Speranza's day - at the fin de siecle - some medical and behav-
ioral scientists were greatly agitated about what they deemed to be
the atavism of the law. In their view, Americans hewed to an out-
dated notion of human behavior, premised criminal law on a false
concept of guilt, and based punishment on primitive feelings of re-
venge. Although the scientists may have thought that these mis-
taken tendencies were slowly giving way - especially with regard
to penology - they probably perceived that there was little likeli-
hood that the concept of mens rea would itself be reformed. For
many medical scientists, this posed a special problem: as expert
witnesses in insanity cases, they were confronted with legal defini-
tions that did not match medical conceptions of human behavior.27
But for all of these new scientists, the problem was essentially the
same. Criminal guilt assumed free will, and for the scientist - who
was trained to ascertain the causes of mental states and acts - that
concept of criminal responsibility was, at best, problematic. Why
distinguish among causes; why deem only some symptoms relevant?
What was - in a world of causes and effects - "free" agency?
Speranza's article was meant - in this heated atmosphere - to
console, to induce patience and understanding. His words - at
greater length than I have as yet given them - were as follows:
There is one barrier, however, that appears insurmountable, as to
which, while it stands, law and medicine may declare a truce, but can
agree to no terms of peace; I refer to that most ancient and greatest of
questions - the freedom of the will.
The study of man from the physiologic standpoint has an un-
doubted tendency to make him, in the eyes of his investigator, a crea-
THm PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 168-69 (1990). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity
and Mercy, 22 Pi. & PUB. ArF. 83, 111-15 (1993).
26. See ROSENBERG, supra note 6.
27. lighe, supra note 6, at 203-26, 234-92. In the first three chapters of her dissertation
lighe ably relates the debate over insanity (and its relationship to the free-wil issue) from
the middle of the nineteenth century until the last decade or so of the century. See also
JANs C. MOHR, DocroRs AND THE LAW. MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINErEENTH-CEN-
TuRY AamsucA 176-79, 197-212, 234-36 (1993); ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 66-70;
Hovenkamp, supra note 6.
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ture of forces beyond its control. Man in this aspect ceases to be a
free agent in the eyes of the student ....
•.. It will hardly be denied that the tendency of psycho-physical
study of man must be towards a denial of spirit.
Law, on the other hand, stands pre-eminently for the freedom of
the will. Without this as a foundation-stone juridic science has no
existence, for the very test of juridic responsibility is man's power of
choice. To this the juridic philosopher brings the sentiment of human-
ity, the teachings of metaphysics and the experience of history, which
are repugnant to the physical measurement of the soul; he contends
that after you have taken man's brains to pieces you have not yet
found his mind; that molecular interaction may be demonstrated as
the physical counterpart of thought, but it is not thought....
I am not taking sides on this question: I am endeavoring to pres-
ent the position of each party and its sources of strength. Unless we
recognize this no fair judgment can be made. This is an age of special-
ization, and the curse of specialization is that it distorts proportions
and narrows the horizon in mental life.
Medicine is essentially a positive science: it is based on the obser-
vation of physical phenomena. Law is one of the humanities: it is [in
Holmes's words] the "witness and external deposit of our moral life.
Its history is the history of the moral development of the race." The
doctor and the jurist too often forget the many-sidedness of man. The
mental pathologist is dazzled by the discoveries regarding the physical
basis of mind and his mental equation thereupon blinds his judgment.
On the other hand, lawyers make too much use of logic, forgetting
that [Holmes again] the "life of the law has not been logic, but experi-
ence."...
Can these opposing forces be turned into a common stream of
usefulness? Can this medico-legal conflict be brought to a settlement
which will be neither a mere working truce nor a concession to eclec-
ticism, but an agreement based on reason and scientific data?
... [I]t will be one step towards an agreement, if law and medicine
will become mutually more tolerant, and will give to their opponents'
views serious and impartial study.
The language of Dr. Carlos F. Macdonald is none too strong when
he tells lawyers that "to set up a legal test or standard of insanity
which is not in harmony with the teachings of medical science.., is a
disgrace to jurisprudence and a travesty upon justice." (American
Journal of Insanity, Vol. LVI., 1899.) On the other hand, doctors
would do well to ponder over Mr. [Edward] Payson's words when he
says that law by its conservatism has "shunned many a quagmire, de-
tected many a false light and stood fast against many an onslaught of
ism and ology on the road of human progress."
Let neither the doctors nor the lawyers draw an impassable and
inflexible line around their respective fields of investigation, but let
them work in common for a common end. No mere doctor, and no
mere lawyer, will be the one master that will solve the problem of
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mental responsibility in law .... The Great Pacificator in this
medico-legal conflict will be he who ... will serenely and persistently
strive for the study of man as he is in his many aspects ... it will be he,
who, knowing the dangers and impracticability of endeavoring to
solve human problems by adhering to theories and ideals, is neverthe-
less confident that without theories and ideals the hope and certainty
of progress are idle and vain boasts.28
Are you consoled? Was Speranza? These are noble thoughts ele-
gantly stated, but that should not deter us from asking: Was Sper-
anza being sincere? At first blush, we may harbor doubts. There is
perhaps too much poetry and too little rock-hard meaning in Sper-
anza's plea for reconciliation, tolerance, and cooperation. What do
we know about Speranza? What light can we shed on his Medico-
Legal Conflict article from an examination of his other writings?
Speranza was born in Connecticut in 1872, the son of Italian
immigrants. His father taught Italian literature at Columbia but
frequently took the family back to Verona where Gino began
school, gained fluency in Italian, and became imbued with a sense
of his heritage. Returning to America in 1881, he undertook his
undergraduate studies at City College and his legal education at
New York University. Speranza's legal career was probably partly
defined by his Italian childhood and identification. Within three
years of his graduation from law school in 1894, Speranza became
legal counsel to the Italian consulate general in New York. Soon
after, he began to devote much of his time and energy to the bur-
geoning Italian immigrant community, specifically to the legal
problems of the immigrants. Speranza's early embrace of Italian
distinctiveness and cultural pluralism gave way, perhaps even
before World War I, to espousal of thoroughgoing assimilation. His
early writings dealt mainly with criminal jurisprudence and penol-
ogy, his later work with crime and immigration and, finally - in
what has been described as an act of "self-denial" - with the vir-
tues of Americanization.29
28. Speranza, supra note 5, at 125-26 (citation omitted). Speranza's reference to Payson's
work refers to EDWARD PAYSON, SUGGESTIONS ToWARDs AN APPLED SCam cE OF SoCoIL-
oGY 176 (1898), and Speranza's phrase, "The Great Pacificator," was, of course, derived from
the popular reference to the Antebellum master of political compromise, Henry Clay.
29. Louis C. Anthes, Race or Nation: An Italian-American's Critique of Immigration
(Sept. 28, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Anthes focuses on the
roots and maturation of Speranza's views regarding Americanization. Anthes uses the term
"self-denial" at page 27. For details regarding Speranza's early life, see id. at 3-4. I am
grateful to Mr. Anthes for allowing me to cite his unpublished essay. See also Arthur Living-
ston, Gino Speranza: The Evolution of An American, in 1 T-m DranY OF GINo SPERANZA
ix, ix-xxvii (Florence Colgate Speranza ed., 1941); George E. Pozzetta, Gino C. Speranza:
Reform and the Immigran4 in REFORM AND REFORMERS IN THE PRoGRSSIVE ERA 47
(David R. Colbur & George E. Pozzetta eds., 1983).
June 1995] 1931
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1931 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
Although Speranza was trained as a lawyer in the United States,
he seems to have absorbed in his earlier years a substantial back-
ground in continental history and political thought. At some point
- perhaps while in law school - he read and was influenced by
continental legal ideas, especially the new criminal anthropology
and jurisprudence. From these sources he developed a behavioral
science perspective, an impatience with the Anglo-American ap-
proach to jurisprudence generally and to criminal justice in particu-
lar. That impatience - better to call it hostility - is reflected in
his earliest writings, occasional pieces on the Italian penal code of
1888, penology, and the relationship between the principles of sci-
ence and those of the common-law tradition.
The young Speranza, then, was something of an anomaly: an
American lawyer with a continental background and a powerful
continental jurisprudential disposition. In common with many fin
de siacle American lawyers, he saw penal reform as not only a legal,
but a social and political movement of great importance. But as we
shall see, Speranza's perspective carried him far beyond the point
to which most American jurists were inclined to go in the direction
of the new sciences. He became, as I see him, mainly an outsider, a
lawyer in league with behavioral scientists and, to a significant de-
gree, at war with his own American profession. The 1901 article
called for a truce. But, again, on what terms? We shall assess the
nature of the campaigns that preceded and followed it.
Two of Speranza's earlier writings - one from 1899, one from
1900 - are of special interest in relation to the later piece. The
first and the more scholarly of the two was a paper read before the
Society of Medical Jurisprudence, entitled "Natural Law Versus
Statutory Law."30 By "Natural Law" Speranza meant the laws of
nature that are discoverable through scientific observation and
analysis - not the more traditional natural law of religion and phi-
losophy that for centuries had been defined as the moral laws
designed by God and knowable to man through God-given powers
of reason. By "Statutory Law" Speranza meant the principles of
juridical, as opposed to natural, science - historically based and
time-tested principles that had either been embedded in statute or
retained force as nonstatutory common law. These juridical princi-
ples had been received and elaborated upon by jurists and legisla-
30. Gino C. Speranza, Natural Law Versus Statutory Law, 59 ALB. LJ. 400 (1899). Sper-
anza drew his title from language - quoted in his article at 404 - used by F.H. Wines. See
FEDmucK HowARD WINES, PUNiSHmENT AND REFoRmA7ON: AN HISTOIRCAL SKETcH
oF THE RISE oF Tim PENrrENTiARY SYsTEM 263-64 (1895).
1932 [Vol. 93:1915
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1932 1994-1995
Pound and Criminal Justice
tors. In the process, some of the discoveries of natural science had
accounted for incremental changes, but in the main, Speranza
seems to have believed, legal science remained traditional and pre-
cedent-based: Natural science had been assimilated by juridical sci-
ence only to the extent that it could be made to conform to the
precepts of juridical science.
Speranza's attack on juridical science was unrelenting: "Venera-
bility is its pride, stare decisis its demigod. It is conservative almost
to the point of stagnation. '31 It bases
its decisions on antiquated and discarded theories... finding justice
not so much in the appreciation of facts in a new and modem light,
but in the decisions of judges, dead or living, whose claim to authority
at times arises from the fortuitous circumstance of having occupied
the bench of the highest tribunal of the land!32
The contrast between juridical and natural science was, therefore,
stark: "The charlatans of the Middle Ages and the quacks of more
recent times were oftentimes honest men, and, measured by the ig-
norance of their surroundings, they may even be called learned
men. Yet do our modem physicians follow their prescriptions?" 33 I
trust I need not continue in this vein.
Speranza's critique turned in the direction of a fairly conven-
tional plea for an utterly positivist approach to criminology and pe-
nology. 4 His claim that "our classic jurisprudence, has studied the
crime and practically failed to study the criminal" can be found in
numerous contemporary works.3 5 His optimism and his confidence
in the new sciences of the day were nearly unbounded, as were
those of his audience, the members of the Society of Medical Juris-
prudence. Even his cautionary remarks about those scientists who,
caught up in one or another fashionable new theory, allowed their
"convictions to blind [their] judgment"36 had been sounded fre-
quently in scientific circles. Speranza's target - a quite common
one - was Lombroso, whose criminal anthropology carried over
31. Speranza, supra note 30, at 400.
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id.
34. Speranza claimed: "I am not here to defend [the "Positive School's"] theories or to
attack its critics, but merely to state its method of research and to describe its field of activ-
ity." Id. at 402. He quickly dropped this pretense of neutrality.
35. Id. at 401. See also HENRY M. Boms, Tim ScrENcE OF PENOLOGY: THE DmENSE OF
Socal-n AGAINsT CRvi 90-92 (1901); WniLLAm DOUGLAS MORRMSON, CRIME AND ITS
CAUSES, at v-x (London, Swan, Sonnenschein 1891); MAuRIcE PARMELE, THE PuRcaimps
OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SoCIoLoGy n4 THmm RELATIONS TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14-20(1908).
36. Speranza, supra note 30, at 403.
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elements of the earlier "science" of phrenology, including a variant
upon the notion that one could determine personality traits, includ-
ing criminal tendencies, by studying the shape of a person's head.3 7
But Speranza struck a more original note than most other critics in
his treatment of the legal profession's "bias against innovations":
"If you touch our courts," cry the lawyers, "you will destroy the
bulwarks of our liberties; if you change our laws you will endanger
our most cherished principles!" But these are not arguments; they are
the repetition of those wails of despair which well-meaning but
narrow-minded men raised during the so-called conflict between sci-
ence and religion.38
The "wails," the appeals to "the bulwarks of our liberties," were
simply not to be taken seriously.
Nor would they be. The "Positive School of Criminal Jurispru-
dence" would carry the day.
Justice... is truth, absolute truth....
... The conflict between science and jurisprudence, between natu-
ral law and statute law, is unavoidable and irrepressible....
... [It requires no prophetic power to predict that such conflict
will have but one radical though salutary result - it will establish the
fact that it is Truth and not the King that can do no wrong, thus substi-
tuting an axiom for an assumption as the cornerstone of juridic
science.
Science has destroyed empires of venerable theories ... let us
hope that the kingdom of scientific law is at hand!39
This does not sound like the consoling counsel of compromise that
Speranza wrote for the benefit of a mainly legal audience two years
later. But, then, the later paper had in fact envisioned a near-total
victory on the part of science. Only the one, irreducible problem of
free will could never truly be solved - save by mutual agreement
not to agree - and there is no sign that Speranza had seen this
37. For a lengthy discussion of Lombroso, see Hershey, supra note 16, at 500-04, 658-61.
Hershey concludes, inter alia. "It may be added that even admitting that the criminal has
abnormal physical peculiarities, Lombroso goes much too far in concluding that these consti-
tute him a type." Id. at 661.
38. Speranza, supra note 30, at 401.
39. Id at 403-04. Speranza understood that science still had a long way to go: "Criminol-
ogy is still in its infancy ...." Id. at 403. In an earlier article, Speranza had expressed some
doubt about the practical application of science to law. Commenting on the Italian Penal
Code's test of responsibility, Speranza stated: "Tlbe test is, of course, far from perfect, far
from precise. It is doubtful, indeed, if legislators will ever be able to formulate a satisfactory
definition of this difficult question. Scientific definitions of criminal responsibility have been
too technical or abstruse to be of much practical use, and yet the question is eminently a
scientific one." Gino C. Speranza, Criminal Responsibility under Italian Law, 55 ALB. W.
411, 414 (1897).
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point before 1901. It was as though the scientist-lawyer, in 1901,
stood before his legal colleagues, much chastened by new insight,
and appealed over their heads to the scientists to join him in his
campaign to make peace with the juristic tradition. What was the
source of this insight that brought Speranza to his Canossa?
Not long after he addressed the Society of Medical Jurispru-
dence in April, 1899, Speranza published an article in the February,
1900, issue of Popular Science Monthly, in which he addressed an
educated public on "The Decline of Criminal Jurisprudence in
America. '40 Speranza's subject was not simply the conflict between
law and science, but the difference between the continental, or
"Latin," approach to criminal jurisprudence and that of England
and America, the "Anglo-Saxon" approach. From the perspective
of the turn of the century, it appeared to Speranza that, however
good the eventual prospects of the new science might be, the great
advances in criminal jurisprudence of the Italian and French schools
of the preceding decades were losing the influence they had at-
tained in Anglo-American circles at the time of their first appear-
ance. In reality, the story was not so much one of decline as of a
failure of the new science to take hold after a promising debut.
Speranza's article reflected disappointment as well as criticism,
but it reflected, too, a grudging appreciation of the Anglo-Saxons'
great contributions to law and justice. The readers of Popular Sci-
ence Monthly were no doubt pleased to hear at the outset that
"[t]he rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private prop-
erty have been called the 'rights of the people of England,'" and
"[w]hile, in a certain sense, they belong to all civilized people, yet,
in their practical application, they are peculiarly the creation of
Anglo-Saxon common sense and love of order.141 Speranza
pointed out that on the Continent the attempt to vindicate these
rights - "clothed by the Latins in the seductive garb of Libert,
Egalitd, Fraternitg" - "gave us a Reign of Terror, a Commune, and
finally a doubtful republicanism," while the Anglo-Saxons, employ-
ing "the less dazzling formula, 'That no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,'" achieved
"more enduring democracies 'of the people, by the people, and for
the people.' "42 The Anglo-Saxons found in courts of law "the high-
est safeguard for their ancient rights" against the threats posed by a
40. Gino C. Speranza, The Decline of Criminal Jurisprudence in America, 56 PopULAR
SCI. MoNmHy 466 (1900).
41. Id. at 466.
42. Id.
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"partisan Legislature and a tyrannical Executive. '43 It was natural,
then, "that it has become a belief, having the force of faith, that in
our courts will be found the bulwark of those liberties which we
consider essential to the full enjoyment of life." 44 We may wonder
how many of Speranza's readers had read his address to the Society
of Medical Jurisprudence, which had just been reprinted in the
pages of the Albany Law Journal,45 where the author mocked the
notion of judicial bulwarks of liberty as a fraudulent excuse for not
embracing a more properly scientific approach to the law.
To be sure, as in the earlier paper, Speranza criticized Anglo-
Saxon justice as too slow to put law on a scientific footing. He is-
sued a report card on Americans' progress in basing the criminal
law - the branch of law on which "we must rely for the enuncia-
tion of what acts shall constitute a breach of the right of life, liberty,
and property"46 - on the "highest dictates of human knowl-
edge."47 Our record, Speranza confided to his readers, was poor.
Law schools, for example, devoted little time to the teaching of
criminal law; faculty members who taught the subject did not spe-
cialize in it - for example, the professor who taught criminal law at
Michigan, Speranza reported, also taught bills and notes. Both
young lawyers and the community at large were cynical about crim-
inal courts, criminal defendants, and the criminal bar. On the Con-
tinent, "where less boast is made of inalienable rights," the situation
was the reverse: "[I]t is the ambition of all lawyers to get a reputa-
tion at the criminal bar."4  The Anglo-Saxons - and here Sper-
anza meant mainly Americans - were failing in their duty to
safeguard the fundamental rights for which they were famous. It
was a gentle and respectful but thorough scolding.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Speranza, supra note 30.
46. Speranza, supra note 40, at 467.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id. at 469. Compare O.F. Hershey's statement:
In England and America there seems to be a natural antagonism between the medical
and scientific on the one hand, and the legal or judicial on the other. It is different on
the continent. There some of the staunchest advocates of the value of medico-legal and
scientific investigations are prominent lawyers and judges. The first ambition of the new
science is to overcome this antagonism. It has no ambition to do away with law. The
study of criminology and medical jurisprudence is to be introduced in law schools, and is
to be made one of the requirements of admission to criminal practice. A special training
on the subject is to be required of magistrates and judges. They are to study law books
less and criminals more. They are to be more than merely jurists.
Hershey, supra note 16, at 780-81 (citation omitted).
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The transition from Speranza's Society of Medical Jurispru-
dence address to his 1901 article in The Green Bag was well under
way by the time he wrote the intermediate Popular Science article.
No doubt, the intended audience had something to do with the
changed tone and perspective. But the conclusion seems irresisti-
ble: Speranza was - perhaps due to a rethinking occasioned by
the forum for which he wrote - taking the Anglo-American rights-
oriented tradition more seriously. There were costs to society from
hide-bound adherence to tradition; but that adherence had, after
all, prevented sudden radical innovations that might have concen-
trated too much power in a single person or in an institution be-
holden to popular passions of the day. Conservatism and basic
freedom had, roughly speaking, been blood brothers in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition. The problem was, as Speranza now saw it, that the
Anglo-Saxons were in danger of sacrificing all they had achieved on
the altar of mindless traditionalism. Some sensible accommodation
between modem science and traditional rights must therefore be
reached, especially in criminology. Speranza noted that under the
prevailing American system of criminal justice, many defendants
were sentenced to prison who ought to have received psychiatric
treatment under conditions of civil commitment, and many others
who were acquitted on "technicalities" that "save scoundrels"
ought to have gone to prison.49 The more rational system of the
Continent, where the new sciences were respected within legal cir-
cles, was a guide to be followed. But, Speranza seems to be saying,
its lessons in tyranny should not thereby be overlooked.
Thus, we ought to take seriously the concluding, pious invoca-
tions of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in Speranza's 1901 paper. Let
me recall his words, or those of Edward Payson, whom he quoted.
Law, Payson wrote, with respect to the Anglo-American tradition,
had "shunned many a quagmire, detected many a false light and
stood fast against an onslaught of ism and ology on the road of
human progress. ' 50 Speranza had, evidently, been much influenced
- converted, perhaps? - by Payson, whose recent book inciden-
tally and half-heartedly sounded a theme that helped to explain,
and justify, the cautious approach to continental science taken by
the American legal profession.5 1 Speranza, himself, was, of course,
cautious in his approach to this emerging rationalization of the
American legal profession's perspective; he balanced it, you may
49. Speranza, supra note 40, at 472.
50. Speranza, supra note 5, at 126.
51. PAYsoN, supra note 28.
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recall, against the injunction that" 'to set up a legal test or standard
of insanity which is not in harmony with the teachings of medical
science... is a disgrace to jurisprudence and a travesty upon jus-
tice.' "52 In this caution and balancing Speranza sought a middling,
best-of-both-worlds position, one that both accorded the realities of
nature their due and respected the deepest yearnings for human
freedom. Irrational treatment of criminal defendants he would not
abide; yet, in the service of liberty, the concept of free will ought to
retain a place at the core of the legal - not the scientific - con-
ception of human behavior.53
Although we may conclude that Speranza's consoling compro-
mise was sincerely meant, we must also recognize that it was more
wishful thinking than a practicable or coherent program. Where
would one draw the line between the reforms that science de-
manded in the defense of fundamental rights and those repugnant
to the concept of human freedom, also crucial to the defense of
those rights? For all one could say, the American system of crimi-
nal justice already drew the appropriate line: Any reform of the
seeming irrationality of criminal justice, one might maintain, could
have begun an irreversible movement toward an undermining of
the concept of freedom. Who can ever say whether we paid a
higher cost for our concept of freedom than the marketplace of
human ideas actually required?
From the perspective of history, we can draw some conclusions.
We know that the movement of which Speranza was a part fed into
a larger, more politically based, movement for the reform of Ameri-
can institutions, including those of criminal justice. Indeed, as of
1901, the reform of Progressive-era penology was already under
way. As it turned out, there was room for change, even dramatic
52. Speranza, supra note 5, at 126 (quoting Dr. Carlos F. Macdonald).
53. Not all lawyers who were intrigued by the new sciences ultimately compromised on
the free-will issue with regard to the guilt-assessment stage. Two legal writers recommended
that the jury determine solely whether the defendant committed the "act" with which he had
been charged. Charles Curry would then have a group of experts classify the defendant "as a
mad, born, habitual or occasional criminal, or a criminal of passion, and then the court should
sentence him for an indefinite time, or suspend his sentence according to the nature of the
case, and the history, condition and character of the offender." Charles Curry, Criminals and
Their Treatment, 36 AM. L REv. 10, 22 (1902). Ethan Dausman would then have the jury
answer a second question: whether or not the defendant could "be safely permitted to re-
main at liberty without injury to the welfare of society." If the jury found that the defendant
could not be safely released, the court would sentence him for an indefinite period. Ethan A.
Dausman, Crime and Criminals, 36 AM. L. REv. 661, 678 (1902). Possibly, both Curry and
Dausman were building upon suggestions for jury-based determination regarding the "act"
that had long been part of the debate over use of experts to determine the "criminal" ele-
ment in legal-insanity cases.
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change.5 4 But we can also now see how much - from the scientific
point of view - got compromised along the way. Americans made
some significant attempts to reform their penology, but they stood
fast with regard to the criminal trial and the legal definition of crim-
inal responsibility, thus deepening the bifurcation of the two main
stages of criminal process and increasing at least the appearance of
irrationality.55
The rejection of a thoroughgoing "scientific" approach - in the
name of a defense of both the concept of free will and the principle
of political liberty - exacted costs and accrued benefits that can
never be weighed and evaluated, save through the lens of our own
political preferences. We can, however, identify one "benefit" of
the traditionalism pervading Progressive-era penology that most of
us would count very heavily on the positive side. I mention it be-
cause it both brings us to another of Speranza's deepest concerns
and reminds us of an enduring aspect of the "Anglo-Saxon" ap-
proach to human freedom and social justice.
You will recall that the new schools of behavioral science were
divided on the practical applications of their theories. Among the
matters on which there was disagreement was the question, what to
do with incorrigibles? Who were "incorrigibles"? According to the
new scientists, heredity or environment or disease of the brain
could produce a propensity to engage in behavior that the state de-
fined as criminal. In some cases, this propensity was reversible, in
others not; scientists differed in their assessment both of the pathol-
ogy involved and of the likelihood of response to those currently
available treatments. All agreed that some persons would never re-
spond in the manner implied by the concept of "cure," but the uni-
verse of such incorrigibles was different for different students of
human behavior. Moreover, some incorrigibles lacked the cogni-
tive processes necessary for cure, while others possessed those ca-
pacities but were so lacking in social conscience that nothing could
be done. Should all be treated as insane and "humanely" cared for
until they died? Should some be so treated and others not?56
54. See RoTHmAN, supra note 8.
55. This was a largely unacknowledged compromise: most contemporary reformers did
not directly contrast the two stages; they focused on sentencing, as though the issue of crimi-
nal guilt was off-limits, or simply a lost cause.
56. Generally speaking, an author's views on the existence of incorrigibles and the possi-
bility of reforming or curing them were linked to beliefs about the causes of crime. Strict
hereditarians, though rarely suggesting that all criminals were born criminals, usually sup-
ported the notion that incorrigibles required permanent segregation or even execution. See,
e.g., W. DUNCAN MCKiM, HIm rry ArD HUMAN PROGRss 97 (New York, Knickerbocker
Press 1899); Address by Henry Hatch, Crime and Criminals, and What Shall Be Done With
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Americans had long been exposed to the doctrine that criminal
law ought not to be based on revenge or retribution, but ought in-
stead to look to a mixture of cure and prevention. If cure was im-
possible, prevention might still be- an option. Permanent
incarceration was one form of prevention, but, as Americans came
to see over the course of the nineteenth century, it had two draw-
backs. First, it was expensive; second, it was strong medicine for
recidivists whose crimes were relatively minor. The threat of this
degree of incapacitation ("specific deterrence") might deter others
("general deterrence"), but the proportionality between the harm a
convict had caused society and the hardship visited upon him might
offend one's sense of justice. Just how thoroughly "scientific" ought
one to be in the name of prevention?
By 1900, a few American scientists who studied criminal behav-
ior were coming to share a perspective that some continental crimi-
nologists and penologists had introduced into the transatlantic
literature of the late nineteenth century, an extreme and "therapeu-
tic" form of the social defense position. It took the scientific prem-
ises of human behavior and the social policy of prevention to their
logical conclusions; some of the leading behavioral scientists were
among those who now seem to us the most cold-blooded on the
question of remedy. Some favored "benign" - nonretributive -
execution or "elimination"; others counseled permanent incarcera-
tion of recidivists, however minor their recurring crimes. In Anglo-
American circles, the proponents of this form of the social defense
concept could be found among those who had been influenced by
Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism.57 Should we be entirely sur-
prised to find in the American Law Register of 1904 an article by
Gino Speranza that criticized American penology under the title of
The Survival of the Weakest as Exemplified in the Criminal?58
Them, in 1904 PROc. OF THE ANN. CONGRESS OF THE NATL. PRISON ASSN. 302. Environ-
mentalists could express support for the possibility of curing some criminals, with indetermi-
nate sentences to deal with possible incorrigibles. Se4 e.g., Henry Maudsley, The Moral
Sense and Will in Criminals, 2 MEDIc-LEGAL J. 1 (1885). Most often, as Frances Kellor
noted in 1901, American criminologists drew on both the Italian (hereditarian) and French
(environmental) schools in thinking about the causes and, hence, treatment of crime. See
FRANcIs A. KELLOR, EXPERIMENTAL SocIOLoGY. DEsCRUMVE AND ANALYICAL DELiN-
ouENis 1-5 (1901); see also Francis Wayland, Incorrigible Criminals, 23 J. Soc. Sc. 140(1887); Address by Francis Wayland, The Incorrigible - Who He Is, and What Shall Be Done
With Him, in 1886 PROc. OF Trm NATL. PRISON CONGRESS 189, 189-93 (Chicago, Lakeside
Press 1887).
57. See, e.g., HENRY M. Boes, THm SCIENCE OF PENOLOGY (1901); G. FRANK LYDSTON,
THE DISEASES OF SoCImY (1904).
58. Gino Carlo Speranza, The Survival of the Weakest as Exempifed in the Criminal, 43
AM. L. REG. n.s. 159 (1904) [hereinafter Speranza, Survival]. For earlier articles by Speranza
that point in the same direction, see Gino C. Speranza, The Coefficients of Impunity, 39 AM.
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Speranza's 1904 article reflected a mixture of compassion and
severity, of treatment and repression. Prison was inappropriate
and, indeed, counterproductive for those persons who were merely
"mistaken," having been temporarily led astray by social conditions
or circumstances. A system of probation or, at least, early parole
was needed, and Speranza took the opportunity to berate American
penology for its backwardness in this regard. The reforms he fa-
vored were only slowly coming into existence in most states, though
they would soon come, quite universally, with a great rush. As for
the true "criminal class," which was much smaller than most Ameri-
cans recognized,
it deserves most repressive measures against it for the social good....
The truly criminal are a danger, and the hope of reforming them is
almost a negligible quantity....
... [T]he whole juridic framework must be erected on the modem
lines of the social defence. The conception of punishment as a de-
fence to crime has gone into bankruptcy: it neither defends nor de-
ters. Criminal therapeutics must take its place; that is, where a cure is
possible, let the remedial agencies suggested by criminologic and soci-
ologic science have full scope. But where juridic therapeutics fail, let
there be no mistaken altruism to perpetuate the unfittest.59
What Speranza most feared was that the new penology, when it
came, would serve to condition the truly criminal to act as though
they were reformed though in fact they were not, and so make
those least fit for social existence the most adept at negotiating the
conditions of existence in modem society. A proper system of sci-
entific evaluation of human behavior would facilitate the separation
of the treatable from the incorrigibles - the "truly degenerate,"
thus the "truly criminal" in the scientific, not moral, sense - but it
would have to be "based on more reliable, tangible, and positive
tests than the somewhat vague and uncertain theory of the forces of
good and evil in man and their control by the spirit or the will."'60
L. REG. n.s. 647 (1900) [hereinafter Speranza, The Coefficients of Impunity]; Gino C. Sper-
anza, What Are We Doing for the Criminal?, 40 AM. L REG. ns. 215 (1901); Gino C. Sper-
anza, Society's Defense Against the Criminal, 63 ALB. LJ. 12 (1901); Gino Carlo Speranza,
Criminality in Children, 15 GREEN BAG 516 (1903) [hereinafter Speranza, Criminality in
Children].
59. Speranza, Survival, supra note 58, at 163, 165-66. Three years earlier, Speranza had
declared: "Let us hope that the day is near when the volume of our laws, which bears the
title 'Crimes and Their Punishments,' will be replaced by a treatise on 'The Therapeutics of
Crime.' Speranza, What Are We Doing for the Criminal?, supra note 58, at 220.
60. Speranza, Surviva supra note 58, at 166. Speranza was by no means alone among
lawyers in his views regarding penology. See, ag., Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sen-
tence, 9 YALE Li. 17, 27 (1899); see also Warner, supra note 23. Both Lewis and Warner
were leading penologists.
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Thus, in the end Speranza chose science over free will, in this
particular context. The compromise he had recommended three
years earlier regarding assessment of responsibility had given way to
the exigencies of social defense against serious crime regarding de-
termination of treatment. American penology, however, was to
prove only partly responsive to the nonretributive social defense
theorists - whether of the strictly utilitarian or of the scientific-
positivist stripe. Progressive-Era reforms were to reflect a mixture
of new and traditional concepts of human behavior. Many Ameri-
cans favored retention of capital punishment or long-term incarcer-
ation for serious felonies and were skeptical of the naive optimism
on display in the new system of probation, indeterminate sentences,
and parole, as it applied to less serious felonies; they resolutely held
to a notion of retribution. Serious offenders - even incorrigibles
- were morally evil persons who refused to obey the law and who
therefore deserved the worst. Between the most traditional and the
deterministic-social-defense theorists there was a certain shaky alli-
ance of the sort that, in France, had created a "politics of social
defense,"61 but this alliance was based solely on agreement regard-
ing results, and only with respect to incorrigibles. With regard to
treatable offenders, and with respect to the premises upon which
criminal responsibility rested, the two camps could not have been
farther apart.
Americans - or American society as a whole - took a middle
road, mixing the rhetoric of social determinism with the language of
free will and drawing lines accordingly, if irrationally. But it was
largely resistance to the new science, and to its deterministic prem-
ises, I believe, that led Americans at large to reject a strictly thera-
peutic version of social defense. The scientific concept of the
"incorrigible" would remain subject to question; relatively few con-
victs would be thought of in that way.62 Most criminals, we seemed
61. See NYE, supra note 6, at 171-226.
62. There were, however, 16 states that passed some form of a sterilization law between
1907 and 1917. It should be pointed out that most such laws were aimed at the insane or
feebleminded, although they often included habitual criminals, drunkards, and sex offenders
as well. By 1931, the number of criminals among the roughly 12,000 individuals sterilized
since 1907 was very small. See MARK II HAIuER, EuoGmcs: HEmDrrARIAN A'mTruDs iN
AlmmucAN THOUGHT 133-41 (1963); see also ALL N, supra note 6, at 41. Referring to the
eugenics movement as a whole (rather than to its application to those specifically convicted
of criminal offenses), Allen notes that the eugenics movement "for the first three decades of
the present century rivaled the rehabilitative ideal in its appeal to the educated and influen-
tial segments of the community." Id. Hovenkamp notes that between 1907 and 1926, 23
states enacted sterilization laws: "Some of the laws were aimed at criminals, but many were
much broader statutes, part of the eugenics movement to improve future generations through
the sterilization of people whom the state had reason to believe were mentally defective."
Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 563 n.75; see also KEI M. LuImRmt, Gmncs AND
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to believe, had chosen to do wrong and, if they possessed cognitive
abilities, both deserved punishment and were probably reformable:
Under the right conditions, they would choose, freely, to do right.
Although actual conditions of imprisonment typically made a
mockery of our ideals, most Americans remained convinced that
the inalienable "Anglo-Saxon" rights to freedom and to due pro-
cess required both the opportunity for rehabilitation within a sys-
tem of reasonable punishment and constant adherence to the
concept of free will. Whatever the social benefits, the social and
personal costs of an openly deterministic social defense theory were
too high. They both offended the prescript of political liberty
against restraints imposed by the state and offended the deeply held
faith that human worth and free will were, in the last analysis, one
and the same.
The criminal law has never fully recovered from the fin de siecle
critique launched by the new scientists. The route to general social
disillusionment with criminal justice administration has been circui-
tous. Progressive-Era penitentiaries had much less capacity to re-
habilitate than their enthusiasts hoped or expected. More recent
penologists have rejected indeterminate sentences as ineffective,
and even fraudulent, devices whereby many offenders are incarcer-
ated far longer than they need or ought to be. Rather than reform
and achieve parole, many offenders, quite predictably, stagnate and
remain under lock and key. The science that fostered the new pe-
nology subsequently devoted much time and energy to explaining
why rehabilitation of offenders often did not take place; the posi-
tion of rehabilitation's critics has been strengthened through the
colorable claim that, from the perspective of traditional principles
of legal and human rights, the resulting long-term incarceration was
unjust.63
But the post-Progressive-Era crisis in penology is not the whole
story. Less noticed, perhaps, has been the gradual de facto break-
AmmucAN SociErY (1972). For a description of the early findings on sterilization, see H.C.
Sharp, Rendering Sterile of Confirmed Criminals and Mental Defectives, in 1907 PRoc. OF
THE ANN. CONORESS OF ThE NATL. PRISON ASSN. 177. Sharp performed some of the first
vasectomies in the country, on consenting boys at the Indiana Reformatory, and some of the
first legally required ones, under the 1907 Indiana statute, Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907
Ind. Laws 377, which was the first of its kind in the United States.
63. See ALLEN, supra note 6, at 32-34, 44-49. Allen provides a subtle assessment of the
many kinds of claims regarding the failure of rehabilitation attempts, and notes how modem
supporters of a "just deserts" doctrine have pointed to these failures in their criticism of the
use of long-term and indefinite incarceration. Id. at 51-52, 57-58, 66-69. David Rothman
discusses the vicissitudes of modem penology, including the critique of the rehabilitative
model, in The Crime of Punishment, N.Y. REv. BooKcs, Feb. 17, 1994, at 34.
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down of the bifurcation of trial and punishment upon which the
traditional concept of criminal responsibility had come to depend.
The deterministic language of penology has inevitably fed back into
the earlier, guilt-determination stage of criminal process. Or so
some commentators have thought - including, as it happens, Sper-
anza, who was among the first to address the question of jury be-
havior in this fashion. We do well to conclude our discussion of the
fin de sicle with a brief return to Speranza's writings, this time to
his comments on the criminal trial jury.
The jury has, of course, occupied a special place in relation to
tensions among conventional morality, the "science" of human be-
havior, and the rule of law; practically the entire history of the jury
in the Anglo-American tradition could be analyzed in these
terms.64 Not surprisingly, most late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-
century commentary on the relationship between jury behavior and
legal rules reveals only a limited understanding of these tensions. It
is worth noting some aspects of that commentary before returning
to Speranza.
The doctrine of the jury's right to find law as well as fact had
been largely, though not quite entirely, rooted out of American ju-
risprudence across the later decades of the nineteenth century.65
Juries continued, of course, to deviate on occasion from formal judi-
cial instructions on the law, a phenomenon of nullification that in-
creasingly.earned the epithet of "lawlessness," even as it set in
motion the modem debate over the jury's "right" so to act when it
feels morally compelled to do so. As the law-finding doctrine de-
clined, legal writers turned their attention to the "science" of fact-
finding, and in doing so they often criticized jurors as unintelligent,
too sympathetic, or otherwise guided by their emotions.66 For a
64. This is, in general terms, the subject of the larger project on which I am engaged. I
have drawn many of the informal observations in this essay from my ongoing research. I
have also touched upon this particular issue in my book, VERDIcr Acco=mio TO CoN-
scmNcE, supra note 14, at v, 267-317, 356-83.
65. The most comprehensive account of the demise of the law-finding doctrine remains
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. Rnv. 582 (1939). For
discussion of the criminal trial jury in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see,
for example, LAwREN E M. FmEDMAN & ROBERT V. PEncrvAL, Tim RooTs op Jusrxcn
182-95 (1981); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of the Criminal Trial
Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867 (1994); David Millon, Juries, Judges, and
Democracy, 18 LAw & Soc. INQurRY 135, 154-57 (1993) (book review).
66. On the (lack of) intelligence issue, see, for example, Trial by Jury, an unsigned com-
ment from the Chicago Legal News, reprinted in 2 ALB. W. 159,159 (1870): "[O]ur jury quit
their shops for the courts of justice; they march straight from the weighing of cheese to the
weighing of testimony; from dealing in candles and bacon, to dealing with the lives, proper-
ties and liberties of men." On the emotions of jurors, see, for example, . Kopelke, Criminal
Law Reform, 29 ALB. LJ. 148 (1884), where the author notes
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time, optimistic reformism accompanied the endemic cynicism.
Some commentators looked forward to a new era of jury delibera-
tions characterized by rational decisionmaking in accordance with
existing legal rules.67 Others opined that Americans had much to
learn from the contemporary English model of the criminal trial,
wherein swift selection from a more highly qualified pool produced
a more intelligent and less willful jury, one that listened respectfully
to a bench empowered to comment upon the evidence and to issue
firm and pointed instructions.6 Taken as a whole, however, the
commentary of the period does not reveal great confidence in lay
assessment of "fact," in jury-based assessment of evidence that pro-
ceeded by way of reason and was consistent with legal standards,
but was responsive as well to community-based understandings of
language, mentality, and physical behavior.
By Speranza's day, doubts about the possibility of a truly ra-
tional jury process matched - or outweighed - optimistic im-
pulses. All the same, few lawyers responded favorably to some
behaviorists' call for replacing the lay jury with a panel of "ex-
perts," even in legal insanity cases. Perhaps lawyers were coming to
see the principles of the new science as even more threatening than
the worst excesses of jury behavior. Indeed, it may be that some of
the lay jury's most severe juristic critics saw that institution as the
last line of defense against the scientists' attack on the orthodox
approach to criminal responsibility. Thus, although lawyers and
scientists agreed that criminal process ought to be made more ra-
tional, and although both singled out the jury and the myriad "tech-
nicalities" of the law that recourse to the jury entailed as a prime
site for reform, there were distinct limits to this area of agreement.
If the two camps were destined to remain apart - especially re-
garding use of a lay jury to determine the issue of legal insanity -
an inclination in the mind of the average juryman to rather believe in the innocence of a
man than in his guilt, frequently even in disregard of the evidence offered, or even if
convinced of guilt, then at least to make the punishment light. It is a kind of sentimen-
talism, which of course the counsel for the defense try their utmost to kindle and turn to
the advantage of their client.
Id. at 148.
67. For a discussion of the way in which jurors ought to go about the business of finding
fact, see, for example, Charles E. Grinnell, Beyond a Reasonable Doub4 9 GREEN BAG 97
(1897). Grinnell noted the many obstacles to good jury decisionmaking, but seems to have
believed that, with some reforms, the system could yield acceptable results.
68. The debate over the virtues of the English system of jury trial stretched from the
1870s (if not earlier) into the 1920s (and beyond). In 1909, the American Institute of Crimi-
nal Law and Criminology (AICLC) charged a committee with study of the English system.
See infra text accompanying note 102. Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century commen-
tary on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the English approach to jury trial in
criminal cases was voluminous.
1945June 1995]
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1945 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
within the legal world itself a similar form of disagreement was
bound to make itself felt. The more "scientific" the jurist, the more
the jury required reining in - but, then, only to a point. At that
point, the more fundamental difference between lawyer and scien-
tist kicked in. What, we may wonder, is really different today in this
regard?
The full story of the fin de siecle interplay among these warring
elements awaits treatment on another occasion. For present pur-
poses, we must note that jurists roundly criticized the jury from
many angles, including importantly that institution's supposed ad-
herence to "frontier justice." For the most part, this criticism was
premised on the assumption that jurors brought parochialism, na-
iv6t6, and downright ignorance to their task.69 Often it is difficult
to determine the precise perspective of those who commented upon
the jury, especially those who pointed to jurors' leniency. From the
late nineteenth century to our own day, both the endorsement and
the criticism of jury "sympathy" has frequently been embodied in
language that conceals the critic's true perspective, if indeed the
critic has focused clearly on what it is that pleases or galls him. In
this regard, interpretation of Speranza poses a special problem. He
said little about the jury and he used some conventional phrases
without tying them to particular kinds of cases. What mainly must
be kept in mind is that, among lawyers, Speranza's attempt to make
sense of de facto law-finding was unusual, for he spoke from the
perspective of behavioral science. At some point - it is not clear
just when - he came to see jury behavior as a response to new
ideas, and in that sense positive, but also as confused and born of
frustration. Moreover, like most true behavioral scientists, Sper-
anza favored top-down reform; the conscience of the community
had its place, but it could not bear the entire burden of remaking an
out-moded and irrational process of criminal justice. He appears to
have traveled a path that some others were taking during the first
decade of our century, one that even some other lawyers trod, but
- once again - his behaviorist and deterministic perspective led
69. Often, these concerns were tied to a view of the jury as "untrained" or "unscientific."
See, eg., T.D. Crothers, A Psychological Study of Jurors, 60 ALB. LJ. 341 (1899); Current
Topics, 54 Axn. W. 17, 23-24 (1896) (quoting George Hoadley's comments on the topic).
Such attitudes assumed jurors were easily played upon by counsel. See, e.g., G. Carlton Jack-
son, Jurors by Occupation, 13 VA. LJ. 25 (1889); Edward A. Thomas, Shall the Jury System
be Retained?, 3 THm FORUM 102,107-08 (1887). On occasion, criticism was linked to tensions
over the question of the jury's role in law-finding. See, e.g., Orville C. McLaughlin, Trial by
Jury, 64 Ann. L. 286, 287, 289 (1902).
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him to a solution that had both the virtue of consistency and the
defect of total impracticality.
Speranza's comments on the jury are scattered throughout his
work. He never wrote extensively about the jury per se, but dis-
cussed it where it bore relation to his central interests. His earliest
remarks were conventional: Like many others, lawyers and behav-
ioral scientists alike, he criticized the "emotional and hysterical ac-
quittals of persons guilty of taking the law into their own hands to
avenge their honor. '70 Speranza applied this criticism to his obser-
vation that there was a widespread "social complicity with crime,"
which undermined the principle of the social defense.71 But Sper-
anza did not settle entirely for the generalities about misplaced
"pity" or "sympathy" so common in the period. In his 1903 article
Criminality in Children he appears to have taken a further step.
Careful study will show that the tenderness of the law in its provi-
sions regarding special cases, and more especially the tenderness in its
application in given cases, has its reason not so much in the unfitness
of the punishment to the crime as in its unjust and unfair application
to those who are not the real culprits. Thus the theft of bread is lar-
ceny, and larceny should be under the ban of the law; but the hungry
man who steals a loaf would probably go free because the trial jurors
would say: "It was not he who stole - but the Social Conditions that
let him get hungry." And more clearly, if a child kills his playmate,
the jury will almost instinctively attribute the child's malevolence to
the indifference or maliciousness of the parents.72
Speranza might have been invoking age-old notions of human
motivation, despite the modem ring of his language. Nearly a dec-
ade later, he made himself clear. By then others, too, had begun to
suggest that jurors sometimes reflected progressive notions; they
were not always simply, and habitually, "sympathetic," or "senti-
mental," but were occasionally ahead of the law in grappling with
the social origins of crime.73 In 1912, Speranza opened New Hori-
zons in Penal Law with the assertion that "[p]ublic opinion is grow-
ing restless over the administration of the criminal law."74 In noting
that jurors registered this discontent he suggested that "[t]he fact is
that the popular mind has come to make part of its convictions the
reforms contended for by penologists for over a century regarding
the basic principles of the function of the state towards the crimi-
70. Speranza, The Coefficients of Impunity, supra note 58, at 652.
71. Id. at 652-54.
72. Speranza, Criminality in Children, supra note 58, at 516 (emphasis added).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 177-88.
74. Gino C. Speranza, New Horizons in Penal Law, 18 CASE & COM. 745 (1912).
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nal."75 At times the jurors in exercising lay judgment risked
breaching social defenses. Thus did Speranza, in this, his final arti-
cle on criminal responsibility,76 explain how "reformers and laymen
have, under the impulse of such discontent, carried their protest be-
yond just bounds, by extending sympathy where it was not deserved
- resulting often in hysterical verdicts - and thereby exposing
themselves to the just charge by conservatives of a desire to over-
ride the law."'77
The "basic principles" of the "new penology" that Speranza in-
voked might, he said, be called "more humane," but he preferred to
style them "more just because.., more rational." He called for the
"swift application of suitable discipline," which in most cases would
be work.78
I call it discipline for want of a better word; for it is not punishment
and it is not mercy, but a social means to a social end. Such end is
that society shall be protected; and such protection modem penal law
must attain by different means, varying from the simple fact of convic-
tion, with no other penalty ... to the absolute elimination of the
transgiessor from society.7 9
Speranza noted that "[p]ublic opinion revolts against [an of-
fender's] elimination by death," but opined that "it would approve
perpetual exclusion from society in a penal colony."8 0 He con-
cluded with the observation that "[t]he old saying that 'the punish-
ment must fit the crime' is but the precursor of the modem
principle that the discipline must fit the criminal"; if the fit was
proper, "juries would not acquit against their oath."8' Presumably,
absent the prevailing tension between their increasingly scientific
understanding of crime and the traditional retributive approach to
penology, jurors would accept the exigencies of the concept of the
social defense.
Speranza's insight was, of course, just that: his own way of un-
derstanding a form of jury behavior that most fin de sidcle and
early-twentieth-century commentators described, without more, as
foolish sympathy. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that Sper-
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Speranza would go on to write many more articles dealing with the problems faced by
immigrants, a subject to which he had devoted considerable energy since the turn of the
century.
77. Speranza, supra note 74, at 745.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 746.
81. Id.
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anza - and a few other commentators - weren't far off. the mark.
Indeed, from the perspective of our own day, it would be surprising
if the rhetoric of determinism had not gradually affected the under-
standing of society at large, as popular journals, newspapers, and
novels referred more and more to the factors that conditioned crim-
inal behavior. One might conjecture that increasingly across the
decades of our century the ritual of the trial stage has been thor-
oughly adulterated. We have gradually come to reflect our often
subconscious ambivalence regarding the doctrine of mens rea, our
underlying doubts about the criminal law's general presumption of
free will. Although we know that rehabilitation rarely works, we
accept much of the behavioral-science analysis of crime and we thus
often intuitively balk at assigning a full measure of guilt. Fortu-
nately, we are not often tested in this way, as most cases end in
guilty pleas on a "bargain": If the defendant "freely" chooses to
plead guilty, doubts about his having freely chosen to commit the
underlying offense are paved over - or simply not addressed.
II. TiHm PROGRESSrVE ERA: POUND
A.
Speranza wrote little on the problem of criminal justice after
1904. His parting shot, the 1912 essay New Horizons in Penal
Law,82 bears the influence of the widespread concern with penology
of the early years of the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology (AICLC), an organization in which Speranza played a
minor official role from 1911 to 1913.83 The issues the young Sper-
anza had struggled with have, of course, remained central to crimi-
nal justice. And Speranza's advice in his 1901 paper has proved
prophetic. Proponents of a strictly scientific approach to criminal
responsibility have made little impact upon the daily life of the
82. Speranza, supra note 74.
83. Speranza served as chair of the Committee on Crime and Immigration. See 1 J.C.L.C.
680 (1911); 4 J.C.L.C. 523, 523-27 (1913). Speranza's interests in legal matters, increasingly
more practical than theoretical, lay in the rights of immigrants before the law and in the
problem of criminality among immigrants generally. His more literary and journalistic new
horizons lay just ahead: a war-years shift in perspective on assimilation made him a prolific
publicist of the virtues of Americanization. For Speranza, Progressivism ultimately meant an
Anglo-Saxon version of the melting pot experience. Whether his views on criminal responsi-
bility also melded into the "Anglo-Saxon" paradigm we can not know, for either out of frus-
tration or lack of interest, he stopped writing about it. See Anthes, supra note 29. Anthes
portrays the post-War Speranza as opposed to the traditional notion of the "melting pot,"
opposed to further immigration. Speranza increasingly identified with the Anglo-Saxon
"spirit" and saw that "spirit" as threatened by further large-scale immigration. He had him-
self (as he saw it) already melted into the "old stock" culture. Id. at 29.
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law;84 attempts at a middle ground have dominated, melding the
insights of behavioral science with a lawyer's perspective.
The tensions and anxieties of the fin de siacle gave way to the
more optimistic reformist perspective of high Progressivism, and to
an attempt - albeit temporary - at rapprochement between sci-
entist and lawyer. Legal thinkers could not help being affected by
the "scientific" ideas that lay all about them. If the great bulk of
them affirmed ideas that were more or less compatible with the
conventional understanding of criminal responsibility, many none-
theless followed the scientists' lead in approaching penology in de-
cidedly behaviorist terms.
The founding era of modem criminal justice administration
stretches from the 1870s down to the 1920s; the latter half of that
period, the Progressive Era, constituted the chief moment of exper-
imentation, advances, and overall consolidation. This was true at
the front end of criminal process, with respect to the professional-
ization of police and investigatorial practice; and at the back end,
with respect to the use of probation, indeterminate sentence, and
parole, the recourse in some states to sterilization, and the attempt
to reform prison conditions to the standards of the rehabilitative
ideal.85 The guilt-assessment stage, however, at least with regard to
the more serious felonies, witnessed fewer initiatives: The substan-
tive law remained largely intact, and, despite a great deal of agita-
tion, trial procedure did as well.86 If the guilt-assessment stage saw
significant change, it was in the ever-increasing number of defend-
ants who avoided trial by pleading guilty.87
84. E.g., KARL MENNIN ER, TmE CRIME OF Pu sHMENT (1968).
85. See, eg., FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 65; BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN
PRIsoNs: A HISTORy OF GOOD NTrmONs 234-66 (1977); RomTAN, supra note 8; SAMUEL
WALKER, POPULAR JUSTnCE 127-60 (1980); see also ALEXANDER W. PiSCOTrA, BENEvoLENT
REPRESSION: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE AMERICAN REFORMATORY-PRISON MOVEMENT
(1994). Piscotta traces the vicissitudes (mainly failures) of the adult reformatory movement
from 1876 to 1920.
86. Transformation of trial practice did occur in the juvenile courts; this increased the
pressure for reform of the regular courts, but to no avail. See STEVEN L ScmrossMAN, LoVE
AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT. TnE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROoRESsIVE" JUVE-
NILE JusTIE, 1825-1920 (1977); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 413-17. For a contem-
porary account, see John P. Briscoe, Reforms of the Criminal Law, 8 J.C.L.C. 653, 653-54
(1918). George Kirchwey, President of the AICLC, recommended in 1918 the extension of
juvenile court practice to adult courts. See George W. Kirchwey, Proceedings of Tenth An-
nual Meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology: President's Ad-
dress, 9 J.C.L.C. 327, 337 (1918).
87. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 250-52, 390-91; FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra
note 65, at 174-81; Albert NV. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 CoLum. L. REv.
1 (1979); see also Reginald Heber Smith & Herbert B. Ehrmann, The Criminal Courts, in
CRIMINAL JUsTCE IN CLEV.LArN 229,237 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
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The most famous manifestation of this early-twentieth-century
program in criminal justice was the formation - by Roscoe Pound
among many others - of the AICLC in 1909.88 Itself a manifesta-
tion of the emerging working relationship between scientists and
lawyers, the Institute's publication, The Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, aired all the leading issues of the day, matters of
practice as well as more theoretical concerns. The work of the In-
stitute was carried on primarily through committees,8 9 whose en-
deavors intersected with national and state bar association
committees, state legislative commissions, sub-groups of medical
and psychiatric associations, associations for prison reform, and
state crime commissions. From these organizations there came a
deluge of writings that, together with the state and municipal crimi-
nal-justice surveys of the 1920s that Pound helped to organize, form
the foundation for modern criminal justice scholarship. We do well
to pause for a moment to take note of this founding generation,
before turning specifically to Pound.
The reformist writing of the early-to-mid teens ranged over
every stage of criminal justice administration: investigatorial tech-
nique, prosecutorial bureaucracy;90 trial procedure including, inter
alia, the rules of evidence, the role of the judge, and the scope of
the jury's authority;91 and - most importantly - penology and the
treatment of the insane, the feeble-minded, and juvenile offend-
ers.92 From outside the legal profession the dominant thrust contin-
ued to center on the causes of anti-social behavior. Alongside
88. The AICLC was an outgrowth of the National Conference on Criminal Law and
Criminology held in Chicago, June 1909. See 1909 PRoc. OF THE FrsT NATL. CONF. ON
CnmM. L. AND CmrnNoLOo'y [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. For a brief discussion of the Chi-
cago Conference and the creation of the Institute, see James W. Garner, Editorial Comment
1 J.C.L.C. 2,25 (1910). See also DAVID WIODOR, ROSCOE PouND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW
142-45 (1974).
89. See 1 J.C.L.C. 677, 678-82 (1911) (listing the various committees).
90. See, eg., Robert H. Gault, review of MAYER C. GOLDMAN, THE PuBLIc DEFENDER:
A NECESSARY FACTOR IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 8 J.C.LC. 315-16 (1917).
91. See, e.g., Jesse L. Deck, Some Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 8 J.C.L.C. 325-
36 (1917); Charles W. Eliot, The Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in
the United States, 25 GREEN BAG 65,66-67 (1913); Edward J. McDermott, Delays and Rever-
sals on Technical Grounds in Civil and Criminal Trials, 7 PRoc. AN. PoL. Sm. ASSN. 97
(1910); William E. Mikell, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 52 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL &
Soc. Sm. 102 (1914); Samuel Scoville, Jr., The Evolution of Our Criminal Procedur 52 AN-
NALS AM. AcAo. POL & Soc Sa. 93, 96-99 (1914); Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency
of the American Jury, 13 Micm. L. REv. 302, 302-05, 310 (1914).
92. See, e.g., George G. Battle, The Problem of the Disposition of Insane Criminals, 1 VA.
L Rnv. 108 (1913); Robert H. Gault, The Method of Treating the Criminal Insane in Ger-
many, 4 J.C.L.C. 5 (1913); Bernard Glueck, Concerning Prisoners, 2 MENTAL HYGIENE 177
(1918) [hereinafter Glueck, Prisoners]; Bernard Glueck, Psychiatric Aims in the Field of
Criminology, 2 MENTAL HYGmNE 546 (1918) [hereinafter Glueck, Psychiatric Aims].
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notions of human behavior based mainly on hereditarian influ-
ences, there had long since emerged an environmentalist perspec-
tive. To this the fin de sicle added Freudian and other forms of
psychoanalysis.93 Classic studies in behaviorism soon followed. 94
Naturally, there were multifaceted constructs that drew upon all of
these insights.95 Contemporary advances in behavioral science -
to which Pound paid at least glancing attention - focused not only
on the genesis of "crime," but also on the treatment of offenders.
Though these advances grappled with the concept of responsibility
generally, they paid special attention to the problem of legal in-
sanity. In this context, behavioral-science scholars took a leading
role in recommending reform of trial procedure; alongside some
legal writers, they criticized the prevailing insanity test,96 argued for
revision of the rules concerning presentation of expert testimony,97
and took on the question of the role of both judge and jury.98
Legal scholars shared the intense interest in the insanity de-
fense, but their increasing participation in this regard did not lead
many of them to agree with the most radical of the behaviorists. As
they had since the middle decades of the nineteenth century, legal
93. See, e.g., NATHAN G. HALE, FRmuD AND THm AMEmCANS: Tnm BE INNINGS OF Psy-
CHOANALYSis IN TiE UNrrED STATES, 1876-1917 (1971); AMEmcAN PSYCHOANALYSIS: OR.
GINS AND DEVELOPMENT (Jacques M. Quen & Eric T. Carlson eds., 1978).
94. See, eg., WILULAM McDouGALT, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1909); JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCrION TO COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
(1914); see also RAY MADDING MCCONNELL, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL CON-
sTRAnrNr (1912); MAURiCE PARMELEE, THm SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1913).
95. For contemporary studies applying various of these behavioral science approaches to
crime, see, for example, Edwin G. Conklin, Heredity and Responsibility, 37 SCIENCE 46,49-51(1913); Charles B. Davenport, Heredity, Culpability, Praiseworthiness, Punishment and Re-
ward, 82 PopuLAR Scr. MONTHLY 33 (1913); Charles G. Davis, The Psychology of Crime and
Criminals and the Stigmata of Degeneration, 19 CASE & CoMMENT 820 (1912); Glueck, Pris-
oners, supra note 92, at 177-78, 180, 198-99; Glueck, Psychiatric Aims, supra note 92, at 546,
550-53; Maurice Parmelee, A New System of Criminal Procedure, 4 J.C.L.C. 359, 366-67
(1913).
96. See eg., Herman Adler, Organization of Psychopathic Work in the Criminal Courts, 8
J.C.L.C. 362 (1917); Frank H. Bowiby, Insanity as a Defense in Homicide Cases (pts. 1 & 2),
17 CASE & CoMMENT 491, 554, 558-60 (1911); Herbert J. Friedman, Comment on Recent
Judicial Decisions, 1 J.C.L.C. 612,615-17 (1910); Edwin R. Keedy, Tests of Criminal Respon-
sibility of the Insane, 1 J.C.L.C. 394,400-02 (1910); Edwin R. Keedy et al., Insanity and Crim-
inal Responsibility, 7 J.C.LC. 484 (1916); Philip Coombs Knapp, Criminal Responsibility, 6
J.C.L.C. 571 (1915); Carlos F. MacDonald, Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1 PRoc.
AcAM. Po. Sc. 641,658-59 (1911); Henry Rutgers Marshall, Proceedings of the Conference
on the Reform of the Criminal Law and Procedure Held in New York, May 12 and 13,1911, 1
PRoC. AcAD. POL SCL 705, 714-17 (1911).
97. On criticism of expert witnesses in insanity cases, see 1910 PROC. WISCONSIN BRANCH
AM. INsT. CRIm. L. & CRIaINOLOGY 30 (Conference held Nov. 26-27, 1909); Eliot, supra
note 91, at 69; Glueck, Psychiatric Aims, supra note 92, at 548-49; MacDonald, supra, note
96.
98. On the jury, see Battle, supra note 92, at 114-18; Bowlby, supra note 96, at pt. 2, 557-
59; MacDonald, supra note 96, at 646; Parmelee, supra note 95, at 361-62.
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scholars and practitioners continued to seek reform of, but none-
theless to work within, the prevailing system of jury trial. In part,
they were responding to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington in State v. Strasburg,99 invalidating legislation
abolishing the insanity defense as unconstitutional - and com-
menting along the way on the limited implications of the new crimi-
nological theory for the traditional social and legal concepts of
guilt.1°° The movement for such legislation reflected an odd mar-
riage of interests between scientists, and some jurists, who consid-
ered the jurisprudence of insanity archaic and many other jurists,
99. 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910).
100. The legislation at issue provided for postconviction mental examination in cases in
which state officials thought it appropriate. The court held that:
To take from the accused the opportunity to offer evidence tending to prove [insanity] is
in our opinion as much a violation of his constitutional right of trial by jury as to take
from him the right to offer evidence before the jury tending to show that he did not
physically commit the act ....
110 P. at 1024.
The court also noted "the very able and ingenious argument ... based upon the seeming
assumption that the modem humane treatment of those convicted of crime practically
removes them from the realm of punishment ...." 110 P. at 1025. The court quoted exten-
sively from counsel's brief on this point:
"The central idea upon which the whole fabric of criminal jurisprudence was formerly
built was the idea that every criminal act was the product of a free will possessing a full
understanding of the difference between right and wrong and full capacity to choose a
right or wrong course of action.... A better understanding of crime and the science of
criminology now convinces us that this theory is wholly wrong - that a dominant per-
centage of all criminals are not free moral agents, but, as a result of hereditary influences
or early environments, are either mentally or morally degenerate ......
110 P. at 1025. The brief, as quoted by the court, then asserted that older forms of punish-
ment "are giving way to workhouses, reformatories, and asylums, the purpose of which is to
instruct, educate, and reform rather than further to debase the individual, and the modem
systems of criminal classification and segregation are themselves a recognition of the fact that
every criminal is a concrete problem." 110 P. at 1025. The court then stated:
The argument seems to be in its last analysis that, because of modem humane methods
in caring for and treating those convicted of crime, there is no longer any reason for
taking into consideration the element of will on the part of those who commit prohibited
acts .... Learned counsel's premise suggests a noble conception, and may give promise
of a condition of things towards which the humanitarian spirit of the age is tending; yet
the stem and awful fact still remains, and is patent to all men, that the status and condi-
tion in the eyes of the world, and under the law, of one convicted of crime, is vastly
different from that of one simply adjudged insane. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact
that the element of punishment is still in our criminal laws. It is evidenced by the words
"shall be punished"....
110 P. at 1025. One concurring opinion responded to the novel argument more abruptly.
The argument that persons are no longer punished for their crimes is illusory and
unsound.... The man who is deprived of his liberty is also punished, and you cannot
change the fact by changing the name.... But why should we attempt to uphold the
statute on humane grounds, when it is an apparent and palpable attempt on the part of
the Legislature to punish those whom it fears the tribunal created by the Constitution
will acquit?
110 P. at 1027 (Rudkin, C.J., concurring).
This discussion bears an obvious relationship to the issues raised by the AICLC Modem
Criminal Law Series General Introduction, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 105-
112.
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politicians, and members of the public at large who sought to elimi-
nate recourse to the "insanity dodge" via overly susceptible trial
juries. Most legal scholars of the'post-1910 period both accepted
the courts' negative response to such radical reform as a fait accom-
pli and adhered to the tenets of the traditional common-law under-
standing of defendants' rights, political liberty, and the concept of
mens rea. At the same time, juristic criticism of the more egregious
features of jury trial was intense. The AICLC committee on crimi-
nal procedure singled out the delays of voir dire practice and the
relatively unfettered discretion that judges allowed juries to exer-
cise. 01 Comparative scholarship contrasting the perceived virtues
of the English trial with the excesses of its wayward American off-
spring became a staple of JC.L.C. reform-oriented writings.10 2
We can not be certain about this, but for some legal scholars,
conventional-sounding trial reform initiatives may have reflected
unarticulated deterministic tendencies: proponents of such reforms
may have intuitively associated better educated jurors, fewer "tech-
nicalities," and the right of the judge to comment on the evidence
and to manage proceedings with a firm hand with a form of guilt-
assessment that represented something close to a mere finding on
the question whether the defendant had committed the "act" with
which he had been charged. Thereafter, the behaviorist principles
of the sentencing stage would dominate proceedings. Some lawyers
appear to have adopted a treatment concept of penology; others,
especially in the late teens and early twenties, evidenced a more
frankly repressive social defense perspective. 03 Most probably
countenanced a combination of the two: the least dangerous and
most treatable would be rehabilitated and released; hardened of-
101. See, e.g., PROC DINGS, supra note 88, at 148.
102. For discussion at the 1909 Conference of the appointment of a committee "to inquire
into the systems of criminal law and procedure in other countries, particularly Great Britain,"
see PROCEEDINGS, supra note 88, at 149; see also i& at 188-92. For ensuing writings on the
subject, see James W. Garner, Editorial Commen4 1 J.C.L.C. 1, 4 (1910); John D. Lawson &
Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Procedure in England, 1 J.C.L.C. 595, 608-11 (1910); James W.
Garner, Editorial Commen: Criminal Procedure in England, 1 J.C.L.C. 682 (1911); James NV.
Garner, George Gordon Battle on English Procedure, 2 J.C.L.C. 334, 336 (1911); Edwin R.
Keedy, Criminal Law Reform in England and in the United States, 1 PRoc. ACAD. PoL. Sc.
667, 673 (1911).
103. See, eg., Julian P. Alexander, The Philosophy of Punishmenl4 13 J.C,L.C. 235,239-40
(1922); Henry W. Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded, 9
J.C.L.C. 485, 499 (1919) (recommending custodial, not criminal principles, as the latter deal
with "definite acts of wrongdoing rather than with general conditions of potential menace");
William G. Hale, Crime: Modem Methods of Prevention, Redemption and Protection, 9
J.C.L.C. 240 (1918); John Alan Hamilton, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime 12 J.C.L.C.
159, 172-77 (1921) (arguing for combining treatment with social defense, subordinating for-
mer to latter).
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fenders would be given opportunities for rehabilitation but would
serve longer sentences as a deterrent both to them and to others;
incorrigibles would be segregated, perhaps sterilized or even elimi-
nated in the name of the social defense.
One trend that suggests the potential for an increasingly deter-
ministic legal-academic perspective on criminal responsibility - as
distinct from penology - was signaled by a brief but important
flagship statement that appeared under the auspices of the AICLC.
At the National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology's
1909 meeting, the Conference resolved to establish a series of mod-
em continental criminal-science studies in translation.104 The com-
mittee charged with selecting and preparing the works was - more
so than the Conference itself - dominated by legal academics, all
from the "Chicago School." The Chair was John Henry Wigmore,
Dean of the Northwestern School of Law and under whose auspices
the 1909 Conference had been held; Pound, who shortly after the
conference had migrated from Northwestern to the Chicago Law
School, and his new colleague there, Ernst Freund, served under
Wigmore, as did William Smithers, Secretary of the Comparative
Law Bureau of the Philadelphia-based A.B.A., and two non-jurists,
Maurice Parmelee, Professor of Sociology at Missouri and Robert
Scott, formerly Professor of Political Science at Wisconsin.
The Committee's General Introduction 0 s which appeared in all
of the Series publications until the late teens, was behaviorist in
tone and substance. But just how deterministic was it? One can
locate a language of negotiation and compromise employed by
some among the progressive juristic caste of the 1910s, an approach
to the free-will problem that preserved a basis for something like
the traditional notion of criminal responsibility.106 That language
104. See PRocEmr~nos, supra note 88, at 204 (indicating that the resolution was submit-
ted by Wigmore); id. at 219 (indicating that the resolution was reported by the Committee on
Resolutions); id. at 16-17 (indicating that the resolution was adopted by the Conference at its
General Session on June 8).
105. General Introduction to the Modern Criminal Science Series, in RAYMOND SALmL-
Ls, TmE INDIrVmUAIZATON OF PuNIsHMENr v (Rachel Szold Jastrow trans., 2d French ed.
1911) [hereinafter General Introduction].
106. Perhaps the most significant strain of such thinking was represented by Edward
Lindsey, a member of the Pennsylvania Bar (as well as of the American Anthropological
Society) and an Associate Editor of the newly founded J.C.L.C. Lindsey published an article
in the first volume of the J.C.L.C. in which he stated: "An act of free-will is as much deter-
mined by conditions as any other event, but the decisive factor in an act of free-will is not any
extraneous circumstance, but the character of the acting person. To state it briefly, we define
free-will as a will unimpeded by compulsion." Edward Lindsey, Penal Responsibility and
Free Will, 1 J.C.LC. 695,696 (1910). Lindsey drew on a recent article by Paul Carus, Person
and Personality, 20 MoNmsr 364 (1910): "Dr. Carus thus clearly shows that we need give up
neither our notions of causality nor of freedom of will." Lindsey, supra, at 696.
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alone suggests that we ought to read the General Introduction as a
testament to the opacity of all but the most explicit early twentieth-
century juristic ideas regarding criminal responsibility.
The General Introduction began with a rehearsal of the early
path of medical science, in which conceptions of the causes of dis-
ease and notions of treatment were primitive and undifferentiated.
Modem medical science progressed by recognizing the individual
characteristics of different diseases. "The same truth," the Commit-
tee stated, "is now known about crime; but the understanding and
the application of it are just opening upon us."'107
The old and still dominant thought is, as to cause, that a crime is
caused by the inscrutable moral free will ... in itself the sole and
ultimate cause of crime. As to treatment, there still are just two tradi-
tional measures, used in varying doses for all kinds of crime and all
kinds of persons - jail, or a fine - for death is now employed in rare
cases only.'08
The modem approach by contrast would recognize the "natural
causes" of crime, the "circumstances which work to produce it in a
given case."'109
Thus the Committee characterized the prevailing legal view re-
garding the causes of crime as an absolutist version of the concept
of free will, and it appealed instead to the "natural causes" that
"work to produce" crime, but quite selfconsciously rejected the no-
tion that crime was a "disease."' 10 This approach, one might have
thought, accommodated the notion that crime was only partly, al-
beit largely, the product of deterministic "natural causes." Yet the
Committee's recommendation for studying the causes of crime
seems to leave little scope for human freedom, at least on the part
of those who were criminals. It included
all the possible data that can be causes of crime, - the man's hered-
ity, the man's physical and moral make-up, his emotional tempera-
ment, the surroundings of his youth, his present home, and other
conditions, - all the influencing circumstances. And it means that
the effect of different methods of treatment, old or new, for different
kinds of men and of causes, must be studied, experimented, and com-
pared. Only in this way can accurate knowledge be reached, and new
efficient measures be adopted."'1
As the committee pointed out in reproachful tones:
107. General Introduction, supra note 105, at vi.
108. Id.
109. Id. at vii.
110. Id. at vi-vii.
111. Id. at vii.
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All this has been going on in Europe for forty years past, and in
limited fields in this country. All the branches of science that can help
have been working, - anthropology, medicine, psychology, econom-
ics, sociology, philanthropy, penology. The law alone has abstained.
The science of law is the one to be served by all this. But the public in
general and the legal profession in particular have remained either ig-
norant of the entire subject or indifferent to the entire scientific
movement. And this ignorance or indifference has blocked the way
to progress in administration.112
About the details of this "progress," though, the General Introduc-
tion remained supremely ambiguous, finessing the fact that individ-
ualization could operate in the name of benevolent cure, "remedy,"
or in the name of nonretributive social-defense, "repression.11 3 Or
both - with resulting tensions. Its seeming message of nonrespon-
sibility, reflecting enlightened understanding of human behavior,
perhaps presumed the effectiveness of treatment that would rein-
force adherence by released offenders to prevailing moral codes.
Then, too, juristic acceptance of the principle of individualization
might have assumed what some scientists - including many penol-
ogists - openly proclaimed: that many offenders would be found
untreatable and should be kept permanently in isolation from the
public. Equally, however, its very message might undermine the
social defense by preaching a sermon that would weaken the re-
solve of potential offenders. And its focus on the offender rather
than society at large might lead to early release of "cured" offend-
ers and thus detract from the general deterrent capacity of criminal
administration. Might not a retreat from harsh punishment - even
were it replaced with "benign" long-term incarceration - itself be
a potential "cause" of criminal behavior?
Over the course of the Progressive Era, these problems increas-
ingly challenged the rapprochement of 1909. In part they resulted
from the Great War and its immediate aftermath, which saw height-
ened concern with crime and national security. But they were also
the product of the intensive study by psychologists and penologists
of incarcerated offenders; the results of such studies, allegedly re-
vealing large numbers of "insane" and "feeble-minded," held im-
portant implications for traditional approaches to guilt
assessment.114 The growing importance of psychiatry further inten-
sified conflict between lawyers and behaviorists. Even those law-
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See infra text accompanying note 367.
114. See; e.g., Kirchwey, supra note 86. Kirchwey had been Dean of Columbia Law
School, then warden at Sing Sing. In his 1918 AICLC "President's Address," Kirchwey told
his audience about Dr. Bernard Glueck's studies in Sing Sing:
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yers disposed to view criminal behavior as determined increasingly
concluded that the psychiatric school undermined the social de-
fense. For the most part these increasing tensions remained at bay
until the mid-1920s, which is itself testament to the strength of the
Progressives' belief in the solubility of social problems.
In fact, these old tensions lay at the heart of Progressivism, the
ambiguities implicit in "treatment," "social reform," and "effi-
ciency." In its own ambiguity the General Introduction papered
over the competing strains of Progressivism, as represented by the
varying perspectives of individual criminal justice scholars. The
General Introduction was, after all, written by a committee. More
to the point, it was written by a legal culture at war with itself, as all
legal cultures infected by a "science" that implies strongly mitigated
criminal responsibility are likely to be.
The deterministic rhetoric of the Progressive Era, then, made
inroads on the presumption of human free will in the criminal con-
text, portraying will and context in constant competition. But an
examination of contemporary noncriminal jurisprudence reveals
determinism's tenuous grip on American legal thought. The con-
trast between criminal and noncriminal jurisprudence lay side-by-
side with the more fundamental relationship I am sketching
throughout this essay between the criminal justice perspectives of
social and behavioral scientists on the one hand and legal scholars
on the other. As noted, deterministic criminal jurisprudence had
originally come from outside the legal academy and had penetrated
it in more than a modest way, while accommodating a residuum of
the traditional concept of mens rea and a freedom-affirming view of
the rehabilitated offender. With respect to noncriminal jurispru-
dence, the implications of deterministic thought seem to have
played out rather differently. In that context, a more conventional
You who have made yourself familiar with his writings will recall that Dr. Glueck's con-
clusions based upon the consecutive study of 660 admissions, without any selection or
discrimination, that of the population of Sing Sing prison apparently nearly 60 per cent.,
some 59 per cent., were not normal, were either abnormal or subnormal, half of them
probably mentally defective in such degree as to be practically irresponsible, twelve
years of age and under mentally; the other half divided unevenly between those whom
the psychiatrist classes as psychopathic and those whom he classes as insane, were all of
them either continuously or occasionally quite irresponsible for their acts. In other
words - let us be conservative - upwards of one-half of the population of Sing Sing
prison is made up of persons who are non compos. They should not be held responsible
by the law for their acts on the presumed ground of their capacity to choose between the
right and the wrong ....
Id. at 333-34. As to most of the remaining inmates, Kirchwey reported on the basis of his
own "personal observation.., during which [time] I was connected in a responsible way with
Sing Sing," id at 334, that most were "young fellows who have from childhood, babyhood in
many cases, led neglected and then vicious and then criminal lives," iU at 335.
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message of Progressivism held sway, one that largely avoided the
tensions and darker themes of Progressive-Era criminal justice.
Here, the vanguard of the new, anticlassical jurisprudence, from
Pound's early sociological jurisprudence down to the realism of the
1920s and early 1930s, more comfortably adopted a relativistic ap-
proach to human autonomy. As in criminal jurisprudential writing,
the enemy was an exaggerated view of human autonomy. In the
context of private law, however, jurists conceived the problem in
light of the perceived imbalances in bargaining power in the mar-
ketplace and in society at large. Given this crucial difference in set-
ting, the remedy, reflected in writings both on private law and on
the main currents of constitutional doctrine, was an adjustment of
the balance of power between individuals or between individuals
and collective entities. Noncriminal jurisprudence focused, then as
now, more directly on the problem of equality of opportunity than
on the problem of human freedom per se.115
We should note at the outset that the modem critique of crimi-
nal law in the main preceded that of private law. Although the lat-
ter, too, had roots in the late nineteenth century,11 6 it did not
become widespread until the 1910s and 20s, by which time the late
nineteenth-century behavioral and medical science attack on the
principles that underlay criminal law had already led to movements
for juvenile justice and reform in penology, intense conflict regard-
ing the insanity test, and some tellingly defensive commentary re-
garding the concept of mens rea. The critique of private law, by
115. The point I want most to make is that a gentler - and perhaps the true - spirit of
Progressivism informed the early private-law-based critique of classical jurisprudence. Like
most of the reform projects of the day, this side of sociological jurisprudence called for direct
confrontation of the facts of social existence and a flexible, efficient use and manipulation of
the environment (both physical and mental) to make good on America's promise of (rela-
tively) equal opportunity for personal autonomy and development. Like other programs, it
viewed governmental institutions as instrumental, recognizing their creative, shaping power,
it rationalized this reforming role for institutions as a necessary counter-force to those as-
pects of social and economic life that distorted, corrupted, or suppressed fundamental Amer-
ican values. This mainstream Progressivism - and sociological jurisprudence as well - was
founded on a soft, albeit definite form of behaviorism. It recognized the fragility of the
human will and the limitations on human autonomy in a complex industrial society. In gen-
eral, and in the context of private law, Progressivism emerged as the first wave of modem
revisionism; it was dedicated to using the new sciences as instruments for recovering the old
values, to optimistic and only very partial exploitation of the techniques of science, and to
systemic repression of the new scientists' bleak implicit message. The drift within Progressiv-
ism toward a harsher, more deterministic social control ethic - as in the case of some forms
of penology - was a drift out of the mainstream, perhaps in its most "progressive" forms,
out of Progressivism altogether. For an excellent treatment of Progressivism (which is not
responsible for the tenor of my own brief account), see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of
Progressivism, 10 REv. im AM. HisT. 113 (1982).
116. See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRisis OF LEGAL ORTHoDoXY 33-143 (1992).
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contrast, began early but matured slowly, largely out of attempts to
limit the reach of private law concepts as they were embedded in
constitutional law. In its origins, this critique of private law bears
significant relation to the attack on traditional concepts of criminal
responsibility. But outside of criminal law, the critique of human
freedom was always somewhat muted and emerged more clearly
from economics, sociology, and political science than from behav-
ioral and medical science.' 1 7
,The noncriminal classical jurisprudence of the late nineteenth
century was, of course, more epiphenomenal than appears from
conventional historical accounts. It gave heightened emphasis to
general tendencies of mind, however, and it provided a target for
critics, who readily gave it a prominence and importance it other-
wise might not have had. Today we see classical jurisprudence
through the lens of, among others, Holmes, who exaggerated for-
malism in order to set off his own deeply skeptical views," 8 and
Pound, who by nature simplified matters in order to think more
clearly about them.119 In this sense, it was Pound who spoke the
language of the law: His prewar sociological jurisprudence evi-
denced a refreshing candor about the conventional legal thought of
his day. If he exaggerated the typicality of classical jurisprudence,
he aptly epitomized its main thrust and nicely mocked the often
unstated assumptions of fin de siecle jurists and legal academics. 20
Pound styled his foray "sociological jurisprudence," and indeed had
already established himself as the leading exponent of the subject;
117. For an important account of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century develop-
ments regarding deterministic perspectives in the social sciences, see THOMAS L. HASKELL,
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SoCIAL. SCIENCE: Tim AimmcAN SOCIAL SCIENCE As-
SOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF Aurrsorry 234-56 (1977). My point
here is that those private-law jurists who were influenced by developments in the social sci-
ences seem not to have moved beyond episodic concern with aspects of environmental causa-
tion to holistic conclusions of a deterministic sort.
118. See Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes's Common Law and German Legal Science, in
Ttm LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR. 72 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
119. Pound was, nonetheless, a learned, wise, and important legal scholar. His historical
and philosophical writings were overly schematic, but his reach was impressive - even ex-
traordinary - and he used his ability to create schemas and taxonomies to good advantage.
For accounts of Pound, see JAmEs E. HERGET, AMEmCAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970, at
164-70 (1990); PAUL SAYRE, Tim Lim oF RosCoE POuND 312-80 (1948); WIGDoR, supra
note 88; N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the
Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1306-11; G. Edward
White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early 7wentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L REv. 999, 1004-12 (1972).
120. This tendency to exaggerate and this critical insight characterized Pound's early
criminal-law efforts, though - as we shall see - in the domain of criminal law more radical
strains of thought infected even his early writing.
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his 1908-09 essays, Mechanical Jurisprudence'21 and Liberty of Con-
tract,122 lay at the cutting edge of the legal-academic Progressive
critique of the formalism and the exaggerated view of human au-
tonomy prevalent in noncriminal classical jurisprudence. He at-
tacked on two fronts: first on the obsession with formal rights at
the constitutional level that, as he saw it, rationalized the striking
down of social legislation on grounds that such legislation limited
autonomy in the domains of property and contract; and second, on
the Langdellian formalism in private law that gave unrealistic pri-
macy to the ideal of autonomy.
The seemingly unlikely fit between the quasi-scientific reasoning
processes of Langdellian scholarship and the quasi-religious quality
of the fundamental rights that some jurists and scholars found at
the heart of both the Constitution and the common law is intrigu-
ing.123 In fact, these natural rights had lost much of their traditional
religious nature, and had been shrouded, instead, in a kind of secu-
lar fundamentalism.' A4 These jurists and scholars came to see the
rights to liberty, property, and freedom of contract as natural to
man, in the sense of fitting his own purposes and inclinations. To
study man and his development in historical context, to consider
the purposes of the state and civic order, to ponder the irreducible
ideas of the common law: all of these endeavors led many jurists to
see human nature and human potential as inextricably bound up
with the phenomena of human reason, human autonomy, and en-
joyment of the fruits of the free exercise of human faculties. For
121. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
122. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909).
123. See GRNT GiLMoRE, TmE AoGs oF AmjpacAN LAW 41-67 (1977); see also William
E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth-Century America, 87 HARV. L. Rlv. 513,560-66 (1974). A large body of scholar-
ship deals with the "formal" or "classical" jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century. Not
all historians give as much emphasis to "legal science" as do Gilmore and Nelson; nor do all
characterize the period as an "Age of Faith." For a recent account of "classical legal
thought," see HoRwrrz, supra note 116, at 9-31. Horwitz draws upon Duncan Kennedy,
Towards an Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850-1940, 3 Rps. LAw & Soc. 3 (1980). Daniel R. Ernst discusses the Kennedy-
Horwitz approach in The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102
YALE LJ. 1019 (1993) (book review).
124. See Nelson, supra note 123, at 555-58. Horwitz argues that Progressive jurists "bent
on de-legitimating the claimed autonomy of orthodox legal reasoning" charged classical ju-
rists with basing decisions on natural law principles, whereas classical jurists "felt... con-
strained by their own positivistic framework." HoRwrrz, supra note 116, at 159. According
to Horwitz "natural rights discourse structured legal argument by suggesting starting points,
background assumptions, presumptions, or first principles in the law." Id. at 158. See Ros-
coe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 612-13 (1907), for
examples of the fundamentalist concepts of property rights to which he objected, and which
he believed were passing out of favor, despite their continued articulation in legal texts and
judicial opinions.
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many, the scientific study of man demonstrated that these phenom-
ena were facts of life, natural to man, good because fitting and
tested over time.
The argument was not entirely tautological; it served larger pur-
poses. Some found Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism plausible:
Human development and competition accorded with nature's inevi-
table sorting out of the fit from the unfit, so that interference with
natural processes was socially regressive. Others may have contin-
ued to believe - or to say - that God intended man to be an
autonomous and self-realizing being. Still others, no doubt, saw so-
cial and economic well-being and productivity as the beneficiaries
of this conception of human nature and activity. Most jurists in-
dulged a combination of these notions, a curious blend that made
classical jurisprudence complicated and compelling. 125
By Pound's day this world view had encountered searching criti-
cism for several decades from political scientists, sociologists, and
historians, among others; most of the attack had not been aimed at
the law, as such.126 Legal scholars enjoyed the luxury of distilling
and crystallizing the ideas of an earlier generation of thinkers from
fields that - unbeknownst to most lawyers - were undergoing
major transformations. Pound contributed to scholarship by de-
ploying the new criticism in his attack on classical formalism. In
reality, Pound countered, man was a social being; his actual auton-
omy was relative to his social context; any fair-minded attempt to
accord all people some semblance of their basic rights required con-
stant attention to their social situation. As Pound saw it, legal rea-
soning and legal categories had come to mirror subjective desire for
personal autonomy either out of jurists' wishful thinking or in their
service to the interests of those whose positions endowed them with
power to exercise real autonomy in relation to others, whose own
freedom was thereby rendered a fiction.127
That Pound wrote extensively in both noncriminal and criminal
jurisprudence made him a rare bird in his day. It is perhaps instruc-
tive that he brought differing emphases to bear on his concern
125. For a valuable discussion of the complexities of "Victorian Legal Thought," see
Ernst, supra note 123, at 1037-46.
126. See generally HASKELL, supra note 117; JAMES T. KLOPPENBERO, UNCERTAIN Vic-
TORY' SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSMSM IN EUROPEAN AND AMRIucAN THouoHT,
1870-1920 (1986); DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMmCAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 53-142
(1991); MORTON WE1TE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERIcA: TAE REVOLT AGAINST FORMAL-
ISM 11-106 (1957). White focuses on the law at pages 59-75, using Holmes as a link between
the larger, nonjuristic movements and the beginning of a juristic critique.
127. Many of Pound's early writings sounded one or another of these themes. See Pound,
supra note 122; see also Pound, supra note 124.
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about human freedom in the two domains. In his criminal law writ-
ings, to which scholars have paid scant attention, Pound gave signif-
icantly greater emphasis to his skepticism regarding the concept of
free will - which in itself says something important about the dif-
ference between the two fields of concern. Yet even in his criminal
justice studies, at the cost of coherence - and by skating on the
surface - Pound fashioned a relatively untroubled accommodation
of the free-will critique; he envisioned fundamental change over the
long term and settled, in the short run, for reforms that mixed dis-
cordant elements.
Pound's criminal law writings, from almost the fin de sijcle down
to his 1923 Colver lectures - delivered at Brown University and
published, with only slight revisions, seven years later as Criminal
Justice in America12 - repay consideration because they reflect
the thinking of a moderate realist of pronounced social-science
bent, a juristic Progressive of large vision. Pound's criminal law ju-
risprudence - as it evolved across the Progressive Era - reveals
those understandings of history, politics, and society which reflected
the tensions that one of the most influential and widely read early-
twentieth-century academic common lawyers experienced regard-
ing the interrelated problems of political liberty and human free
will. In retracing Pound's steps over two decades, we witness the
final - yet, as we shall see, inconclusive - act of the fin de siecle
drama with which we began.
B.
Pound, like Speranza, was a lawyer; but whereas Speranza had
fully embraced a version of the behavioral science theory of his day,
Pound, though trained originally as a botanist, remained a jurist
through and through. But Pound - here a true Progressive - re-
sisted the idea of an unbridgeable gulf between the law and science,
which he believed could be made to serve law's ends. If Pound per-
ceived the most intractable problems that the new science
128. RoscoE POUND, CRnvuNAL JusnTcE iN AmmucA (1930). In the Preface (dated No-
vember 7, 1929), Pound stated:
These lectures have been written out from the notes used at the time of their delivery
(1923). In the years which have intervened much has happened, but little, I think, to
change the main lines of the picture or important details. Occasionally a reference to
subsequent events has been interpolated; but with these few exceptions the lectures
speak from the date of their delivery and represent what I then thought and said. This
caution seems expedient lest they should appear to pass a present judgment on what I
am now required to look into more deeply.
Id. at Preface. All discussion in this Essay of Pound's 1923 lectures refers to the 1930 pub-
lished form.
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presented, he chose to avert his gaze; for the most part, he tended
to write as though they did not exist -9
Like Speranza, Pound believed that the Anglo-American tradi-
tion had spawned a concept of rights that was artificial but highly
useful as a brake on the overweening power of the state. Indeed,
Pound produced a minihistory, from classical times forward, into
which the Anglo-American experience neatly fit. The history of the
West exemplified a cyclical pattern: Periods characterized by the
unrestrained and arbitrary power of the state were followed by
periods that saw an accent on the rights of the individual.130
Nineteenth-century America, in the second part of the cycle, cele-
brated a concept of natural rights founded, in part, upon a recep-
tion of English resistance theory, itself a reaction against the
royalist hegemony of the preceding centuries. Such ideas accorded
well with our own early political and social experience, or what
Pound termed our "pioneer attitude": 131 freedom-loving Ameri-
cans manifesting individualism in their desire to govern themselves,
to take law into their own hands, to shake off the yoke of common-
law formalities. There was some tension between rights ideology in
its English and American guises, but taken together they could
blend into a unitary, individualist, natural-rights tradition.
For Speranza, the century's turn was the new age of behavioral
science, whose methods and concepts directly countered the free-
129. This is at least mainly the case, as my study of Pound will suggest. See also Sheldon
Glueck, A Memoir in Appreciation of the Dean of American Legal Scholars, in Roscon
Poutmi AND C~mnNAM Jusn~cE 1 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1965). Glueck provides a compre-
hensive overview of Pound's criminal justice writings, covering many areas that I do not treat.
He gives relatively little space to the areas of criminal jurisprudence I am concerned with,
however, and he does not provide a detailed or interpretive account of the particular
problems I address. He correctly notes that Pound paid little attention to the substantive law,
noting that "he left to others the baffling issue of mixing the oil of ethically based 'responsi-
bility' with the water of science-influenced determinism." Id. at 23. He also pointed out that
"[i]n 1960, Pound was still insisting that 'Nowhere in the legal order is rethinking of funda-
mental problems more needed than in our criminal law."' Id. at 22. For a more general
discussion of Pound, see id. at 19-23. He also summarizes some of Pound's views on legal
rules, discretion, and individualization. See id. at 30-36. For two other discussions of the
general characteristics of Pound's approach to criminal justice, see John Griffiths, Ideology in
Criminal Procedure, or, A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YA. U. 359, 391-95
(1970); Louis H. Masotti & Michael A. Weinstein, Theory and Application of Pound's Socio-
logical Jurisprudence: Crime Prevention or Control?, 2 Paospi'crus 431 (1969).
130. Pound's habit of providing a schematic and loose-fitting historical periodization for
the origins of the ideas he addressed in what were predominantly philosophical, rather than
historical, commentaries traces back to his earliest articles. See, eg., Roscoe Pound, Do We
Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 CoLum. L. REv. 339 (1905); Roscoe Pound, A New School of
Jurists, 4 U. Snrt. OF TnE U. OF NEB. 249 (1904); Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common
Law, 18 G aN BAG 17 (1906). Much of Pound's later work repeated and elaborated upon
that historical framework.
131. PouND, supra note 128, at 132.
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will-based ideas of the nineteenth century. For Pound, at least well
into the 1920s, the new age was the age of collectivism; the demands
of modem life made the nineteenth-century concept of individual-
ism, to put it mildly, an inconvenience. But Pound, unlike Sper-
anza, looked mainly to sociology and political science, rather than
to behavioral and medical science, perhaps as a result of his early
focus on noncriminal law. Pound understood that behavioral and
medical scientists had attacked - he came to say they had
"routed" - the concept of free will in criminal law, but to that fact,
from which, as we shall see, he never drew truly deep or disturbing
conclusions, he paid only intermittent and relatively minor atten-
tion. It did not blunt his optimistic belief that law and science were
ultimately headed in the same direction. For Pound, scientific no-
tions were functional, instructive, the keys to administrative effi-
ciency - they might well instruct judges regarding the effects of
their decisions. Science was above all a means to mediate between
the individual and the collective order. The new learning made
plain that the reification of rights in common-law theory, as well -
in important instances - as their constitutionalization, threatened
paralysis, and threatened to undermine the position of those indi-
viduals whose social and economic circumstances rendered their
possession of those "rights" a cruel artifice.132 This is, of course,
where his noncriminal-law critiques of "mechanical" jurisprudence
and liberty of contract fit into his historical analysis. Not that
Pound was entirely sanguine about the new collectivist age for
which he prescribed modification of the judge's approach to the
common law. Once again, as he commented in 1921 in The Future
of the Criminal Law,133 the age witnessed a drift back in the direc-
tion of unrestrained authority; once again, insistence on "individual
freedom" and on individual rights, in the form of the procedural
guarantees of the criminal law, had to be maintained - up to a
point, and in order to achieve the proper balance.
What, then, of the new behavioral science? Had Pound missed
the deeper implications of that movement altogether? As early as
1909, Pound seemingly had endorsed criminologists' critique of the
concept of free will; in that year - still early in his career - Pound
reflected with considerable maturity on the relationship between
science and law and set forth a position against which his later writ-
ings on criminal jurisprudence must be read. But his thinking was,
132. Pound, supra note 122.
133. Roscoe Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 COLUM. L REv. 1 (1921).
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and remained, profoundly contradictory. He repeatedly rejected
the essentials of what he called the "orthodox" common-law theory
of crime, or what he believed had come to be so in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century America: the retributive theory, the necessary
joinder of act and intent, and the notion that the offender had pos-
sessed free will. This critique has the feel of a mantra, though, in-
toned but not elaborated upon or explained. Pound never spelled
out an alternative system of criminal justice. He was aware that
dismantling the orthodox approach posed dangers for political lib-
erty, and argued for retaining the safeguards of criminal procedure.
In large part, it must be said, Pound deferred problems to the
future, seeking temporary refuge in the bifurcation of trial and pe-
nology. Too much the jurist to follow the implications of the free
will critique to their logical ends, he adopted a middling position,
one that recognized offenders were at least largely the product of
social or other determining conditions, but that sought to accommo-
date this perspective within the existing system. He urged a deem-
phasis of the concept of individualism and, above all, a reform of
legal institutions. That reform, together with a gradual erosion of
the doctrine and practice of retribution, would, Pound thought, cure
the worst infirmities of criminal law and its administration, and al-
low for retention of those necessary protections against the state. If
tensions remained, they would disappear in time, as law accommo-
dated itself to developments in science. The underlying theory of
crime would itself eventually be reformed - the assumption that
the offender possessed a truly free will would disappear - but the
rest of the criminal law would evolve from reforms already under
way. The administration of criminal justice would change, perhaps
dramatically, but it would remain in its essentials the administration
of justice by jurists and as jurists understood it.
The "logic" of Pound's reformist position was clear in 1909.
Before examining Pound's remarks in that year, I should note that
in a series of articles from 1905 to 1908, Pound had already marked
out a distinctive position on the state of criminal justice administra-
tion in America. Pound's earliest criminal law writings reveal the
influence of his student days and of his early teaching and practice
in Nebraska, where he was attentive to problems of procedure that
he always understood as more than matters of machinery. He
quickly saw the interplay between judge and jury and the manner in
which each filled out the law on the books. 1 4 From his legal educa-
134. WioDoR, supra note 119, at 98-99.
1966 [Vol. 93:1915
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1966 1994-1995
Pound and Criminal Justice
tion at Harvard under the tutelage of John Chipman Gray he ab-
sorbed an appreciation of the judge's lawmaking role;135 in his
Nebraska professorial capacity he developed his understanding of
the social importance of creative exploitation of that role through
exposure to, among others, the prominent sociologist Edward
Ross.136 Frontline practice, mostly in private-law areas, taught him
the subtleties of jury-based lawfinding.
Pound's 1903 Outlines of Jurisprudence'37 reflects both his inter-
est in Holland's Elements of Jurisprudence138 and, perhaps more im-
portantly, his attraction to Sheldon Amos's discourse on criminal
law.139 Amos contributed a modem perspective on criminal juris-
prudence, including elements that folded over easily into the em-
bryonic sociological jurisprudence which Pound borrowed, both
directly and via others, from fashionable German legal scholar-
ship.140 But Amos influenced Pound in other ways as well: In
lengthy passages that Pound prescribed for his students,141 Amos
preached the necessity of a fit between the mandate and theory of
the law and deep-seated social norms. Nowhere was this more im-
portant than in criminal law. As Pound saw it, sometimes this
meant legal reform could proceed only so fast; sometimes it meant
devices were required to correct for the inflexibility of law. But the
attention to the necessity to create a "fit" was always present. This
strain of thought ran through Pound's publications during his Ne-
braska days - down to 1907 - and thereafter, both at Northwest-
ern until 1909, where Dean Wigmore encouraged his interest in
criminal justice reform scholarship, and at Chicago in 1909.142 It
135. Id. at 89.
136. Id. at 111-13.
137. RoscoE POUND, OuTLINS OF LEcrUREs ON JURISPRUDENCE, CBFLY FROM THE
ANALYrICAL STANDPOINT (1903).
138. See id. at 66 (discussing TkoMAs ERsImGH HOLLAND, THE ELEmENn OF JURIsPRU-
DENCE (Oxford, Clarendon 1880)).
139. See PoUND, supra note 137, at 66 (regarding SmrELON AMOS, SCIENCE OF LAW 228-
89 (1880)).
140. See James E. Herget, The Influence of German Thought on American Jurisprudence,
1880-1918, in THm RECE=rION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAw WoRL, 1820-
1920, at 203, 215, 221-23 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
141. PotmD, supra note 137, at 66.
142. See Paul D. Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. LEGAL EDuc. 467,
503-11 (1994). Carrington notes that after Pound's acclaimed 1906 address to the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association, see Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissat-
isfaction with the Administration of Justic4 in REPORT OF TmE TwmNrr-Nmnx ANNUAL
MEETING OF Tim AMERCAN BAR AssOCIATnON (1906), Wigmore enticed Pound to leave his
post at Nebraska and come to Northwestern. At Northwestern, Pound organized the 1909
national conference on criminal law and criminology. Carrington, supra at 507. Pound was
active as well outside the law school, having joined various interdisciplinary organizations.
He became a member of the Juvenile Court Committee in which he worked closely with Hull
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followed him east to Harvard in 1910 and, in one fashion or an-
other, played a critical conditioning role in almost everything he
thought and wrote about the criminal law down to his final days in
the mid-1960s in Langdell Hall.
To his earliest criminal law work, then, Pound brought the same
elements that have been studied by scholars of his noncriminal ju-
risprudence. The extraction of Pound's specific ideas on criminal
jurisprudence from his more general frameworks of sociological ju-
risprudence, organicism, instrumentalism, and Progressivism works
some scholarly injustice, but helps in the task of retracing Pound's
thinking about the role of freedom - free will and political liberty
- in American criminal justice. In any case, one has to sneak up
on the issue of freedom in Pound, for that, in a sense, is the route he
himself took. He rarely focused on the issue systematically:
Rather, he most often resorted to anecdotal accounts of actual on-
the-ground-experience to make his points about the role of the
ideal of human agency in the description and assessment of the law
in practice. From a historically and sociologically informed empiri-
cism - one in which the issue of freedom, first political liberty,
later human free will, played an increasingly important role -
Pound drew his observations and prescriptions, too many to detail
here. My story of Pound's odyssey is only one of many that might
be told.
From his first essay in criminal jurisprudence in 1905, Pound as-
sociated popular discontent concerning both private and criminal
law with the American adversary system's "exaggerated respect for
the individual":143 "We strive in every way to restrain the trial
judge and to insure the individual litigants a fair fight, unhampered
by mere considerations of justice."144 This cost time, money, and
House's Jane Addams and with Ernst Freund, and became involved in the Social Science
Club, where he collaborated with Albion Woodbury Small, the prominent sociologist. Id. at
508. In 1909, much to Wigmore's dismay, Pound accepted a position at the University of
Chicago Law School, probably in order to gain greater access to the likes of Dewey, Small,
Freund, and Addams.
Pound put these credentials and connections to good use. He leapt into the vanguard of
the national campaign for judicial law reform, arguing for "the authority of courts to make
their own rules of procedure, for the simplification of court organization to prevent needless
hassling of jurisdictional issues, for the harmless error principle, and for the eradication of
needless technicality." Id. at 509.
143. Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 346-47
(1905).
144. Id. For Pound's classic description of this "sporting theory" of justice in private-law
cases, see Pound, supra note 142, at 404-05. Pound drew here, in this famously iconoclastic
address, upon Wigmore. See 1A JoHlN HERy WIGMoRE, EVIDNcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 57 (Peter Tillers rev., 1983). Thirty years later, Wigmore described the shocked and
angry reaction of many members of the American Bar Association in attendance at the meet-
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public patience: "[O]ne may sometimes wonder whether lynchings
are not our modem bills of pains and penalties."1 45
In the years 1905-1907, Pound trained his critical gaze on the
impact of "individualism" on the substantive law and on the gulf
between the law and contemporary attitudes, a gulf widened by a
period of dramatic social change which spawned diverse interests
and conflicting groups. The existing law could no longer achieve
"justice," which is to say, "adjust the relations of every man with his
fellows so as to accord with the moral sense of the community."' 46
When law failed, "The individual looks at cases one by one and
measures them by his individual sense of right and wrong."1 47
Pound's remedy for this problem appeared initially in his 1907 arti-
cle, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence.48 The article as-
serted that a widespread disrespect for law engendered "appeals to
the so-called unwritten law... appeals from the clear and settled
law to the individual feelings of the citizen ... ."149 Pound attrib-
uted these antinomian attitudes to the social upheavals of a period
of transition, 5 0 an optimistic note that was repeated in 1908 when
Pound claimed that:
[T]his friction between ethical and sociological theory and legal the-
ory is a temporary phenomenon. When the shifting to the new stan-
dard of justice is accomplished, when education and the labors of
sociologists have brought about the internal conditions of life mea-
sured by reason, the judicial machine will run normally once more
and law will speedily take care of the external conditions.151
ing in St. Paul, Minnesota. John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. PaulAddress of 1906, 20 J.
AM. JuDIcATuRE Socy. 176 (1937). Belknap aptly recounts the incident in MICHA. R. BEL-
xKp, To IMPROVE TmE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTtcE: A HISTORY OF Tim AMImcAN JUtI-
cATuRu SocmTY 9-12 (1992). Belknap notes: "Even the ABA, where the opposition to
Pound's views was probably never as great as Wigmore believed, soon'acknowledged the
validity of many of [Pound's] criticisms." Id. at 11. See also N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HST.
REv. 55, 56-58 (1990).
145. Pound, supra note 143, at 348. Pound here adopted a widely shared view of the
relationship between lynching and the delays associated with the regular judicial process. See
RicHARD MAXwELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN
VIOLENcE AND VIGILANTIsM 144-79 (1975).
146. Pound, supra note 142, at 399.
147. Id.
148. Pound, supra note 124.
149. Id. at 607.
150. See id.
151. Roscoe Pound, Enforcement of Law, 20 GREEN BAG 401, 403 (1908). Here Pound
stated: "Today moralists and sociologists are taking another view of justice. Not liberation of
energies but satisfaction of wants is made the central point. They are defining social justice.
They are teaching that while equality is a concept of individualization, justice is a concept of
co-ordination." Id. (footnote omitted).
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In the meantime, of course, "The necessarily mechanical operation
of legal rules is an inherent difficulty in the administration of [crimi-
nal] justice."'152 The result of this "temporary" dysfunction: "Juries
are conscious that the law in some way does not accord with the
general sense of right, and find verdicts which are crude attempts to
vindicate half-grasped conceptions of social justice.' 15 3 This con-
ception of the jury was an important theme for Pound. In his earli-
est articles, he often situated the jury as a progressive, mediating
institution, both in civil and in criminal cases. Often - especially
on the criminal side - but not without ambivalence.
That ambivalence, at best, was a hallmark of Pound's most com-
prehensive prewar study of criminal administration, Inherent and
Acquired Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive Justice, a
speech delivered to the American Political Science Association in
December, 1907, and published the following year. 54 Therein
Pound referred to the "extravagant powers conceded to juries"; 55
and to "the excessive ... powers which we delegate to juries or
permit them to usurp.' 56 But in commenting upon "our habits of
piecemeal legislation [that] make criminal codes absurd from want
of proportion," Pound conceded: "It is no wonder that the common
sense of jurors leads them to take the law into their own hands in
such a situation.' 5 7 Pound's ambivalence toward the jury reflected
the complexity of his now almost fully developed analysis of what
had gone wrong with criminal justice administration. It traced to
what he saw as the causes of a "[d]issatisfaction with criminal law
and its administration [that] today is world-wide" and that in
America focused mainly on "inefficiency" rather than injustice. 58
That "inefficiency" Pound detailed with respect to both "inherent"
and "acquired" difficulties, covering almost every aspect of criminal
justice administration.
Only several aspects of Pound's well-known disquisition need to
detain us. First, Pound noted that the "public desire for vengeance"
was deep-seated and that juristic commentators were divided be-
tween those who sided with "moralists or sociologists" in their con-
152. Id. at 406.
153. Id. at 403.
154. Roscoe Pound, Inherent and Acquired Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive
Justice, 4 PRoc. AM. PoL. Scx. AssN. 222 (1908).
155. Id. at 225.
156. Id. at 235-36.
157. Id. at 232.
158. Id. at 223.
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denmation of it and those who regarded it "as a legitimate as wel
as practically necessary end."' 59 Pound conceded that "to prevent
self-help and to meet the demands of the moral sentiment of the
community, it is necessary to retain much that is purely retribu-
tive. 1 60 But, he added, this same emotion played havoc with the
administration of criminal justice, producing serious inconsistencies:
One jury is stem, applies the revenge theory as like as not; another is
soft-hearted. And so the fact that we are not all agreed, nor all of us in
all our moods, upon the end of punishment, infects both legislation
and administration with uncertainty, inconsistency, and in conse-
quence, inefficiency. 161
Second, these insights went to the heart of Pound's account
indeed, they governed it perhaps more than he himself realized.
They bridged "inherent difficulties," such as the desire for revenge,
the problems of controlling the inevitable need for discretion and
the ties between criminal law and politics with "acquired difficul-
ties," which were at once embedded in our inherited common-law
adversary system and given a special turn by the American histori-
cal experience. Americans' attraction to natural law theory and
ultra-individualism flowed from our resistance to English legal and
political oppression. This latter resistance to governing magistrates
exacerbated common law "jealousy" of legislation, procedural com-
plexity and delays, and, most important, the exaltation of juries
over judges that interfered with efficient, accurate, and consistent
administration of criminal justice. 62 Pound understood that the
("inherent") retributive theory was related to the ("acquired") un-
bridled powers of the American jury, but he sketched the essentials
of that relationship in only vague terms. We must abandon the re-
tributive theory, he now counseled - adding almost derisively that
it was "taught as among the fundamenta of law."'1 63 He predicted in
his concluding passage that "[g]eneral improvement will come
through better general education in sociology, leading the public to
abandon the retributive idea and the man in the street to desist
from his demand for revenge .... ,"64
159. Id. at 226.
160. Id. at 227.
161. Id. (emphasis added). As my emphasis is meant to indicate, I read this statement as
poignant and self-revelatory, not as one of Pound's commonplace observations. I sense that
it reflects a life-long personal perspective that Pound normally did not allow to rise to the
surface in his writing.
162. Id. at 230-35.
163. Id. at 234.
164. Id. at 239.
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Third, although Pound had begun by balancing the sociologist's
criticism of the desire for revenge and some jurists' recognition of
the virtues of that deep human emotion, and had ended with a call
for repudiation of the "retributive theory," he remained vague
about what that "theory" involved. As to will theory - the con-
ventional doctrine of mens rea - Pound had remained almost si-
lent. He recognized that the requirement of intent flowed from the
retributive theory, which he opposed; however, his noting the im-
portance of the movement to eliminate intent as an element in
many statutory offenses165 seems to be essentially instrumental.
The intent requirement forestalled attempts at rational social con-
trol. If Pound believed it was premised on a false conception of
human behavior, he hadn't said so. Pound may have accepted the
criminologist's view that" 'crime [was] a disease,' 166 and assumed
his audience would understand all of the implications of that view;
but his chief point seems to have been that sociological and crimi-
nological education would stem the desire for revenge and so make
possible rational and efficient procedures for determination of re-
sponsibility and intelligent and effective means of reform of con-
victed offenders. Pound sought a rational, sociologically informed
ordering between liberty and social needs, but not - at least not
explicitly - an entire rejection of the conventional notion of mens
rea or a retreat to a system of criminal justice premised upon a de-
terministic theory of the social defense. It was, all and all, an elabo-
rate, even beautiful construct, evasive on the critical issue of
underlying premises as, one might suggest, any socially acceptable
juristic account of criminal justice must inevitably be.
Finally, Pound's call for a reduction in the powers of the crimi-
nal trial jury requires further comment. Pound opposed the official
law-finding doctrine where "such absurd legislation" continued to
exist and he railed against the practice of allowing juries to set pun-
ishments: "They will be lawless enough without encouragement,"
165. Id. at 234.
166. Pound's statement here was that "[t]he criminologist complains that... whereas he
has 'demonstrated positively that crime is a disease,' the law persistently deals with the crimi-
nal as a normal person." Id. at 222 (quoting Boms, supra note 57, at 90). Two years later,
when Pound addressed the first meeting of the National Conference on Criminal Law and
Criminology (June 7, 1909), he stated: "[The criminologist] complains that whereas it is
demonstrated that in many cases what we call crime is a disease, the law persistently deals
with every offender, unless he is of unsound mind, as a normal person, and as a reasoning
being who has wilfully gone wrong." PRocEEDiNos supra note 88, at 1 (emphasis added).
Note that Pound signed on to - perhaps coauthored - the general introduction to the
Modem Criminal Science Series (1911), which explicitly stated: "It need not be asserted for
one moment that crime is a disease." General Introduction, supra note 105, at vii. See supra
text accompanying note 110.
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he remonstrated.167 Pound noted instances of inconsistent jury ver-
dicts, which resulted from the variable influences of "sentimental-
ity" or from varying reactions to the "unwritten law," which
flourishes in one place as it withers in another.1 68 In closing, Pound
prescribed "limiting the jury to their proper function of finding
facts, and giving the court power to hold them to it," by which he
seems to have meant giving judges the power of "fair comment on
the evidence" and of alerting jurors to the "sophistry and bun-
combe addressed to them by counsel. '169 Pound seems to have be-
lieved that immediate procedural corrections would eliminate, or at
least limit, the tendencies of juries to respond variably and outside
the strict rule of law to the vagaries of retributive or merciful im-
pulses. Yet Pound also evidenced sympathy regarding some forms
of jury "lawlessness" that responded to the gulf between individual-
istic legal conceptions and the social conception of justice. In that
context the jury was not always retrograde, but sometimes, rather,
progressive: "In a crude way, juries are continually attempting to
apply a newer standard of justice, but half-grasped, and the result is
shown in many otherwise inexplicable verdicts." 170
Thus, true jury reform awaited the advent of sociological juris-
prudence. That new day would bring forth a rational and consistent
form of criminal justice, wherein retribution and the intent require-
ment would have given way to - what? A criminal jurisprudence
that did not depend upon a concept of human free will? If so, was
Pound prepared for the implications of so fundamental a transfor-
mation of law, of culture, of human psychology? Unlike Speranza,
Pound had not yet gone to the heart of the matter. He had avoided
the Scylla of despair and the Charybdis of utter "science." But,
then, he was only getting underway. So far as one can tell, he had
not yet truly confronted the challenge to will theory that science
posed for law in the fin de sidcle.
A seemingly unavoidable occasion for such a confrontation
presented itself when, in 1909, Pound reviewed Maurice Parmelee's
The Principles of Anthropology and Sociology in their Relation to
Criminal Procedure.'71 A social scientist with strong interests in
167. Pound, supra note 154, at 236.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 239.
170. Id. at 231.
171. Roscoe Pound, Book Review, 3 AM. PotL Sci. Rnv. 281 (1909) (reviewing MAURIcE
PARmEiL n, THE PR IPS OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SocioLoGY iN TmEm RELATION TO
CRUMNAL PROCMURE (1908)).
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criminal anthropology - and a year or so later, a co-signer with
Pound of the General Introduction - Parmelee supported the posi-
tivist school of criminal jurisprudence and argued in favor of a lim-
ited form of the social defense theory of criminal justice.
Parmelee's critique of the classical school's reliance on the concept
of free will was trenchant:
We have already indicated that [the positive school] does not accept
moral liberty as a basis for penal responsibility. This does not mean
that the existence of a free will is necessarily denied. As a matter of
fact some representatives of this school deny it and others do not.
But they all agree that even if it exists it is something so incalculable in
its character that it cannot be considered in developing a science of
criminology and in the practical treatment of crime.172
The "practical treatment of crime" depended upon the individuali-
zation of punishment; this in turn required a judiciary trained to
gather data of an anthropological and sociological nature.173 Par-
melee paid only intermittent attention to the dangers of the social
defense. At times he wrote quite broadly: "[B]y carefully studying
the criminal himself, his rights as an individual are abridged only to
the extent that social welfare demands."1 74 Elsewhere he was more
guarded, although perhaps less so than he himself recognized: "A
positive [criminal] procedure must retain every guarantee of indi-
vidual liberty... for the criminal so that restrictions placed upon
him shall not exceed those demanded by social defense."' 75
Not surprisingly, Parmelee was hostile to the institution of jury
trial. He conceded, in much vaguer terms than Speranza employed
three years later, that juries kept "judge and justice in touch with
the public"' 76 and that they tended to "individualize punishment,"
but he stressed that this form of individualization "has not always
been on a rational basis."' 77 Rather, he claimed: "In France, the
tendency is to appeal to the passions, in England the tendency is
toward excessive casuistry, but everywhere an oratorical character
is given to the debate and a great deal of sentimental claptrap is
introduced on account of the predominance of sentiment over rea-
172. MAtnUcE PARmE=, Ti PINCiPLEs OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SocIOLooy IN
THEm RELATION TO CRIMINAL PRoCEDuRE 20-21 (1908) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 400-01.
174. Id. at 122.
175. Id at 130-31.
176. Id. at 381.
177. Id. at 363-64. For Speranza's comments on jury behavior, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 73-81.
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son in the jury."' 78 Parmelee looked forward, ultimately, to the ab-
olition of jury trial in criminal cases.179
Pound's response to Parmelee melded respect for the fin de sij-
cle advances in criminology with a warning that the law must, in the
short term, stand its ground. He proceeded upon the understanding
that the scientist "refuses to define crime,"'180 noting that "[b]y
criminal procedure," Parmelee meant a "'process by means of
which the class called criminal is separated from the rest of soci-
ety.' "181 "[T]he law," Pound asserted,
must proceed from defined crimes and a from definite, settled theory.
Hence, for the lawyer, the analytical view of crime, that it consists in
doing what the State has forbidden under sanction of public prosecu-
tion, in violating a public duty, imposed, for whatever reason, by the
State, is the only tenable one.' s2
Pound termed the practice of "deal[ing] with the criminal rather
than with crime" the "criminologist's strongest point," but he in-
sisted that "to minimize the dangerous possibilities of magisterial
caprice, corruption or ignorance," the law required "generality, uni-
formity, and to a considerable degree mechanical action" - an in-
hospitable environment for individualization. 8 3 The defense of
political liberty required a cautious approach to implementing be-
haviorist doctrines and procedures. The power to legislate crimes
and punishments carried with it the possibility of "dangerous forms
of oppression of one class or one portion of the community by an-
other"; whereas "one form of criminal procedure for all causes in-
volving grave penalties will remain an indispensable protection to
the individual."'184 Pound recognized the tensions that his prescrip-
tion entailed, and seems to have recognized also that, in practice,
some form of mediation would - and should - result. In this
respect,
[w]ithout some such dispensing power, the inherent mechanical ten-
dencies in legal systems lead to worse results than the relaxing of logi-
cal principle and sometimes erratic short-cuts to crude equity
characteristic of juries. Undoubtedly our law has carried protection
of the individual much too far. Undoubtedly American criminal pro-
cedure has developed a sort of jury lawlessness. But the history that
led up to the constitutional and common-law guaranties of individual
178. Id. at 366.
179. Id. at 384.
180. Pound, supra note 171, at 282.
181. Id. at 281 (quoting PARMELEE, supra note 172, at 7).
182. Id. at 282.
183. Id
184. 1&
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rights and to the power of juries to render general verdicts may repeat
itself, and is by no means to be ignored.1 5
Thus did Pound continue the dualistic approach to the jury as both
necessary leavener and dangerous obstruction to justice that had
characterized his earliest writing.186 Perhaps acknowledging the
reach of behavioral science, Pound suggested: "In a crude way, ju-
ries are continually attempting to apply a newer standard of justice,
but half-grasped, and the result is shown in many otherwise inex-
plicable verdicts."' 8 7 Pound seems to have anticipated Speranza's
insight that juries were influenced by the rhetoric of penological
reform, but whereas Speranza doubted the jury's ability wisely to
apply the new science before its basic principles were embedded in
official legal practice, Pound - in the interests of political liberty
- now accepted ad hoc, jury-based applications of such ideas as,
for the time being, the better part of wisdom. 8
In his review Pound did pay lip service to the importance of
behaviorist research on the Continent. But while recognizing its in-
fluence on many American reforms - he mentioned juvenile
courts, the indeterminate sentence, and suspension of sentence 89
- Pound remained skeptical of its ability to travel:
[O]ur criminal law is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and
moral responsibility and juridical ideas of retribution, and both crimi-
nal law and procedure are so thoroughly mechanical, that we by no
means make what we should of our discoveries.
The truth is... criminal law is the most archaic part of our legal
system. But it has to deal with some of the most modem of problems.
It needs and will soon receive a very different form of study and a
radically different type of treatment from those which have obtained
in the past.190
What did Pound mean by "theological ideas of free will and
moral responsibility"? Identifying these as "Puritan" notions left
185. Id. at 282-83.
186. For another example of Pound's view on this aspect of jury behavior, see Pound,
supra note 151, at 403 ("Juries are conscious that the law in some way does not accord with
the general sense of right, and find verdicts which are crude attempts to vindicate half-
grasped conceptions of social justice.").
187. Pound, supra note 155, at 231.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 70-81.
189. Pound, supra note 171, at 283. It should be noted that Pound looked upon the devel-
opments in juvenile justice with some ambivalence - or such was the case, at least, in 1912,
when he considered the powers of discretion accorded to judges in those courts quite danger-
ous. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modem City, 26 Hv. L. Rnv. 302,
322 (1913). Pound was not opposed to the institution of the juvenile court as such, but was
concerned that judges be trained adequately to deal with the special problems of juvenile
justice.
190. Id. at 283-84.
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open the possibility that Pound referred to absolutist notions im-
bued with ideas of divine inspiration, distinct from secular concepts
of human freedom and morality that were commonly thought com-
patible with conventional notions of causality. Nonetheless, his
writings on criminal justice from the following years, which often
continued the religious characterization of free will, can indeed be
read as calling for a concept of criminality that would exclude the
element of free will almost entirely. 191
Pointing in the same direction was Pound's statement that "for
the lawyer, the analytical view of crime, that it consists in doing
what the State has forbidden under sanction of public prosecution,
in violating a public duty, imposed, for whatever reason, by the
State, is the only tenable one."'192 Pound contrasted this view with
the criminologist's "refus[al] to define crime";193 due process and
other essentially political considerations required clear and pre-
fixed definitions of criminal offenses. Applied literally, this would
allow for rejection of the application of any concept of free will to
offenders and make possible legislative abandonment of simple in-
tent in cases in which the state so desired; it would allow, too, for
proceeding upon only those "mental" requirements prescribed in
legislation, such as premeditation or malice. Nothing indicates that
Pound ever repudiated these requirements in principle, though he
would allow the State to dispense with them in some undescribed
range of offenses.
Pound thus apparently conjoined a relatively statist approach to
the common lawyer's perspective on the procedural aspects of
political liberty with acceptance of some version of the scientist's
perspective on human freedom. He appears to have gone beyond
the Speranza of 1901, denying the need to accommodate the con-
cept of free will and asserting that law could come to assimilate
191. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 1910 PRoc. B. ASSN. ST.
oF KAN. 45:
So too, the retributive theory is almost among the fundamenta of our criminal law. We
look upon the criminal in the abstract. He is a free moral agent, who, having a choice
between right and wrong, voluntarily chose the wrong and must abide the penal conse-
quences appointed in advance. Not only does this Puritanical view of the matter keep
alive the retributive theory in jurisprudence, after kindred sciences have abandoned it,
but it hampers the efficiency of penal legislation intended to protect society.
Id. at 54; see also General Introduction, supra note 105 (bearing a close relation to the above
statement and signed by Pound). The extent of the denial of the relevance of free will to the
concept of criminality remains unclear, though Pound appears to be coming close to pushing
it aside entirely. For Pound's repeated assertions to the same effect in the late teens and
early twenties, see infra section II.D.
192. Pound, supra note 171, at 282.
193. Ia-
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science in this regard and yet remain the law. But this is only as it
seems. Pound never truly defined his terms. He always led from
the, perspective of the lawyer, and he always embedded his reform-
ism regarding criminal justice within his more general thinking
about the social order. At points Pound sounded themes that can
be found in late-nineteenth-century juristic deterrence-based social-
defense writings - Hershey's voice can sometimes be heard.194
Rather than embrace that perspective fully, though, he seems to
have drawn upon it in part and to have eschewed the whole. His
true target was legal orthodoxy; his true goal - as suggested by his
remarks on the jury's supplying "crude equity," where that was re-
quired - was a via media between that orthodoxy and its radical
rival, as well as between the state and the individual, a balance that
he apparently believed inconsistent with any version of a pure so-
cial defense position, just as he surely believed it was inconsistent
with the criminologist's "refusal to define crime."
It is important to note that Pound's frontal critique of the "free
will doctrine" emerged in the context of the criminal law. It has, to
be sure, an important history in his work, in the form of his private-
law critique of nineteenth-century individualism and in his stress
therein on a sociological perspective. Little in his writing in this
area, however, hints at the more holistic attack on the concept of
autonomy that seems to have appeared at least by 1909 in his writ-
ing on criminal jurisprudence. In Liberty of Contract,195 Pound re-
ferred to "practical conditions of inequality,"1 96 and complained
that justice had, in the nineteenth century, come "to be regarded as
a device to secure a maximum of individual self-assertion"; 197 "Pu-
ritan theology," he claimed, "gave rise to ultra individualism
.... "198 Here he seems to stress relative degrees of autonomy,
whereas with respect to criminal justice he noted that Puritanism
gave rise to "the doctrine that man was a free moral agent with
power to choose what he would do and a responsibility coincident
with that power," thus challenging the idea of autonomy in a more
fundamental way.199 Pound's concrete examples, outside of the
194. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24. Hershey and Pound were in fact close
friends during their Harvard student days (1889-90) and for many decades thereafter. See
WIODOR, supra note 88, at 33.
195. Pound, supra note 122.
196. Id. at 454.
197. IM. at 459.
198. I&
199. Roscoe Pound, The Ritual of PunitiveJustice in 1909 Pnoc. Wisc. CONF. ON CmuM.
L & CRM woLOoY 36, 42. Yet Pound opened the 1909 Chicago Conference with a brief
1978 [Vol. 93:1915
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1978 1994-1995
June 1995] Pound and Criminal Justice 1979
criminal law, are instructive. Pound criticized one court for failing
to "consider that laborers in mines may be in a continual condition
of poverty, and, that, as Lord Northington put it: 'Necessitous men
are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present exigency,
will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon
them.' "2m He noted, "It is said that statistics show the great major-
ity of accidents happen in the last working hour of the day, when
the mind is numbed and the operative has ceased to be the free agent
which our law contemplates."'201 As to the remedy for such situa-
tional unfreedom: in The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence,
Pound noted the advances signaled by legislation that took account
of the actual position of individuals in society, a trend he identified
with a newly emerging "moral sense of the community," and "the
custom of the people, the expression of their habits of thought and
action as to the relations of men with each other. '"2°2 Surely these
popular "habits of thought" did not embrace a rejection of the no-
tion of free will! He contrasted these tendencies to "the general
moral sense of the past," "the older individualism," and "individu-
statement that included the observation: "Then, again, we have, especially in the criminal
law, and in many places in the law of torts, ideas of free moral agency and responsibility
carried to an extreme." See PROCEmiNGs, supra note 88, at 2. Here, Pound equated crimi-
nal and some noncriminal doctrines; Pound's perspective appears to be relativistic as to both.
See also Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Acdion, 44 AM. L. Rnv. 12, 32-33 (1910)
[hereinafter Pound, Law in Books]; Pound, supra note 191, at 50-52. Note, however, the
passage in which Pound wrote:
[O]ver-individualism... expresses the feeling of the self-reliant man that, as a free moral
agent, he is to make his own bargains and determine upon his own acts and control his
own property, accepting the responsibility that goes with such power, subjecting himself
to liability for the consequences of his free choice, but exempt from interference in mak-
ing his choice.
Pound, Law in Books, supra, at 26. Here, "over-individualism" (with respect to contract and
property) is associated with the belief that one, "as a free moral agent," may behave a certain
way. Pound did not clearly state that the belief that one is a "free moral agent" is itself false.
By contrast, he seems to argue that "free will" is a false belief in the context of the criminal
law. Between 1913 and 1919 Pound came to characterize "free will" generically as a mere
feeling, a clear extension of the ideas he was expressing here. Even then, however, it is not
clear that he ceased to treat contract relations in terms of relative degrees of freedom. See
infra text accompanying notes 235-43. It is possible that, as of 1910, the "free moral agent"
concept that Pound opposed, both in criminal and in private law, was the absolutist version of
the idea, and that he had not fully rejected the concept of free will. Rather, he absorbed a
version of the behaviorist critique of the doctrine, assumed that human freedom was greatly
limited by circumstances, but assumed also that under the right conditions - conditions of
rough equality - humans could exercise "liberty," which he seems to have equated with
freedom. Pound may have thought that the very fact that a person had committed a "crime"
demonstrated he had not - under the prevailing circumstances - possessed a free will or
"liberty." Thus, his critique of the concept of free will in the context of the criminal law was
both more emphatic and stated in a fashion that implied its total rejection.
200. Pound, supra note 122, at 471-72 (criticizing and quoting Vernon v. Bethel, 2 Eden
110, 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762)).
201. Pound, supra note 191, at 53 (emphasis added).
202. Pound, supra note 124, at 612, 615.
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alist theories," which still governed the training of bench and bar
and, hence, the responses of courts to the new legislation.203 Pound
also contrasted the traditional common law view to the new sociol-
ogy, "the direction of popular thought," and "the unconscious drift
of the law," by which he meant not only legislation but also jury
verdicts in some kinds of private law cases involving egregious im-
balances in bargaining power.2°4
Pound confronted the free-will doctrine head on in the domain
of criminal jurisprudence, having been drawn out into the open by
the behaviorist perspective represented in Parmelee's 1908 book.
Here, a divide opened in Pound's thinking, one that, as we have
seen, was endemic to the early twentieth century generally. Pound
reflected the tensions between an anti-free-will view and the attrac-
tions of a more relativistic position. He had by 1909 grasped the
nettle, but the resulting tensions played out more profoundly in the
context of his criminal law writings.
In truth, even within his criminal jurisprudence, Pound's con-
stant reiteration of the need to reform the orthodox theory of crimi-
nality was in powerful tension with his desire to maintain protection
of the individual - the vindication of political liberty.205 He seems
not to have fully understood this, and he never stopped saying that
eventually society would solve the problem of absorption of the
new sciences without surrendering basic liberties. As we shall see,
affirmation of the concept of human freedom crept into his later
work, when he moved back from the criminal law per se to focus
upon the workings and purposes of the social order generally. But
203. Id. at 612, 613, 615.
204. Id. at 612.
205. See, however, Pound's remarks at the 1909 National Conference on Criminal Law
and Criminology, when he was drawn into a heated discussion of the possibility of scientific
determination of the "criminal type." PRocnmiNbs, supra note 88, at 89-98. Pound began
quite tentatively:
I don't think that any criminologist now claims that probably we shall ever be able to
look at a man and say that he is necessarily a criminal. On the other hand they do
believe, and they seem to have a good deal of warrant for believing, that there is to a
certain extent - just how great that extent is we cannot tell - a physical type of person
who is born with anti-social tendencies, which we call criminals; that is, his physical
make-up is such that he has the tendency to do those things which are anti-social.
Id. at 92-93. He noted that such study was proceeding in Europe, where "they have a free-
dom of dealing with criminals... which we do not have in this country. In this country, in
accordance with the requirements of due process of law, very little can be done beyond what
any person may voluntarily submit to." Id. at 93. Pound warmed to his subject:
If we are to accomplish anything in this country we have got to have general laws provid-
ing for some such mode of investigation. I do not know how far at present it is practica-
ble, but that in the future something of the sort will have to be done, I really have not
much doubt. ... It runs somewhat counter to our Anglo-Saxon notions, but it will come.
As to how far it is an immediately practical question, I confess my mind is still open.
Id. Pound did not address the question of the use of the results of such (future) studies.
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this is to get ahead of the story, for the tensions in Pound's work are
most profound, and most telling, during the late teens and early
1920s. First, we must complete our assessment of the early, prewar
Pound with some observations on his growing frustration with the
criminal trial jury.
The jury fared reasonably well in Pound's review of Parmelee; it
reflected the moral sense of the community in adjusting the
mechanical legal rules that could not be altered suddenly in a soci-
ety devoted to political liberty. And its virtues, as Pound portrayed
them, exposed the dangers of a trial in which the jury was restricted
to a mere determination of whether the defendant had committed
an "act" that the state had defined as a crime. But that was Pound
playing defense against the overreach of the new science. Between
1909 and 1911, Pound came to view the criminal trial jury with in-
creasing skepticism. In his introduction to the 1911 English transla-
tion of Raymond Saleiles' classic work, The Individualization of
Punishment, Pound was downright negative.206 Pound had signed
and quite possibly written the potentially far-reaching General In-
troduction to the Modem Criminal Science Series;207 and in his own
introduction to Saleilles he seems temporarily to have abandoned
one of his most cherished positions, that law must reflect evolving
social attitudes. He now associated Amos with those who deemed
mechanical, as opposed to individualized, justice as "fundamen-
tal.''208 Amos, he said, stated the conventional theory "as a matter
of course, with no hint that we may attain anything better. '209
Pound rehearsed once again the reasons for an overly mechanical
criminal law - by then tired-sounding phrases - and noted that
the "equities" of individual cases had been left to juries. Far from
serving as a needed countermeasure, however, jury intervention
had made it difficult for courts "to procure convictions at all in
cases of homicide. '210 As a result, many jurisdictions had left the
penalty to the jury only to find that this produced wild inconsisten-
cies. Pound now concluded:
Obviously the crude individualization achieved by our juries, and es-
pecially by leaving the assessment of penalties to trial juries, involves
quite as much inequality and injustice as the mechanical application
of the law by a magistrate. Unchecked jury discretion upon the whole
206. Roscoe Pound, Introduction, in SALmLLs, supra note 105.
207. See supra note 105 and text accompanying notes 99-108.
208. Pound, supra note 206, at xiv.
209. Id. at xv.
210. Id. at xv-xvi.
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is worse than the unchecked magisterial discretion from which the
classical school sought to deliver us.211
Although Saleilles himself addressed the problem of responsibility
as well as that of punishment - and, indeed, offered a middle posi-
tion, albeit opaque, that saved something akin to conventional the-
ory,212 Pound seems to have been paying increasing attention to the
sentencing stage, when a better educated judge should apply the
new learning and - perhaps Pound did not consciously think of it
in this way - make up for the inevitable infirmities of the guilt-
assessment stage. Clearly Pound's patience with the criminal trial
jury had worn thin. He had already begun to accept the view, much
in the air at the fin de siecle and constantly reiterated in AICLC
speeches and writings circa 1910, that the English version of the
criminal trial was far superior to the American. In part, Pound
thought this was the result of English juridical theory: "In England,
where an unfettered Parliament makes the written law sensitive to
public opinion, there is very little jury lawlessness." 213 But Pound
did not always permit this perspective to temper his impatience
with the American criminal jury, which existed in what he well un-
derstood to be a very different socio-legal climate. The English trial
became an example for reform in the here and now.
When, in 1910, Pound had reflected sympathetically on jury in-
tervention - in the second-best here and now - he had singled
out, inter alia, the tendency of the jury to correct for the mechanical
nature of the law of insanity.
Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administra-
tion.... [W]here in a particular cause there are peculiar considera-
tions of mitigation or circumstances requiring exercise of a dispensing
power, the power of juries to render general verdicts needs only a
little help from alienist theories of insanity to enable a verdict to be
rendered which will accord with the moral sense of the community.
Here again, as in the case of the "third degree," the law is often too
mechanical at a point requiring great nicety of adjustment.214
A year later, in the wake of the Strasburg decision, which Pound
saw as just another unfortunate victory of "classical theory" over
211. Id. at xvii (emphasis added). Note, however, that Pound was friendlier in his Intro-
duction to the civil trial jury. Id. at xv.
212. SALELLEs, supra note 105, at ch. 6. For an excellent discussion of Saleilles's views,
see GARLAND, supra note 14, at 186-89. Garland addresses Saleilles's concept of the "subjec-
tive reality" of free will, SATrEi.s, supra note 105, at 158-59. As I shall argue, Pound came
to a similar position a few years later;, possibly, he was influenced by Saleilles in this regard,
but neither his Introduction nor his later writings specifically suggests that he was. For fur-
ther discussion of Pound's views regarding the consciousness of freedom, see infra note 242.
213. Pound, Law in Books, supra note 199, at 19.
214. Id. at 18.
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"modem legislation," 215 Pound's tolerance had largely evaporated.
"Exercised in homicide cases," Pound wrote, the power of juries to
render general verdicts "led to the situation Mark Twain satirized
when he called upon the legislature to make insanity a crime. '216
Pound was commencing an important transition. Specific exam-
ples of progressive criminal trial jury responses - reflecting emerg-
ing social customs and embodying "newer standards" that were
"half-grasped" - would, within a decade, become little more than
a part of frontier justice, reflecting "pioneer ideas," or responses to
the "unwritten law."217 By then, however, the experience of the
Progressive Era had reoriented Pound's perspective. New tensions
had set in. On the one side, Pound responded to the seduction of
massive, government-sponsored social reform. These projects were
still only partly effected but nonetheless sufficiently advanced that
mediating institutions like the jury were unnecessary intrusions
rather than necessary evils. On the other side, Pound recognized
the incipient dangers of too much reform, especially the threat of a
criminal law dominated by the collective - and administrative -
state. Basic protections would remain necessary; the new theory
would have to be assimilated carefully and - as always - gradu-
ally. Individual liberty, once too great, would now have to be pro-
tected against the needs of organized society. The cycle was
changing. Human freedom would now have to be redefined as it-
self a social interest and as valid as such. And, as such, jurispru-
dence would have to insist upon it. But Pound did not refer to the
orthodox theory of free will in the criminal law, nor did Pound refer
to the "corrective" powers of the criminal trial jury. For a new age,
Pound postulated a new version of an unstable mix of ideas.
C.
Pound's 1916 speech, Juristic Problems of National Progress,218
represents the first stage of Pound's mature work on criminal juris-
prudence. The years of work on his tripartite study of sociological
jurisprudence 219 and on many briefer succeeding essays had served
him well. So, too, had the prewar era of high Progressivism influ-
215. Pound, supra note 206, at xi. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
216. Id. at xvi (referring to MARK Tw~iN, A New Crime, in SurcHis Nnw AND Oim 220
(1875)).
217. See infra text accompanying notes 299-309.
218. Roscoe Pound, Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 AM. J. Soc. 721 (1917).
219. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24
HAgv. L. Rnv. 591 (1911), 25 HAgv. L. Rtv. 140 (1911), 25 HARv. L. Rnv. 489 (1912).
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enced Pound's thought - deepening it and producing an attractive
selfconsciousness. Pound continued to believe that the role of law
- of society in general - was the "satisfaction of a maximum of
wants with a minimum of sacrifice of other wants" rather than, sim-
ply, the maximizing of individual self-assertion.220 He had grown
increasingly convinced, though, that the moral and social life of the
individual and, indeed, the preservation of what he now called free
individual action were among the most basic wants and, hence,
were themselves central social interests.P 1 This turn of thought -
Pound's application of social-interest theory - accompanied his
fear that the drift toward centralization, the eclipse of the judicial
process by newly-minted administrative agencies, and the sheer
mass of legislative mandates would undermine political liberty,
overall social efficiency, and, especially, individual freedom. This
new emphasis on "spontaneous individual action" significantly
heightened the tension that plagued his criminal jurisprudence. But
operationally, what did this language of "freedom" mean? How did
it come to play so important a role for Pound in the life of the law?
We must answer these questions in order to assess Pound's evolving
criminal jurisprudence. We should begin by noting the role this
new language played in Pound's 1916 speech.
Pound began the speech by criticizing the old theories of law
making as "necessitarian."'' "[In] [t]he seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries," he wrote, "men conceived they were finding law
while making it. To these centuries all law was inevitably deter-
220. Pound, supra note 218, at 724.
221. On the derivation of Pound's theory of social interests, see vIoDOR, supra note 88,
at 210-14. Wigdor emphasizes Pound's attraction to "organicism" and to the idea of "rela-
tion." "It was more meaningful to interpret rights, duties, and liabilities as incidents of a
relation rather than as terms of a transaction or a culpable action. Thus the rights and re-
sponsibilities of employer and employee received their legal definition in terms of the rela-
tionship of the parties rather than the will of the parties." Id at 211. Wigdor traces the idea
of organicism to late-nineteenth-century thought, see especially id. at 325-26, 326 n.11, and
concludes that, with respect to his social-interest theory, Pound was influenced first by Jher-
ing, but more importantly ("directly") by Albion Small. Wigdor states that "Pound hoped
that this theory would replace the conventional preoccupation with 'rights' as the basis of
law." Id. at 213.
H.R Er, supra note 119, at 167-69, establishes the relationship between Pound's theory
of social interests and the ideas Pound gleaned from Jhering, Kohler, and William James.
Herget states that, for Pound: "To have a chance of being accepted, these claims [i.e. "inter-
ests"] must be more than mere personal demands; they are asserted to be morally right,
accepted by society, and generally applicable to some particular class or group of persons."
Id. at 168.
Pound's attention to social interests became a dominant theme in his criminal-justice writ-
ings at least as early as 1912. See Pound, supra note 189. For further discussion of the back-
ground for Pound's social interest theory - and the claim that Pound gave these ideas a
distinctive turn - see SAYRE, supra note 119, at 359-64.
222. Pound, supra note 218, at 723.
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mined by the nature of man... ."2 The nineteenth century jurist
"came to doubt whether he could do more than observe the
processes by which legal rules and doctrines took their predestined
shapes."224
The irresistible movement of the ethical or political ideal to realize
itself, the inevitable operation of natural forces as completely beyond
human reach... the relentless working out of biological laws as hard
and unyielding as those that shape animal and vegetable life - these
... convinced men that the most that legal science could do for us was
to teach us to observe nature's machine in operation .... So obsti-
nate are these modes of thought that the economic interpretation
which has been passing for modem and advanced in much recent ju-
ristic writing is essentially of the same necessitarian character.22
"The time," Pound announced, "calls for voluntaristic theories of
lawmaking on the part of jurists and judges," or what he called an
"engineering interpretation of jurisprudence. 226 The watchword of
such an interpretation would no longer be efficiency, but, in the
military fashion of the day, "organization and preparedness"; the
new legal science would be one that "constructs as well as observes
... that observes in order that it may construct." 227
Pound anticipated objections to such a "voluntaristic philosophy
of lawmaking," the most serious coming from the "political and
philosophical individualist," who will "say that the grain of truth in
the nineteenth-century theories of juristic and legislative futility is
in the necessity of safeguarding this spontaneity of individual ac-
tion, this individual initiative in thinking and acting which is the
mainspring of progress." 2n But Pound rejected this argument as
failing to take account of the "ever-widening recognition and secur-
ing of social interests." 229 The essentially eighteenth-century per-
spective on justice "as a problem of reconciling government and
liberty," had given way, Pound claimed, to "a problem of recon-
ciling organization with spontaneous individual effort; of recon-
ciling social control with individual initiative." 30 The formulation
was not entirely new for Pound, but it was more elaborate and ut-
tered with greater urgency. Something very like the language of
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 723-24.
226. Id. at 724.
227. Id. at 724-25.
228. Id. at 725-26.
229. Id. at 726.
230. Id. at 727.
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human free will was becoming a staple of Pound's social theory and
jurisprudence.
To illustrate the objectives of an "engineering interpretation of
jurisprudence," Pound chose the criminal law, labeling it "a well-
understood body of tradition proceeding on one theory on which
we have grafted an overgrown mass of legislation proceeding on
many diverse and conflicting theories," and claiming that "it is no
one's business to put the whole into even the semblance of order,
much less to survey the whole, trace its different constituents with
reference to the ends to be attained, and seek to make it more ef-
fective toward those ends."231 Pound had initially encouraged the
proliferation of interdisciplinary writings under the auspices of the
AICLC as a route to greater comprehension.232 Now, seven years
later, he vainly but optimistically struggled against the centrifugal
energies that had - one might have thought, predictably - been
released, depicting criminal law as fragmented into a "medical view
in which the criminal law is thought of in terms of the insane and
the epileptic"; a "psychological view in which it is thought of in
terms of the feeble-minded"; as well as the perspectives of penolo-
gists, social workers, and the police.23 3
This focus on system and overall coordination - in the "mili-
tary" style or otherwise - dominated Pound's later writings gener-
ally. It simultaneously reflected Pound's deep skepticism that mind,
man, or society could be understood from any one particular per-
spective - and his naive faith in a holistic approach to solving
problems, one that melded the best of all available ideas. Pound's
skepticism had also a larger dimension, that of the historicist. No
age found final answers but only solutions suitable to itself. This
aspect of his skepticism - a species of relativism - left room for
belief in the existence, at any one time, of general social mores, of
ideas, attitudes, and practices that bound a society together and that
provided the basis for consensus despite the presence of competing
interests. This blend of elements that underlay Pound's engineering
interpretation of jurisprudence eventually separated him from the
postwar realists, whose private-law writings typically denied the
existence of pervasive, society-wide moral conventions and stressed
the arbitrary quality of judicial decisionmaking.23 4 Nowhere did
231. Id. at 728.
232. IRocEINGs, supra note 88, at 3.
233. Pound, supra note 218, at 728-29.
234. See, e.g., White, supra note 119, at 1010-21.
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Pound make his case more emphatically, however, than with re-
spect to the criminal law.
Pound soon integrated his insistence upon the need for system
and coordination with his new-found attention to "individual free-
dom and individual initiative." In 1919, in one of his least known,
yet most revealing essays, Society and the Individual,35 he stated
that individual interests lay side by side with "public interests,"
which are "the claims which the state may make simply as such,"
and "social interests," which included, inter alia, "the social interest
in the individual human existence. '' 236 Individual interests, then, re-
ceived both separate treatment and a place within social interests.
It is fair to say that Pound was attempting to redress a movement in
the direction of the collective state to which, he may well have
feared, his own early writings had contributed. His argument,
stated in generalities that failed to make clear the nature of the
"freedom" he was now attributing to the individual, extended ideas
that he had expressed at least as early as 1910 and that seem to have
crystallized steadily in the 1913-1919 period.
In this piece, Pound briskly denounced the classical view of "so-
ciety and all social groups as products of individual agreement,"
and produced the most comprehensive deterministic account of
human thought and behavior that, to my knowledge, he ever set
forth:
Metaphysically the individual conscious ego may, if you will, be the
unit. But it is a profound mistake to take that ego for the ultimate
reality in the social world. You and I are born into the great stream of
society. We die out of it. But it went on before us and will go on after
us, and if some of us are able to do something to shape some part of
its course, yet how much more will it have shaped us, molding our
thoughts by fixing the conditions under which and words by which we
think, controlling oir actions by bonds of convention, fashion, general
opinion, of which we are hardly conscious, which we can resist only
here and there, and then often but feebly, and forming our very per-
sonality by the pressure day and night of a thousand points of contact
with our fellows in the stream. So true is it that the individual is a
social product or a social outcome rather than society an individual
productP37
Pound did not say how long he had held this general view, which
had long been fashionable in social-science - but not, so far as one
235. Roscoe Pound, Society and the Individual, 1920 PRoc. NATL. CoNF. ON Soc. WoRK
103 (Conference held June, 1919).
236. Id, at 103, 104-06 (1920).
237. Id. at 104.
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can tell, in legal-academic - circles.238 Nor can we know how
much leeway the power to "resist only here and there, and then
often but feebly" allows. Pound rushed on, commenting that
[a] few years ago all this was, one might say, trite. But a reaction has
set in. Men have come to fear that in this emphasis on the social
stream the interests of the individual in the stream will be overlooked
and neglected - as it has been said, that our social thinking would
abolish the individual. Thus there is coming to be a marked revival of
the abstract individualism against which we were all in revolt a decade
ago.23 9
But for Pound, the art of social engineering was the art of
compromise:
I submit the way to meet this reaction is to recognize the kernel of
truth in the old individualism - that is, that one of the chiefest of
social interests is that each individual have an opportunity to lead a
human life; to recognize a social interest in the moral and social life of
the individual, and to recognize that one of the chief agencies of social
progress is individual freedom and individual initiative.240
Here Pound moved from his tentative, distancing phrasing of two
years earlier - "the political and philosophical individualist... will
say that [there is a] grain of truth in the nineteenth-century theo-
ies''41 - to his own forthright recognition of "the kernel of truth
in the old individualism." This "truth" would be conceded and the
individual interests would be reconceived as at once self-standing
and an aspect of the social interest.
Pound seems to have defined the freedom to which he had re-
ferred increasingly in recent years as the consciousness of freedom,
rather than as an "ultimate reality," and its recognition as a social
interest - or possibly the belief in its being an ultimate reality as a
social interest. This pragmatic approach to human freedom kept
238. Pound read voraciously (see HERGEr, supra note 119, at 164-65), but he often re-
duced many variations on a theme to an effective (and affecting) monovocal synthesis.
Pound had been influenced by James, Dewey, and a great many others with respect to both
pragmatism as a general matter and an interest in consciousness and experience more specifi-
cally. (For an excellent study of will, consciousness, and "pragmatic truth" in late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth-century thought, see KLOPPENBERG, supra note 126, at 64-94.) I have
not attempted to associate specific Poundian formulations with specific social-science or phil-
osophical writings. Pounds "methodology" makes it difficult to do so; his lack of philosophi-
cal depth (which is not to say lack of learning and wisdom) makes it a bit beside the point. I
have sought to show how Pound applied his learning, others will shed more light than I can
on the specific sources of that learning.
239. I& It is not clear what Pound is referring to here; his comment might reflect ongoing
trends in "domestic" political and social thought or it might reflect the reaction against either
Marxist ideas or against certain strands of German thought that emphasized the community
over the individual.
240. Pound, supra note 236, at 104 (emphasis added).
241. Pound, supra note 218, at 726.
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social interest and social coordination - hence, "compromise" -
in the foreground. It allowed for restraints on human freedom on
essentially utilitarian grounds, even as it recognized that freedom as
a central feature of human existence, of what it meant to be human.
Born of concerns regarding political liberty, Pound's belief in a spe-
cies of human freedom remained an aspect of his largest concern:
social engineering as a means of achieving the well-being of the so-
cial order generally.242 Through it all, Pound's concept of "individ-
ual freedom" remained supremely vague. His distinction between
the perspectives of the "ultimate reality" and the "conscious ego"
remained, I believe, the critical background idea, but Pound seems
occasionally to have lost sight of it. He sometimes sounded as
though "individual freedom" was a reality, sometimes as though it
was a mere "claim," in the sense of belief. He, himself, might have
thought of it as sometimes one, sometimes the other.
The slipperiness of Pound's idea of freedom is evident in his ap-
plication, in 1921, of social engineering to private law:
242. It is possible that Pound was influenced by Parmelee, or that they mutually influ-
enced one another. Parmelee had in 1916 defined "normal life" as "the spontaneous expres-
sion of human nature," and had concluded: "Now it is evident that in any organized society
the spontaneity of the individual must be limited at least a little by the need for a certain
amount of social control." MAunicE PARmELEE, PovERTY Am SoCrAL PRoOGRS S 452
(1916). Pound had referred to "spontaneous individual effort" in his 1916 speech in a similar
context: "We may restate [the matter] as a problem of reconciling organization with sponta-
neous individual effort; of reconciling social control with individual initiative." Pound, supra
note 218, at 727; see supra text accompanying note 230. Tvo years later, Parmelee wrote:
"But the progress of science has destroyed for all practical purposes the theological and met-
aphysical doctrine of a free will"; he warned that "fear," as an aspect of the penal function,
while useful, "stands in the way of many changes which will prove to be beneficial, and thus
impedes social progress. Furthermore, it prevents the highest possible degree of free activity
on the part of human beings, and thus hinders the spontaneous expression of human nature
which should be the principle object of civilization and of human culture in general." MAU-
icaE PAnRELEr, CRnwNoIoOY 379, 384 (1918). Pound and Parmelee appear to have
tracked one another. Pound expressed his views regarding "spontaneous individual effort"
within the context of his theory of the social interest. Parmelee led more from the perspec-
tive of achieving progress while not sacrificing social control. In one important particular,
Parmelee seems not to have influenced Pound. In his 1918 book, Parmelee adopted a view
that, he said, reconciled the problem of responsibility: "while it is true that the human organ-
ism and human nature have been determined by all the forces which have acted upon them, it
is also true that this organism is a complex mechanism and center of energy from which
radiates stimulations and impulsions which may have far-reaching consequences. Further-
more, as an organism it is highly self-directing, more so, indeed, than any other organism.
Consequently, we have every reason to regard the human organism as an efficient cause of
the deeds which emanate from it, and the consequences of those deeds. In this positive and
scientific sense, then, we may regard the individual as responsible for his conduct." PARME-
LEE, CRImINOOGY, supra, at 380. Parmelee drew here upon RAY MADDING MCCONNELL,
CRIMINAL REsPNoNsmIrrY AND SociAL CONSTRAINT (1912). See especially id. at chapter 12,
entitled "Freedom as the Absence of External Constraint." Pound appears to have avoided
this language and to have rested his views on the consciousness of freedom. Note, however,
that Pound's protdgd, Sheldon Glueck, expressed views similar to those of Parmelee. See
infra text accompanying note 354.
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An important phase of this interest in the individual life calls for
security to free and spontaneous self-assertion .... But there are
many conditions in the life of today in which other phases of this in-
terest must come into account.... Today our statute books have come
to be full of... restrictions. We do not ask: What will promote the
maximum of abstract freedom of contract, taken as the end of law?
We ask rather: Does it secure a maximum of interests with a mini-
mum sacrifice of interests to leave such persons free to contract as
they choose, or must the legal order, in a wise social engineering, hold
down their free self-assertion for a time in certain situations? 243
Here Pound stressed the point he had made from the very start:
"Freedom" is subject to limitation by the legal order. Perhaps his
social-interest theory was simply an aspect of his earlier sociological
jurisprudence, but clearly he now asked different questions. He
had found room for a significant measure of "free individual initia-
tive" in property and contract, though, of course, he did not refer to
it as the exercise of free will. Although the "freedom" he here de-
scribed probably did not reflect "ultimate reality," in private-law
matters the Progressive legal order could adjust for real imbalances
in the practical ability of persons to exercise the freedom they
imagined they possessed in some ultimate sense. There were ten-
sions among the strands of thought in Pound's private-law writings,
but on the whole in that context, his open references to compromise
and coordination papered over those tensions. Social engineering
was a "functional" approach precisely because it recognized com-
peting interests, among them the claim to human freedom as an
243. Roscoe Pound, A Theory of SocialInterests, 15 Poc. OF TH AM. Soc. Socy. 16,27-
28 (1921) [hereinafter Pound, A Theory of Social Interests] (footnote omitted); see also Ros-
coe Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 42 REP. AM. B. ASSN. 445,
450 (1919) [hereinafter Pound, Administrative Application] ("[W]e are forced to admit that a
wise engineering may hold down free self-assertion in many situations and is not bound, as a
condition of rightful existence, to leave all men free to contract or to conduct enterprises with
the minimum of restriction necessary to keep the peace.").
Note that in A Theory of Social Interests, Pound quoted William James: "'Must not the
guiding principle for ethical philosophy ... be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands
as we can?"' Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, supra, at 28 n.1 (quoting WImlUAM JAMEs,
The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in TmE WILL TO BErLmVE, 205 (New York,
Longmans Green & Co. 1897)). Some thirty years later, Pound modified his views:
But thinking of the civil side of the legal order, I have come to feel that instead of
putting the task of law, as William James did, in terms of satisfying as much as we can of
the total of human demands, we do better to speak of providing as much as we may of
the total of men's reasonable expectations in life in civilized society with the minimum of
friction and waste. Free self-determination is a much prized and eminently reasonable
expectation which must ever be weighed in adjustment of relations in and by politically
organized society.
Roscoe Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1954) [hereinafter
Pound, Will in Law] (footnote omitted). Pound restricted himself here to the private law: "I
say nothing of the role of the will in criminal law." Id.
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aspect of human consciousness that engendered both social pro-
gress and, the individual's sense of well-being.
With respect to criminal jurisprudence, the matter was very dif-
ferent. In that setting, to be sure, post-hoc adjustment via the appli-
cation of rules of law, expert opinion rendered in the course of the
judicial process and judicially administered penology could go a
long way. But Pound was convinced that attributing true autonomy
to criminal offenders was factually wrong, productive of retributiv-
ism, and detrimental to the social interest in dealing intelligently
with the underlying causes of crime. Inevitably, Pound's references
to free self-assertion - heuristic or otherwise - seemed to clash
with his continuing critique of the role of free will in the orthodox
theory of criminality. This contradiction was often lost, though, in
Pound's focus upon the need for a rational, coordinated, functional
system of criminal administration. When Pound wrote about crimi-
nal justice as the balancing of the social interest in public order and
the social interest in the individual - in that context, he resorted to
the ambiguous language of human freedom. But when he focused
specifically on the underlying theory of criminal responsibility, he
carried over his comprehensive-sounding rejection of the nine-
teenth-century concept of free will. All of Pound's major writings
of the early 1920s on the criminal law and its administration mani-
fest these ambiguous tendencies.
Pound's most important application of his theory of social inter-
ests to criminal justice appeared in The Future of the Criminal Law,
a paper he gave at the American Prison Congress in the fall of
1920.2" In this setting, though, where one might expect sustained
attention to the enduring problems that the new science presented
for an underlying theory of criminal responsibility, Pound ad-
dressed instead the issues of political liberty and the place of crimi-
nal law - mainly those procedural aspects that reflected its highly
charged political role - in the story of the West and, finally, in the
story of modem America. It is here that Pound suggested most
strongly that collectivism might, in some spheres, have gone too
far.245 He gave great scope to his longstanding concern about the
use of administrative agencies rather than the common-law courts
to resolve issues of criminal justice, referring inter alia to boards of
probation and parole, whose role reduced the court's participation
244. Pound, supra note 133. The paper was originally published in 1920 PRoc. ANN.
CONGRESS AM. PRISON AssN. 68.
245. Pound, supra note 133, at 9-16.
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in sentencing to a mere formality.246 In other contexts, judicial de-
terminations were being preempted by preliminary reports by
"alienists or psychiatrists" or by "boards and commissions" that re-
solved matters through "inspectors and secretaries and agents. '' z47
Avoidance of regularly constituted judicial tribunals meant loss of
protections against governmental overreach. But even in those
courts, there was overreach: "American prosecutions today are
coming to be conducted with a ferocity without parallel in common-
law trials since the Stuarts."2
4
Pound's essay presented in brief compass his pendulum-swing
schema for criminal justice history: Periods of repression were suc-
ceeded by periods of relaxation of authority. The exaggeration of
individual freedom in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America,
long the bete noir, had given way to a social perspective - Pound
had himself campaigned for that change - but there were signs
that, in some respects, the pendulum had now swung too far. As
Pound saw it the institutions of Progressivism threatened the very
values that Progressives had sought to restore and to protect. The
post-World War I war on crime - including, one supposes, the Red
Scare - severely compromised political liberty and the due process
of law. Pound identified the emerging problem of overemphasis on
the state as a failure on the part of jurists and others to perceive
that the moral and social life of the individual was itself a central
social interest. This problem was especially pressing in criminal jus-
tice, where the implications for political liberty lay on the surface.
Once again - and here perhaps more than anywhere - crimi-
nal law needed compromise: "Compromise of such claims, for the
purpose of securing as much as we may, is peculiarly difficult. The
246. Id- at 1.
247. Id. A harbinger of Pound's criticism of the displacement of the regular judicial pro-
cess by administrative process can be seen as early as 1912 in his cautious approach to juve-
nile courts, see supra note 189. Again, in 1914, Pound revealed some significant ambivalence
in describing reforms in criminal justice:
Even in criminal causes, which we think of as par excellence the domain of the common
law, juvenile courts, probation commissions and other attempts to individualize the
treatment of offenders, and the endeavors of the medical profession to take questions of
expert opinion out of the forum and commit them to a sort of medical referee, bid fair to
introduce an administrative element into punitive justice which is wholly alien to our
inherited ideas.
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law (pt. 2), 14 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1914) (footnote
omitted). Pound's essay, Juristic Problems of National Progress, supra note 218, makes the
point with evident force. Horwitz argues that Pound was friendly toward the administrative
process until his "about-face" on the matter in the late 1930s. HoRwrrz, supra note 116, at
217-20. This appears to be true with respect to noncriminal matters, but not as to the crimi-
nal law.
248. Pound, supra note 133, at 9.
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far-reaching nature of the interests involved calls for the best of
which the science of law is capable."'' 49 But what was "free individ-
ual initiative"? Was it merely a "claim"? Had Pound embraced the
concept of free will? Had he altered his oft-repeated critique of the
role of that concept in criminal law?
Pound's reiteration of his standard view bears close scrutiny.
Pound complained - according to form - that "instead of intelli-
gent compromise, our juristic theory of the past has sought to pro-
ceed on the basis of one of the two contending elements
exclusively."250 Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
American "theories of natural rights exalted the social interest in
the individual life at the expense of the social interest in the general
security."' z 1 The criminal law infringed those rights; thus "it had to
be justified by deriving its rules, its sanctions and its authority...
from the free will of the offender himself."25  The problem was
intensified in the nineteenth century, when "the fashion of juristic
thinking sought to make the individual free will, as an ultimate met-
aphysical datum, the starting point of all legal obligation."'253 From
this experience it followed that "limitations on magisterial enforce-
ment of the prohibitions imposed to maintain the general security
... should receive the whole emphasis." 254 Later, Pound came back
to this theme, noting that the same legal profession that needed to
be warned about executive overreach "still adheres either to the
eighteenth-century idea of natural rights as qualities of human be-
ings.., or to the nineteenth century will-philosophy, with its ideas
of free will, vicious will and abstract will, which modem psychology
has wholly undermined." 55
Pound then followed his standard critique with the phrase he
had employed in his 1916 address on "Juristic Problems" 56 and his
1919 remarks on "Society and the Individual, '257 though here he
seems crucially to have aimed it directly at the "ideas of free will"
in the criminal law: "I concede that there is a kernel of truth in
these traditional legal theories."5 8 The concession seems especially
249. Id. at 11.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 12.
255. Id. at 15.
256. Pound, supra note 218.
257. Pound, supra note 236.
258. Pound, supra note 133, at 15:
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far-reaching, but - then again - was it? Pound now directed his
attention to wholly instrumental considerations: "We may not ig-
nore the element of limitation upon magisterial enforcement of the
prohibitions of criminal law and pin our faith wholly in administra-
tive agencies that look upon criminal law purely from the stand-
point of these prohibitions."259
Had the perceived threat to political liberty engendered a belief
in the kind of human freedom that the orthodox common law pre-
sumed to exist? Apparently not. Consider the terms of Pound's
call for cooperation among lawyers and social and behavioral scien-
tists: "Scientific study of law is no less important to the community
than scientific study of medicine. Few diseases threaten civilization
more persistently than the manifold forms of antisocial action that
we call crimes."'260 The caution of the 1911 General Introduction -
"It need. not be asserted for one moment that crime is a disease" 261
- seems to have weakened. From there Pound moved on to his
long-standing, trademark, all-purpose prescription for the future of
the criminal law: "continuous intelligent bringing to bear upon the
fundamental problem and its applications in detail of all that legal
and social and medical science have worked out."262 Pound's rec-
ognition of "individual freedom" and of "free mental activity" had
not, I infer, truly altered his conviction that the most important part
of the "fundamental problem" was the concept of "free will" as the
basis for criminal responsibility.
Pound aptly entitled his essay The Future of the Criminal
Law,263 for it struggled vainly with many of the problems that have
played havoc with criminal jurisprudence down to our own times.
Pound himself, of course, thought that the best minds, the grandest
efforts of all scientists, legal and otherwise, would resolve these
problems. Unlike Speranza, he counted law as a science and
looked forward to eventual integration of the insights of all the sci-
ences. His reaction against the furthest reaches of executive justice
in wartime and its immediate aftermath led him to stress the impor-
tance of the consciousness of human freedom, and to insist that that
consciousness, when nurtured by social programs that limited barri-
ers - governmental as well as private in nature, gave full sway to
human potential as well as to social well being. Pound went so far
259. Id.
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. General Introduction, supra note 105, at vii.
262. Pound, supra note 133, at 16.
263. I&
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on at least one occasion as to refer to what I believe he mainly
thought of as the consciousness of freedom as "free will." Witness
the dramatic denouement of his chapter, "The Rights of Man," in
The Spirit of the Common Law.264
On the contrary the chiefest of social interests is the moral and social
life of the individual; and thus individual interests become largely
identical with a social interest. Just as in the seventeenth century an
undue insistence upon public interests, thought of as the interests of
the sovereign, defeated the moral and social life of the individual and
required the assertion of individual interests in bills of rights and dec-
larations of rights, there is like danger now that certain social interests
will be unduly emphasized and that governmental maternalism will
become an end rather than a means and defeat the real purposes of
the legal order. Although we think socially, we must still think of
individual interests, and of that greatest of all claims which a human
being may make, the claim to assert his individuality, to exercise
freely the will and the reason which God has given him. We must
emphasize the social interest in the moral and social life of the indi-
vidual. But we must remember that it is the life of a free-willing
being.265
The language of "claim" appears - and then, just as Pound de-
scribes humans as "free-willing beings," is eclipsed. Are you con-
soled? Was Pound?
We ought not to be surprised by Pound's "slip" - if that is what
it was. Led principally by his concern for political liberty, he now
saw a "kernel of truth" in the ideas he had attacked for over a dec-
ade - but only a kernel. Pound's theory of social interests cap-
tured - and domesticated - the element of human freedom,
domesticated it but gave it a place so prominent that it is sometimes
difficult to see precisely what his comments on the scientific renun-
ciation of the concept of free will amounted to. Still, Scylla and
Charybdis had once again been avoided; Pound had safely reached
the beckoning shores of deeply humanistic ambiguity.
D.
That ambiguity - or perhaps better, dualism - marked
Pound's two most important writings on criminal justice, his Sum-
mary in the 1922 Cleveland criminal justice survey265 and his lec-
tures, the following year, on Criminal Justice in America.267 But the
264. Roscoe POUND, ThE SPmIT OF THE COMMON LAw (1921).
265. Id at 110-11 (emphasis added).
266. Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City - A Summary, in CmnNvAL
Jusrcu in CLEvLAND, supra note 87, at 559.
267. PoUND, supra note 128.
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two works display other, not unrelated tensions as well. Pound's
Summary contained a belated attempt to come to terms with the
implications of the new sciences for the prospects of a reformed
system of criminal justice; his valedictory lectures, on the other
hand, retreated to a mainly historical perspective on current condi-
tions. Ultimately, the historical account that had served Pound so
well for so long trapped him, reinforcing his tendencies not to probe
deeply into matters for which history was a poor guide and analysis
of theoretical underpinnings a necessary next step.
Pound's masterful 1922 Summary integrated insights tracing
back to his 1908 piece, Inherent and Acquired Difficulties,268 with
more recent reflections on the role of the individual interest as an
aspect of social interests, and empirical information drawn from the
various chapters of the Cleveland project.269 The Summary remains
Pound's fullest and most cogent account of the problems inherent
in criminal administration; its most original aspect is his discussion
- engendered, no doubt, by the Cleveland study, itself - of the
relationship between the new sciences and the criminal law.
Pound opened his essay with a brief but textured discussion of
the problem of free will. Read in the light of Society and the Indi-
vidual,270 Pound's language seems to carry forward his distinction
between freedom as a reality and as a state of human consciousness:
Not the least significant discoveries of modem psychology are the
extent to which what we have called free will is a product, not a cause,
and the extent to which what we take to be reasons for actions are but
rationalizings of what we desire to do and do on different grounds. In
the administration of justice there are many subtle forces at work of
which we are but partially conscious.271
268. Pound, supra note 154.
269. Pound, supra note 266. For a brief background to the Cleveland study, see Felix
Frankfurter's Preface in CRmIMNAL JUSTICE IN CLEvELAND, supra note 87, at v. See also
GERHARD O.W. MuETLLnn CUME, LAW AND THE SCHoLARs: A HISTORY oF ScHoLARsnm
IN AmUcAN CUMNAL LAw 95-101 (1969). Mueller is appreciative of Pound's efforts in
providing the inspiration for the Cleveland survey - and, thus, its many successors of the
1920s, which he lists usefully, id. at 96-97 - but he notes that:
However much the Cleveland Survey may have contributed to uncovering the crime
situation in Cleveland, and to the development of criminal statistics, it is impossible to
avoid concluding that the only certain conclusion to be drawn from it is that law enforce-
ment will fail if the law is not, or not properly, enforced.
Id. at 98. Mueller described Pound's Summary as "a well-prepared historical sketch, most of
which, however, could equally have been produced without the benefit of the Cleveland Sur-
vey." Id. at 99.
The Survey was composed of studies of police administration, prosecution, the criminal
courts, correctional and penal treatment, medical science and criminal justice, newspapers
and criminal justice, and legal education in Cleveland.
270. Pound, supra note 235.
271. Pound, supra note 266, at 561.
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Pound proffered the admonition that one must understand that
human beings, legal machinery, and the "complex environment"
were formed by "[t]radition, education, physical surroundings, race,
class and professional solidarity, and economic, political, and social
influence of all sorts and degrees." 272 Complexity reigned: "[W]e
must insist on plurality of causes and plurality and relativity of rem-
edies." 273 The critique that emerged was not, for Pound, the con-
ventional thrashing of the Puritan notion of free will, but the
rejection of a reductionist attempt to match cause and cure one on
one. Both individuals and sciences had succumbed to monocausal
explanation: "Neither the science of law nor the science of politics
has escaped this struggle to master complex facts by giving them a
fictitious appearance of simplicity." 274
But once again, the language of freedom reappeared when
Pound turned from this causal morass back to the criminal law.
There Pound concluded that compromise was necessary between
the general security and - familiar phrases - "free individual ini-
tiative," "free mental activity." These were of course "claims,"
"claims" that deserve protection as a social interest in the individual
life.275 Nothing in the Summary suggests that for Pound such claims
stood for actual aspects of human nature rather than states of mind.
Nor did Pound repeat his characterization of human existence as
"the life of a free-willing being," 276 a phrase whose short life in his
work perhaps simply paid fleeting homage to the mysteries of
human behavior.
What we do know is that when we turn to Pound's reflections
upon the implications of the new sciences for criminal law we no
longer encounter the language of "free individual initiative." Nor
do we encounter Pound's customary ebullience but, rather, a mov-
ing discussion that is hopeful regarding eventual prospects for use-
ful change, though less than sanguine about the process by which
that change would come about. Of philosophical conundrums it is
not wholly devoid. Traditional criminal jurisprudence, we are told
in Pound's now familiar formulaic expression, "thinks of the of-
fender as a free moral agent who, having before him the choice
whether to do right or wrong, intentionally chose to do wrong. '277
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 562.
275. Id. at 576-77.
276. See supra text accompanying note 265.
277. Pound, supra note 266, at 586.
June 1995] 1997/
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
The theoretical basis for such traditionalism, though, had now been
washed away. Here Pound achieved his most sustained assessment
- and most implicit endorsement - of the implications of the new
science:
We know today that the matter is much more complicated .... We
know that criminals must be classified as well as crimes. We know
that the old analysis of act and intent can stand only as an artificial
legal analysis and that the mental element in crime presents a series of
difficult problems. We recognize that in order to deal with crime in
an intelligent and practical manner we must give up the retributive
theory. But this means that we must largely make over our whole
criminal law, which was rebuilt around that theory in the last two cen-
turies, and that work is going on slowly all over the world.... We
shall achieve lasting results neither by some analytical scheme or rigid
system worked out logically in libraries on the sole basis of books and
law reports, as some lawyers seem to hope, nor by abandoning the
experience of the past, preserved in the law reports, and turning ex-
clusively to administrative, non-legal, expert agencies, which is the
hope of many laymen. Pending this making over of criminal law we
must expect that many features of the administration of criminal jus-
tice will remain unsatisfactory.2 78
Finally, Pound addressed the new sciences more directly:
Medical science has all but undergone a rebirth within a genera-
tion. Within a generation psychology has risen to a practical science
of the first importance, with far-reaching applications on every side.
Psychopathology has overturned much that the criminal law of the
past had built upon. Indeed, the fundamental theory of our orthodox
criminal law has gone down before modem psychology and psychopa-
thology. The results are only beginning to be felt. One result is a just
dissatisfaction on the part of the medical profession with what they
observe in judicial administration of justice and legal treatment of
criminals. In prevention, in criminal investigation as a preliminary to
prosecution, in the trial of issues of fact and in penal treatment we
have much to learn from the physician and psychologist and psycho-
pathologist. But during the period of transition in which we are learn-
ing it and are learning how to use it there will be much experimenting
and some fumbling and much dissatisfaction.279
Too little organization, too little time: No wonder American
criminal justice had not yet accommodated the message of the new
sciences! But there was indeed a deeper reason, Pound allowed, yet
another locally American, rather than universally human problem.
The real challenge had to do with altering the traditional habits of
American democratic thought and behavior that had long since
been ingrained in current administrative practices. On this score,
278. Id. at 586-87.
279. Id. at 588. For additional discussion of these themes, see also i. at 645-48.
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the present was bleak, but - Pound seems to be reassuring his
reader - the prospects for the future remained bright.280
Just how much progress, and of what sort, had Americans so far
made? Pound's 1923 lectures constitute his great summing up on
the question of criminal justice. The central message of the lectures
was not that a determined or compromised will might undermine
the conscious belief in human freedom that Pound so highly valued;
rather, the message was that Americans gave freedom too much
rein, in practice as well as in theory, to suit the conditions of mod-
em life. The data from the Cleveland study had, perhaps, taken its
toll. The public order was suffering woefully from institutional in-
firmities and unabridged individual "self-assertion." The situation
called for moderation; Pound pleaded for institutional development
and new habits of behavior, individual freedom in accordance with
self-restraint. As to deeper philosophical and psychological issues,
they played little role in Criminal Justice in America.
Pound commenced his first lecture by observing that, just as
crimes should be seen in their specific rather than their general na-
tures, so too were fhe sources of law specific.
Hence, today jurists approach the law from psychology rather than
from metaphysics. They think of the scope and subject matter of law
from the standpoint of the concrete desires and claims of individual
men in civilized society, not from the standpoint of the abstract quali-
ties of the abstract individual, nor from the standpoint of the logical
implications of the abstract individual free will. They consider the
desires or claims found to be involved respectively in the individual
life...2s81
But the claims of individuals could clash, and the purpose of the law
was to balance competing claims, whatever might be said about the
psychology that accompanied, or generated, those claims. In this,
the 1923 lectures are by no means original; Pound had been saying
as much for years, as his concept of social interests took hold,
evolved, and came to reflect a settled and inspiring confidence.
Thus the lectures led up to an assessment of where things stood as
of the 1920s, against the background assumption that the law's mis-
sion was eminently achievable. The Progressive theme of the prac-
tical adjustment between the individual and the social order
overwhelmed his account and left little room for consideration of
280. Id. at 645-48.
281. PouND, supra note 128, at 4; see also iU at 33-34 (repeating, almost verbatim, his
statement of some years earlier "Our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of
punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free moral agent, confronted with a choice between
doing right and doing wrong, and choosing freely to do wrong."); POuND, supra note 264, at
51-52.
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the theoretical basis for a notion of criminal responsibility. In the
end, Pound attempted to found juristic criminal justice analysis on
an extended assessment of the relationship of political liberty to the
needs of the modem state and only glancing reference to the prob-
lem of human free will. Let us follow, for a moment, the argument
of Pound's final lecture, Criminal Justice Today.
With customary aplomb, Pound assured his audience that
"[t]here is no intrinsic reason why democratic institutions should be
inefficient." 2n Those who persevered to the final moments of his
performance may well have concluded otherwise. Pound's retelling
of American history brought to the surface conflicting urges in our
culture that, at the least, shed doubt on the likely success of our
institutions of criminal justice. The tensions between individualism
and the striving for order appeared deep, permanent, and fatal to
the ideal of institutional efficiency. Pound, himself, ever the opti-
mist, thought Americans who could be brought to reflect on the
matter might revise their institutions and their behavior to mini-
mize such tensions, so as to achieve in criminal justice a consciously
designed and philosophically uncomplicated functionalism. Such
was the uplifting message of Progressivism that the Dean of the
Harvard Law School continued to espouse.
In this now little-read work of great sweep and learning, Pound
contrasted the democratic ideas and values that flourished in pio-
neer America to those of his own day. He displayed an apprecia-
tion of the former as necessary in their time and place, even as he
criticized Americans' tendency to replicate them in a modem, in-
dustrial setting, where they produced "false" rather than "necessar-
ily democratic ideals. '' 2s3 No stage of the criminal justice process
escaped Pound's criticism. At all stages, there was either overreach
or under-enforcement; the discretion that was practicable in - and
appropriate to - small-town and frontier America yielded arbitrar-
iness and cynicism in modem urban society; Americans' constant
recourse to intuitive approaches undermined the potential of the
new sciences that might otherwise have produced a rational, uni-
fied, and respected system for dealing with the scourge of modem
society - the crime problem. For Pound, the remedy was not, sim-
ply, more money, more personnel, more structure. It was, rather,
282. POUND, supra note 128, at 199. Pound's closing discussion reveals doubts as well as
optimism; I have set forth in the text what I take to be the main tendencies of Pound's frame
of mind.
283. Id. at 198.
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more training, more organization, more system.2m Nonetheless, de-
centralization remained a dominant value as an aspect of our pio-
neer experience that Pound believed must continue to condition the
balance between individualism and collectivism; fear of the specter
of Marxism haunted Pound's scholarship. A decentralized political
system could be coordinated, scientifically designed, and efficient.
Institutions could embody American democratic ideals, if only
Americans would achieve an understanding of those ideals that was
appropriate to the contemporary context.28
Pound was not entirely negative in his assessment of current
conditions. Recent advances in penology drew his praise:
It is enough to say that the prospect here is much more immediately
hopeful than at any other point in American criminal justice. We are
less in a rut here. A body of trained workers has been growing up
which thoroughly understands the problem, its history, and its present
status. We are less hampered here than elsewhere by the pioneer tra-
dition and by pioneer institutions. Penal treatment is not unlikely to
continue to be characteristically the American field of progress in
criminal law and administration.Z- 5
Alongside these supposed successes of Progressive-Era penology,
however, Pound noted that judges at their own discretion often
failed to utilize the resources of the police and social agencies.287
Moreover, Pound observed:
Penal treatment in America today raises specially difficult ques-
tions because the time calls for individualization and the traditional
spirit of our law calls for generalized penalties; because our ideas, in-
herited from the last century, are characteristically humane and stress
the individual life, while the times demand greater regard for the gen-
eral security ... m
Significantly, Pound chose not to address the darker aspects of the
new penology, specifically the concept - strongly supported by
some deterministic jurists and criminologists of the 1920s - of per-
284. Id. at 174-215. It should be noted, however, that Pound never abandoned the suspi-
cion of "system" in the abstract that he voiced in 1912 in Administration of Justice in the
Modem City: "One of the inherent dangers of all system and all science is that system and
science, which are but means, will be taken for ends and that system will be perfected purely
for its own sake." Pound, supra note 189, at 318.
285. PouND, supra note 128, at 214-15. As to decentralization: "We are not compelled to
choose, as has been assumed, between a r6gime of atomistic individualism or one of state
omnicompetence and concentration of all powers and functions in a politically ordered soci-
ety." Id. at 215.
286. Id. at 198.
287. Id. at 33-35.
288. Id. at 197.
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manent segregation or "elimination" of "incorrigibles" in the "so-
cial defense."289
To the successes in penology Pound contrasted the deficiencies
of prosecution and trial. He combined a well-informed critique of
an outmoded and disorganized prosecutorial bureaucracy with a
scathing attack on the politics that produced bargained pleas. To
this Pound added the conventional complaint that convictions too
often led to appeals and the further claim that the judge "in too
many states.., is made quite powerless to control the trial, and the
jury becomes an independent tribunal with large scope for disre-
garding or nullifying the law. '290 Here, the vestiges of pioneer jus-
tice were deeply embedded and a protective ideology made them
resistant to reform: "Distrust of judges, lay magistrates, free rein to
counsel in the forum, extravagant powers of juries, an uneducated,
unorganized, deprofessionalized bar are urged as democratic, and
their supposed democratic character is expected to make up for their
manifest inadaptation to the demands of justice today."291 Pound's
history of criminal justice in America thus contains a striking por-
trayal of the distorting impact of the individualistic ethic in our
newly industrialized social and economic order. What Pound saw
badly strained his deep faith in personal freedom; there is more
than a little pathos in his description of the predicament of moder-
nity. The tensions he uncovered were structural and permeated
every institution in society. Yet Pound managed to maintain a ra-
tionalistic view that Americans could confront and rout what he
took to be the deepest drives. Pioneer justice and pioneer attitudes
would pass; they were the product of a historical phase, and the
necessities of the present would eventually overwhelm current at-
tempts to accommodate them.
Pound's understanding of the "democratic" spirit of his own day
was in at least one respect decidedly limited. As I have said, Pound
associated that spirit with traditional concepts of political and
human freedom, and he assumed that newly gained knowledge re-
garding the place and role of the individual in the modem social
order would eventually reduce what he saw as held-over, and thus
immature, strivings for "self-assertion." We have seen, too, that the
289. See sources cited supra note 103. For social-defense writings of the 1920s - just
after Pound's lectures and before their publication - see HARRY ELMR BARNES, TBE RE-
PRESSION OF CRIME: STUDIzs IN HISTORICAL PENOLOGY 19-42 (1926); PmLP ARCHIBALD
PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRUMNAL 294-95 (1926).
290. PouND, supra note 128, at 199.
291. Id at 199 (emphasis added).
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dangers of the new kinds of knowledge regarding the individual
largely escaped him. Pound also failed to consider whether some of
the manifestations of the "democratic" spirit that plagued the ad-
ministration of criminal justice were themselves by-products of dis-
tinctively modem ideas. We can detect this particular limitation in
Pound's critique when we focus on what had over the years become
one of his principal targets, the criminal trial jury. The nature of
modem jury behavior reveals tensions deeper than those identified
by Pound, and seems to me to suggest that the "rational" function-
alism for which Pound campaigned was bound to meet with only
partial acceptance.
We have seen that Pound had, from the very beginning of his
career, often balanced criticism of the "lawless" jury against the ob-
servation that the jury had long operated as a useful safety valve,
leavening the harshness and "mechanical" nature of the law, both
in civil and in criminal cases, and standing as a bulwark against
overweening governmental authority generally. Moreover, some of
Pound's early observations recognized that jurors sometimes ap-
plied progressive notions in the face of overly traditional legal doc-
trines. His 1909 review of Parmelee's The Principles of
Anthropology and Sociology in Their Relation to Criminal Proce-
dure292 suggests that Pound perceived the relevance of this form of
jury behavior to what he saw as the law's necessarily cautious ap-
proach to new concepts of responsibility.293 Pound's comments in
this regard may even have influenced Speranza, who, from his own
special perspective, enunciated the theme of progressive jury be-
havior in 1912.294 By then, however, Pound had developed a con-
siderably less generous view of the criminal trial jury. I have
suggested that his increasing attention to penology led him to em-
phasize the role of the judge in individualizing justice and to view
jury intervention as dysfunctional.295 Although Pound never fully
abandoned the idea that jurors often acted in good faith to leaven
an overly rigid substantive law of crime,296 his increasing impa-
tience with this practice was nonetheless obvious.
So, too, was his tendency to characterize the practice as an as-
pect of "the pioneer attitude." 97 In his 1923 lectures Pound put the
292. Pound, supra note 171.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 70-81.
295. See supra text accompanying note 211-216.
296. Cf. Pound, supra note 266, at 582.
297. PouND, supra note 128, at 122.
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jury at the center of his discussion of nineteenth-century pioneer
attitudes; nowhere else in the lectures did he dwell on the jury,
though he referred to it often enough as possessing "excessive" or
"extravagant" power.298 Pound introduced the subject with the ob-
servation that "[a]s late as 1909, at the National Conference on
Criminal Law and Criminology, an experienced prosecutor pointed
out that the old-line American, when he sat upon a jury, was predis-
posed to release the accused - his first thought was 'let the fellow
go.' "299 But his main text for his sermon on the jury - on the
"unfortunate effect of pioneer or frontier opinion" 300 - was the
law of insanity. Here Pound adverted to Kernan's 1906 address,
The Jurisprudence of Lawlessness, which catalogued circumstances
in which juries rendered acquittals in accordance with the so-called
"unwritten law. '301 Many of these cases involved real or perceived
"insults to the dignity of a man sensitive as to his 'honor,'" wrote
Pound.302 "In such cases public opinion justified killing, and until
recently juries would not convict. '303 The standard defenses - the
"fiction of fact upon which to hang the defense and acquittal"304 -
were self-defense and insanity. In the latter, alienists produced "ex-
travagant theories," which in time were applied to cases where the
unwritten law did not clearly apply; in response, courts and legisla-
tors were driven "to warp the law as to insanity and make of it a
logical muddle. '30 5
Pound detailed the "plausible superstructure" of doctrines that
came to surround the insanity defense and the countermoves
designed to limit the impact of these doctrines. At the center of this
discussion of the jury's distortion of the law was legal orthodoxy's
definition of a criminal as a person possessed of free will who had
freely chosen to do wrong. The expansion of the insanity defense,
Pound observed, therefore involved artful ways of denying the
existence, in given cases, of free will, and subsequent attempts to
rein in the jury often involved "departing from the whole underly-
ing theory of the orthodox criminal law. '3 06 Among .the results of
298. Id. at 45, 47, 154, 199.
299. Id. at 125.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 126 (discussing Thomas J. Keman, The Jurisprudence of Lawlessness, 29
A.B.A. REP. 450 (1906)).
302. Id
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 127.
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this process were differing approaches among various jurisdictions;
the widespread impression that the law was "a mass of arbitrary
rules"; and the discrediting of expert opinion.307
All this was passing, but only gradually. Although Pound now
saw the "unwritten law" as mainly a nineteenth-century phenome-
non, he recognized that its by-products remained, in the form of
distrust of testimony, great concessions to the common sense of ju-
ries, and resistance to allowing judges to comment on the evidence:
"The evil these things wrought lives after them; the good is gone
with the pioneer conditions which gave rise to them. '308 Still,
Pound was hopeful. Referring both to what he considered exotic
insanity doctrines and to legal rules adopted to limit their impact,
he wrote: "No doubt better theories of criminality will presently
make these anomalies obsolete along with the general principles to
which they are irrational exceptions. '309
My supposition is that what Pound now termed the "extravagant
powers of juries" was only in part a testament to the particular kind
of "pioneer ideals" that he had mainly in mind. It perhaps comes as
little surprise that, as of 1923, Pound believed that the recent mod-
est reform of penology reflecting a more enlightened perspective on
the nature of criminal behavior lessened the need for jury interven-
tion in criminal cases. What Pound failed to consider was the possi-
bility that this Progressive rhetoric itself took a toll on jurors, who,
at the guilt-assessment stage, were being asked to stigmatize as
"criminal" defendants whose "guilt" was increasingly seen as prob-
lematic. Though jurors no doubt adhered to the conventional view
that, in principle, most defendants possessed the capacity to act
freely, they can hardly always have escaped the sense - subcon-
scious though it may often have been - that, in reality, the particu-
lar defendant before them was a victim of circumstances beyond his
control. In short, Pound failed to see that the rhetoric and to some
extent also the practice of modem criminal justice depended upon
an increasingly artificial bifurcation between guilt assessment and
sentencing.
After 1909, Pound did not follow through on his embryonic in-
sights regarding the relationship between the leavening role of the
jury and the archaic aspect of the traditional concept of mens rea.
His mature writings on criminal justice do not advert to the possi-
307. Id at 126-28.
308. Id. at 129.
309. Id at 128.
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bility that the modem jury, in its role as a "safety valve," might
sometimes - but only sometimes, and on an ad hoc basis - have
intuitively drawn lines, outside the formal rules of law, that allowed
the concepts of the new criminology to coexist with more tradi-
tional notions of criminal responsibility.310 If it did sometimes be-
have in this fashion, the jury was, in a sense, simply continuing to
behave as it had for ages; only now, theory had come to provide a
more "scientific" rationale for what this long-standing, practical
"Great Pacificator" 31' had earlier done on the basis of its own
rough understanding of justice. Pound's concerns about the dys-
functional character of jury power fit well with the concerns of
others in the late Progressive Era, when the "irrationality" of jury
decisionmaking became a common theme in realist writing. But
Pound failed to consider whether particular instances of ad hoc ac-
quittals - or convictions on lesser-included charges - resulted
from the influence on the jury of popularized notions of behavioral
science, weakening his analysis of the very problems of modem
criminal justice he sought to address.
In Progressive America - and beyond - "frontier justice" car-
ried two very different meanings. Pound's relegation of the jury
solely to the old frontier was a mistake, but it was an easy mistake
to make, for - then as now - jurors themselves may have trans-
lated modem questions of human responsibility into archaic ones,
or unselfconsciously moved back and forth between new and old.
From one perspective, the slayer of his wife's lover vindicated his
honor; from another, he had been out of control, which is to say, he
lacked the capacity for mens rea. The shift from use of the oldest
category, self-defense, or the next oldest, manslaughter, to that of
310. See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble
Minded, 9 J.C.L.C. 485 (1919). Ballantine observed that:
The law has failed to take sufficient account of the possibility of different degrees of
accountability of those not altogether innocent. At present, the jury fills up the gaps
existing in the law of responsibility, and takes into consideration the moral elements and
motives of crime. Those who as a result of hereditary taint and unfortunate environ-
ment, are mentally and morally degenerate, have not full penal accountability with nor-
mal men any more than little children, and if punishable at all, are punishable in a much
less degree.
Id. at 498. Note that Ballantine preceded this observation with a statement adopting the
conventional paradigm:
'The positivist theory is neither practical nor onvincing.... [Flor practical purposes
the law must accept the common-sense postulate of free will upon which we all act. We
assume in normal persons moral responsibility. They are accountable for their acts, and
may justly be punished if they fail to control their conduct.
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). Ballantine was Dean of the College of Law, University of
Illinois; this article originated as an address delivered at a meeting of the Illinois State's
Attorneys' Association.
311. Speranza, supra note 5, at 126.
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legal insanity as a fictive device for mediating tensions between for-
mal rules and widespread social attitudes was a development quali-
tatively different from any that had preceded it. Public outcry over
the new convention confirmed that it posed an especially serious
threat to traditional concepts of responsibility. The insanity de-
fense provided new theories for old attitudes, and a vocabulary and
set of ideas that blended easily with those surrounding the new pe-
nology and that together infected the assessment of responsibility in
a very wide range of cases. Jurors negotiated the distance between
old and new ideas, or mixed them together, applying them willy-
nilly and not always selfconsciously. The jury took its place on the
new frontier of justice even as it acted out its place on the old one.
"Frontier justice" was a more complex phenomenon than Pound's
historically bound and conventional use of the term suggests.
E.
Pound believed that what was most needed to improve the ad-
ministration of criminal justice was a better educated, less political,
and more dominant bench. Armed with knowledge of the new sci-
ences, the judge would oversee a process that met the imperatives
of a modem industrial society, one that balanced the needs of order
and individualism. The latter would be stripped of unjustifiable and
intrusive elements of "self-assertion" but would retain a substance
and vitality that accorded with the social interest in the deepest as-
pirations of humankind and served as a barrier against an all-
powerful state. But how did the new sciences and the guilt-assess-
ment function of criminal process fit with Pound's particular con-
cept of individual freedom? Was Pound clear in his own mind
about the relationship between this uplifting consciousness of "free-
dom" and the potentially bleak message of the new sciences that
the judge was to learn and apply? Listen one last time to Pound's
oft-stated exhortation, in this case the closing lines of his final 1923
lecture:
In criminal law this problem takes the form of quest for a worka-
ble balance between the general security and the individual life....
We are not compelled to choose, as has been assumed, between a
regime of atomistic individualism or one of state oninicompetence
and concentration of all powers and functions in politically ordered
society. Our ideas in this connection have been confused by loose use
of the words "individualism" and "socialism." The juristic thinking of
today must transcend both nineteenth-century individualism and
nineteenth-century socialism.... Instead of valuing all things in terms
of individual personality, or in terms of politically organized society,
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we are valuing them in terms of civilization, of raising human powers
to their highest possible unfolding - toward which spontaneous free
individual action and collective organized effort both contribute. As
this mode of thinking becomes general, the paths of criminal justice
will be made straight.3 12
If Pound ever suspected that the contradictions among the various
ideals that he himself espoused might not be resolvable, he never
let on. One is tempted to think that Pound well understood these
commonplace conundrums of modernity but had focused almost
entirely on the problem of achieving a rational and functional social
order - an order for which the lessons of social and political sci-
ence were so very promising. Behavioral science, too, had an im-
portant role, especially in the treatment of convicted criminals, who
would be rehabilitated so that they could reenter the reformed so-
cial order. Pound's focus on the larger social order and on the role
of the individual in that order largely, though not entirely, diverted
his attention from the individual qua individual, from the problems
inherent in the concept of human freedom.
We shall never, I believe, resolve the tensions and ambiguities
that appear in Pound's thought. Pound believed that science had
seriously undermined the concept of free will and he was among the
most prominent in juristic circles openly to proclaim that law should
(gradually) abandon that concept as a core requirement for crimi-
nal responsibility. Yet, while he emphasized the consciousness of,
or the claim to, human freedom, he never brought that recognition
together with his position on the mens rea doctrine. Moreover,
Pound never outlined what a non-free-will-based system of criminal
law would look like; never assayed how in such a r6gime the reach
of the social-defense or therapeutic state would be limited by tradi-
tional ideas of due process; and - perhaps most important -
never speculated about the impact of the open renunciation of true
free will on the consciousness of human freedom that, as he saw it,
was critical to political liberty, self-realization, and overall social
progress. Pound wrote about freedom mainly in the context of pro-
cedural guarantees, not substantive law or underlying theory; his-
tory was his guide and perhaps his constraining master, political
liberty remained his central focus, and the task of balancing the
needs of society and the claims of the individual remained his con-
ception of the ultimate goal of criminal justice. The key to achiev-
ing this goal, he thought, was adherence to judicial not
administrative process, the empowerment and improvement of the
312. PoUND, supra note 128, at 214-15 (emphasis added).
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bench, which would draw upon, without being superseded by, be-
havioral-science experts. Given the immaturity of virtually all
forms of scientific theory, the integration of legal and behavioral
science would come slowly, but meanwhile progress would be mani-
fested by a resettling of the relationship between judge and jury.
He seems not to have considered that such a resettlement might be
frustrated by the impact of behavioral science, which the law had
not yet formally assimilated, on the popular imagination.
How far Pound's private thinking had progressed on the most
intractable problems of criminal jurisprudence it is impossible to
say.313 Publicly, he settled for the platitudes that he was writing in a
313. I have reviewed Pound's pre-1930 papers, including much of his correspondence, but
have found nothing that sheds a light different from that indicated in his published writings
on the issues with which I am principally concerned. Pound's published writings after 1930
do not reveal substantial attention to these problems or significant development in his think-
ing about them. For brief commentaries by Pound that reiterated his earlier thinking - as I
have described it herein - see, for example, Roscoe Pound, Introduction to RoLUIN M. PER-
KINS, CASES AND MATERAuLS ON CRmINAL LAW AND PRocEDUE xiii (1952); Roscoe
Pound, The Rise of Socialized Criminal Justice, 1942 NAT.. PROBATION ASSN. Y.B. 1, re-
printed in RoscoE PoUND AND CuamNAL JusnTcE, supra note 129, at 177.
In 1965, a year after Pound's death, his long-time colleague Sheldon Glueck ventured
some comments on Pound's views. He noted that:
[B]ecause [Pound] ... recognized the ethical element in law, he would not have been
satisfied with a purely behavioristic criminal law, which removed such concepts as intent,
motive, deliberation, premeditation, "malice," and the defense of insanity from the sub-
stantive law definitions of crimes and assigned them, as mental concepts, exclusively to
psychology and psychiatry.
Sheldon Glueck, A Memoir in Appreciation of the Dean of American Legal Scholars, in Ros-
coE POUND AND C unNAL JUsncE, supra note 129, 1, 22. As I have noted, in his 1909
review of Parmelee, Pound seemed to suggest that the legislature could employ these mental
concepts at its discretion, though (I speculate) perhaps more freely in lesser criminal offenses.
See supra text accompanying notes 192-94. Pound did not return to these matters; an early
book review ought not to be given much weight. Pound's criticism of the Strasburg decision
suggests that, as of 1910, he countenanced legislative abolition of the insanity defense, at least
when a convicted person retained the right to examination while incarcerated and, if found
insane, could be transferred to an asylum. See State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910)
(finding a statute that invalidated the insanity defense unconstitutional); see also supra notes
99-100 and accompanying text. Glueck does not seem here to rest his views on Pound's
writings; more likely, he wrote on the basis of his discussions with Pound after 1930 (perhaps
long after). For further discussion of Glueck's views on Pound,.see infra note 452. Paul
Sayre, SAYER, supra note 119, at 170-78, recounts a colloquy between Pound and several
students in Pound's seminar (presumably on jurisprudence) that appears to date from 1924-
25, when Sayre was an S.J.D. student at Harvard, or possibly from 1929-30, when Sayre was a
lecturer in Civil Procedure at the law school. In the colloquy, Pound states: "Claims are
made by human beings; this I consider objective fact. Now the psychological forces in which
those claims can also be stated is another matter. Doubtless an important matter and part of
the whole juristic picture." Id. at 175. Pound states:
We necessarily deal with approximations in law and as such they are true. Others
may insist on psychological or philosophical forces that will be the ultimate quality but
they can't put their finger on these things and usually they don't themselves agree for a
very long time on what this ultimate quality is.
Id. Pound continues:
If you will permit me, I would like to add this: Where is the moral element in all this
psychology of yours or do you think it's just a question of deterministic psychology and
that morals are outmoded and there is no such thing as morals anymore? It's matters
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"period of transition," that "we are learning" the message of the
new sciences and "are learning how to use it.''314 He disguised his
true thoughts - whatever they were - with the concluding obser-
vation that the road to reform would not be smooth: "[T]here will
be much experimenting and some fumbling and much
dissatisfaction." 315
In this isolated moment, Pound sounded not a little like the
Speranza of the Medico-Legal Conflict, who had appealed for calm
and for a melding of the best of the scientific and the legal tradi-
tions.3 16 As Pound put it, "[T]he experience of the past, preserved
in the law reports" - some undisclosed distillation of that experi-
ence - would have to inform, or be made to fit with, the new
learning of the "expert[s]. '' 317 Like Speranza, Pound suggested
here that the deepest problems of the substantive criminal law
could be resolved only by a combination of law and science. Unlike
like this that worry me with the psychological approach as I have seen it developing
recently.
Id. Pound told his students that the law had to deal with "actual claims"; he stated that: "All
science constantly deals with conventional approximations," and asked: "Are you going to
preclude the law from dealing with approximations as every other science does?" ld. at 175-
76.
It is possible that Pound was conceding here that even the concept of mens rea ought to
be based on the human "claim" to freedom, but that matter appears not to have arisen. It
appears from Sayre's account that Pound was discussing affirmative claims (e.g. the claim to
the right of free speech; the claim to the right to be free from harm) and the reasons why the
law ought to respect them. I do not believe that Pound truly confronted here the problem of
basing criminal responsibility on the fact that humans made general claims to freedom, that
is, of holding a person criminally responsible on grounds he had acted "freely." In that con-
text, I believe, Pound himself doubted the wisdom of recognizing the "freedom" that the law
presumed.
314. Pound, supra note 266, at 588.
315. Id; see supra text accompanying note 279. These "platitudes," as I have termed
them, did not prevent Pound's essay in the Cleveland survey from being seen as a major
contribution, which in many ways it was. See, eg., Arthur Evans Wood, Methods of Crimino-
logical Inquiry, 16 J.C.L.C. 437, 443 (1925) ("[Pound's] philosophic spirit, historical perspec-
tive, and scientific insight make it a landmark in American criminological jurisprudence.").
Wood also noted that:
Many further difficulties are indicated by Professor Pound in his discussion of the
Cleveland data. From the foregoing it can be seen that he is driving at no merely local
improvements, but rather towards a radical reorganization of thought and practice in our
system of punitive justice, so as to bring it in accord with modem psychology, psychiatry
and sociology.
Id. at 444. Wood, an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, summa-
rized some of Pound's historical and sociological discussions and noted his "call for adminis-
trative changes in our police and court systems [and] the more extended use of psychiatric
clinics and of probation .... " Id. Wood evidently took Pound's fairly optimistic statements
regarding the integration of law, medical and behavioral sciences at face value. Pound's ob-
servations were indeed relatively advanced, coming as they did from a legal scholar, despite
the fact that Pound tended to skate over the dire implications of the new sciences for the
concept of criminal responsibility.
316. Speranza, supra note 5, at 126.
317. Pound, supra note 266, at 587.
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Speranza, however, even at this isolated moment of insight, Pound
seemed to believe that law and science could meld completely,
speak with a single voice. Law was different from the behavioral
sciences, but it was a science and one that could be perfected by
rational selection from among the principles of the two domains.
Pound seems never to have doubted that law and science could
achieve ultimate unity, never to have conceded that the principles
of the latter would always play havoc with those of the former, that
the ultimate demand of the human project was adjustment to the
reality that, as Speranza had at one point concluded: "Law is one
of the Humanities. ' 318
Im. POUND ECLIPSED?: THE CONVERSATION
OF THE MID-TO-LATE 1920s
For a time, many of those who wrote on criminal justice quoted
Pound. His influence was considerable throughout the interwar pe-
riod - and to some extent beyond. But increasingly it was Pound's
sheer presence that drew attention, rather than the historical per-
spectives and general ideas associated with sociological jurispru-
dence that had long been center-stage. Pound was well aware of
the new currents of the immediate postwar years, including the
marshalling of forces for our first great war on crime.319 His late
writings on criminal justice reflected his concern that individual lib-
erties might be lost, that the coordination of the social order might
carry beyond reasonable limits. He had himself been central to the
318. Speranza, supra note 5, at 125; see supra text accompanying note 28.
319. In the years following the Great War, criminal activity seemed to skyrocket in the
United States. 1919 was particularly tumultuous, witnessing the Red Scare, major race riots
in several large cities, and the Boston police strike. The fears engendered by these events
were intensified by the perceived rise in violence associated with Prohibition. The law-
enforcement community and scholars of criminology swiftly responded to these develop-
ments: on the national level, Congress created the F.B.I. in 1921, which in turn started the
Uniform Crime Reporting program to track the ebb and flow of seven index crimes; locally,
police departments took important strides toward professionalization of training and equip-
ment; and academics conducted detailed studies of systems of enforcement.
Pound had been a leader among the academics who had responded to the heightened
concerns about crime and the enforcement of public order. As noted, supra text accompany-
ing notes 266-69, he was instrumental in the development and proliferation of the crime
commission. These commissions met with varying degrees of success. Some, like the Cleve-
land Survey, which brought the pervasive practice of plea bargaining and discretionary en-
forcement to the attention of the populace, were accepted as models for subsequent reforms,
while others, like the Wickersham Commission's Report, which brought to the fore impor-
tant issues of police lawlessness and brutality, lost much of their influence due to the ebb and
flow of political fortunes and the institutional power of the law-enforcement community. See
generally WAncnR, supra note 85, at 161-93 (citing FamM~AN, supra note 6, at 272, 360-62).
See also JAmsS D. CAIDER, Tim OnGiNs AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEMERAL REIE CON-
TROt. PoUcy. HERBERT HoovER's INmATrrvnms (1993); ROBERT K. MuRRAy, RED SCAnM
A STUDy iN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920 (1955).
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first of the great crime surveys and had drawn to some extent upon
the mass of data it provided. But in the main, Pound was backward
looking. He subordinated his understanding of the novel to his con-
struction of the long view, placed the recent within the context of
breathtaking historical sweep. Pound wrote generally - and in
generalizations. He was indefatigable in promoting empirical re-
search,320 but in his own writings he rarely looked at matters up
close. New facts were made to fit ideas he had formed over two
decades, and those decades themselves were treated as part of a
longue durde. So, in due course, was Pound.
The social, political, and legal ferment of the war years and the
intellectual movements that resulted are largely missing from.
Pound's work. They can be found in the writings of those who were
influenced by Pound's many contributions, but these are as often as
not writings that pay him homage as they pass him by. The true
point of departure in criminal jurisprudence and criminal-justice
studies was the mid-twenties, just after Pound's audiences had
straggled home from his yet-unpublished lectures. It manifested it-
self in a new school of criminologists who fed on the data of the
Cleveland survey and of the many others that followed, and in a
number of legal academics who reflected increasing interest in
criminal jurisprudence and criminal justice administration. It
showed also, of course, in continued concern among medical-
jurisprudence scholars - both in and out of the academy - with
the longstanding problem of legal insanity. Although all of these
groups are traceable to the great cooperative enterprise of the
AICLC, the mid-twenties were nonetheless the beginning of the
halcyon years, the era of geometric increase in participation, in new
initiatives, and in time and money spent.
The new era lies beyond our present story. But some of its first
stirrings help draw that story to a close, and to put Pound's part in it
in better perspective. Although the characters I have chosen for
this last act, scientists and legal scholars, spoke most directly to
320. Pound sought to continue the tangible work of the Cleveland Survey through the
fairly successful Harvard Crime Survey of 1926, and his work on the Wickersham Conmis-
sion's 1929 national survey. The Wickersham survey resembled the Cleveland Survey in its
methodology, but with its national scope was a much more ambitious effort. The impact of
the commission's product, however, was overcome by the contentious public debate over
Prohibition.
From his bully pulpit at Harvard, Pound attempted to create an atmosphere in which legal
scholars would take the need for criminal justice reform seriously. He encouraged the devel-
opment of fellowships for students and professors in the area of criminal law, and was a force
behind the creation of Harvard's Institute of Criminal Law in 1929 - an innovation that fell
victim to the Depression by 1935. See WioDon, supra note 88, at 246-48.
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Pound, they were closer in spirit to the young Speranza, for they
struggled in earnest with the problem of law and science rather than
holding it at bay and wishing it well for the future. Much of what
they wrote in the twenties continued discussions that dated from
the late nineteenth century, matters that Pound had recognized but
largely skirted: the psychology of vengeance, which Pound claimed
was deep-seated 321 but then treated as mainly a transitory historical
matter; the problem of criminal responsibility; and the principles of
an enlightened penology. Among those who took up these themes
were the veteran psychiatrist William A. White, and the neophyte
behavioral scientist and legal scholar S. Sheldon Glueck. I first con-
sider a few central aspects of their work from the mid-1920s and
then close my story by sketching in the outlines of what I treat as a
"conversation" among them and others at the dawn of a new (?)
era.
A.
By the time White wrote Insanity and the Criminal Law3 2 he
had practiced as a psychiatrist for more than thirty years and be-
come a leading figure in legal-insanity reform circles.32 3 White
adopted the psychiatrist's typical compromise position. He recog-
nized the constitutional obstacles to the preferred reform, the sub-
stitution of medical or psychological experts for the lay jury in the
determination of legal insanity, and argued instead for independent
expert witnesses alongside those called by opposing parties and for
a liberal test that did not import "artificial" definitions of insanity.
White signed onto the 1916 AICLC (Keedy) report,324 which fell
considerably short of his real preferences. In his independent writ-
ings, which culminated in Insanity and the Criminal Law, he pressed
his more extreme views in the hope that he could "go over the
321. Pound made this point briefly in 1907, supra note 155, at 226-27, and again in 1922,
supra note 87, at 575-76.
322. W=uAM A. WHrrm, INsANrrY AND THE CRnINL LAW (1923).
323. William A. White, M.D., was appointed superintendent of the Government Hospital
for the Insane (Saint Elizabeth's) in 1903, and became an early American supporter of Freu-
dian psychoanalysis. He began teaching at the Georgetown University Medical School that
year, and the George Washington University School of Medicine in 1904, as well as develop-
ing intern and training programs at Saint Elizabeth's. White's interest in legal questions
eventually resulted in pushing for cooperation between the American Psychiatric Association
and the ABA from 1927 on. See Tighe, supra note 6, at 436-500.
324. See Keedy et al., supra note 96 (report of the AICLC Committee "A," chaired by
Professor Edwin Keedy). White signed on to Keedy's 1916 report, despite reservations about
the very use of legal definitions of insanity, because he believed that some reform was better
than none at all. The story of the AICLC Committee "A" (and White's role on that commit-
tee) is recounted in great and telling detail in Tighe, supra note 6, at 310-81.
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heads" of jurists and appeal directly to the educated public. But he
achieved, unwittingly, the ultimate irony: he analyzed jury behavior
in terms that made the constitutional right to jury trial seem not
merely an aspect of political liberty, but an enlightened response to
the deep tendencies of human_ behavior.
White began by describing crime in primitive society as "infan-
tile" antisocial behavior that "tends to stir similar tendencies in the
herd which are under severe repression in the service of civilization
and culture. '' 325 The member of the "herd" who is directly of-
fended rationalizes his punishment of the criminal as getting "rid of
sin," but "he is trying to get rid of that sin which he feels is resident
in himself."326 Thus, the criminal "becomes the handy scapegoat
upon which he can transfer his feeling of his own tendency to sinful-
ness"; he "deludes himself into a feeling of righteous indignation,
thus bolstering up his own self-respect and serving in this round-
about way, both to restrain himself from like indulgences and to
keep himself upon the path of cultural progress. ' 327 From these
"crude beginnings" came modem "concepts of crime, criminals and
criminal law.''328
The original negative impulse in response to an offense is ven-
geance, tending "only to prevent disintegration by destroying the
disintegrating factors. '329 Vengeance "takes no account of the pos-
sibility of utilizing the forces locked up in these inimical tendencies
for constructive ends, it makes no effort to divert these forces into
channels of usefulness and creativeness. '330 Punishment in accord-
ance with the prescriptions of the state permitted the expression of
personal vengeance,331 though this process was transformed over
time by the creation of formal institutions designed to determine
responsibility. Here White turned to the criminal trial jury:
The jury listens to the evidence that is offered in the case, and hears
something of the history of the crime, the conditions which led up to
it, its actual performance, and the behavior of the defendant thereaf-
ter.... Now the jury takes all of these things into consideration and in
doing so represents, or stands for, in miniature, the body of society of
which it is a part.... In other words, the community, through the
325. War, supra note 322, at 13. For a discussion of White's views, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 6, at 565-66.
326. W=r, supra note 322, at 13.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 14.
329. Id. at 16.
330. Id. at 17.
331. Id- at 18-19.
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medium of its selected agents, the jury, in this way projects its own
feelings upon the accused, so that from this point of view responsibil-
ity stands for something which exists in the minds of the jury rather
than in that of the defendant 3 32
The jury "becomes society," or "the herd, in miniature, reduced in
size to the minimum number of constituent units that conceivably
may adequately reflect its opinions and feelings. '333 Its judgments,
White asserted, "can only be understood as biological forces oper-
ating as selective agents in a practical manner... in accordance
with the standards prevailing at the time.' 334 The substitution of
the jury for the individual who had been offended "makes for a
better organized, more closely knit, and highly integrated struc-
ture"; vengeance recedes into the background, though it remains
the underlying motive.335
The central purpose of White's book was to argue for reform of
the legal insanity defense, not the full-blooded reform he preferred,
but the Criminal Responsibility Bill proffered by the AICLC com-
mittee on legal insanity some years before. Nevertheless, White
could not resist pointing out that under his preferred approach,
wherein the jury would find whether the defendant had committed
the act, and experts would determine whether he had been sane at
the time of the act,
the antipathic emotions of the herd would have quite as good an op-
portunity to vicariate as now. After the prisoner was condemned and
the key turned upon him, so to speak, the public would promptly for-
get him, as now, and any constructive scheme of social therapeutics
could then be worked out in peace and quiet and free from the emo-
tional strains that now not infrequently greet an effort on the part of
the accused to effect his acquittal by way of the plea of insanity.3 36
White conceded that his preferred scheme was unconstitutional, an
objection he regarded as "incontrovertible" given "the standpoint
of crime as now conceived, as an offense against society which must
be punished. '337 White turned instead to realistic consideration of
how the law of insanity ought to be administered, and he produced
a strikingly original suggestion.
TWo of the most important features of the Criminal Responsibil-
ity Bill were its adoption of an eminently flexible insanity test and
332. Id. at 89-91.
333. Id. at 184.
334. Id at 185.
335. Id. at 183-84.
336. Id. at 168.
337. Id at 169.
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its provision for court-appointed experts in addition to those called
by the parties. The two reforms interacted in a significant fashion,
according to White: the independent expert, unconstrained by ser-
vice to one of the parties and, therefore, far more credible than the
presumed partisan experts, would serve to get all of the real psycho-
logical facts before the jury. As a result,
[the] verdict will reflect such sympathy as the added facts may war-
rant, sympathy being understood to stand for that quality which en-
ables one to put himself, in his feelings, in the place of the other
fellow and so to appreciate, at first hand, his position with reference
to all of the facts, his temptations, his weaknesses, his disappoint-
ments, desires, ambitions, wishes, tendencies and all that sort of quali-
ties which make him a human being at one with others?338
The jury, "free from the impedimenta of artificial and static tests to
which they are required by law to adjust their findings, will find the
law and the custom much more accurately .... The jury needs ...
to be left as free agents through which the law as it exists in the
popular consciousness may flow to free expression. "3 3 9
Thus did White seek to harness the true and organic role of the
jury to the cause of reform. At least with respect to the insanity
defense - but implicitly in all serious criminal cases - White en-
dorsed the law-finding that he viewed as inevitable and argued for a
transformation of the vengeance impulse into an unobstructed flow
of human sympathy - a close cousin of both age-old empathy and
modern deterministic psychology. Indeed, White went on to claim
that the progress of criminal procedure had been away from per-
sonal vengeance and toward an "impersonal meting out of jus-
tice.' 234° Here, White invoked history: "[E]arly in the jury system
juries were chosen who knew the contestants or the defendant,"
whereas now jurors are chosen for lack of that very knowledge "on
the theory that they will thus bring a judicial attitude of mind to
bear upon the questions at issue."3 41 This made it possible to pro-
ceed yet further, "to get at the real merits of the broader, and more
particular social issues, unhampered by the distorting effects of
prejudice or of powerful emotions."3 42
It is worth remarking upon the differences between Pound's and
White's accounts of criminal justice administration. Pound wrote as
an amateur though accomplished historian and professional com-
338. Id. at 209.
339. Id. at 209-10.
340. Id. at 210.
341. Id. at 210-11.
342. Id. at 211.
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mon lawyer; White wrote as a professional psychiatrist and amateur
anthropologist. Pound conjoined deep respect for the "claim" to
free will with both a call for reasonable restraint on individual as-
sertion and a professed acceptance of the behavioral scientists' de-
nial that "criminals" in fact freely chose to commit unlawful acts;
White was a dyed-in-the-wool determinist. Both envisioned a fu-
ture in which those convicted of criminal behavior would receive
treatment rather than punishment. Pound placed trust in a bench
educated in the principles of human behavior: better to leave the
power to sentence in the hands of the court, which would be vigi-
lant with respect to convicts' rights, than to surrender convicts up to
a cadre of experts employed by the bureaucratic state. White put
his faith in experts, who he imagined would exercise independent
judgment. White was sanguine about long-term - even permanent
- civil commitment of convicts, where that was required by the
severity of their illness. Pound skirted that issue, assuming, presum-
ably, that most convicts were treatable well within the time-frames
already employed in criminal justice administration. Although
Pound looked to a future in which scientific principles of treatment
would dominate, it remains doubtful that he accepted White's bleak
theory of human behavior. For Pound, the consciousness of freely
willed expression, creativity, and self-control remained basic, and
his focus on this sunnier side of human psychology leaves his reader
to suppose that, by Pound's lights, the incurable were few and far
between.
One infers from Pound's account that most offenders were the
product of social forces that were subject to change by an educated
public. If change did not come easily, it was because the conditions
of a modem industrial order were difficult to alter; political will
failed. There is little in Pound to suggest he took seriously either
White's view of crime as the product of deeply embedded anti-
social urges or his view of criminal justice as the group's collective
sublimation of its own similar urges. Pound viewed humans as far
more rational and malleable than did White, despite the fact that
his historical perspective led him to emphasize the influence of
"holdover" attitudes.
We have seen that, for Pound, the jury reflected the common
view, in both a social and a political sense. It had once played a
vital role as a brake on tyrannical authorities and had then served
usefully to leaven the overly mechanical common law. The jury had
provided discretionary justice in communities that lacked a well-
articulated governmental structure. In all of these instances, the
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jury had exercised an independence that had been rationalized
through an ideology of personal freedom, an ideology that lived on
beyond the point at which it bore relevance to existing conditions.
Modem criminal justice thus required an ideology that justified re-
straints upon the jury. Pound regarded the continued "extrava-
gant" power of juries as an aspect of cultural lag, explicable in
terms of American history and the ideology of freedom that it had
inspired. All this would pass: "General improvement will come
through better general education in sociology, leading the public to
abandon the retributive idea and the man in the street to desist
from the demand for revenge .... ,,343
In Pound's account, the jury had just as often protected the de-
fendant against the "social group" as it had acted out group ven-
geance against an offending individual. Pound deemed it mainly an
institution of resistance to authority, a holdover from times when
individual self-assertion was the reigning ideology. We have seen
that in writing about the insanity defense, Pound focused on the
problem of the unwritten law, railing at the jurors' often wrong-
headed sympathy for the defendant. 344
White, too, recognized juror empathy; but its opposite, a desire
for vengeance, dominated his account of typical jury practice.
While White believed that the principles of modem science argued
against the use of a jury, ultimately he capitulated to a full jury trial
in legal-insanity cases, against his better judgment and in the name
of constitutionalism. Political liberty now would have its day. But
he argued for independent witnesses on the ground that their set-
ting forth all the circumstances surrounding an unlawful act would
lead the jury away from vengeance, toward understanding and sym-
pathy. White sought to employ his principles of psychology to pro-
duce verdicts of "not guilty by reason of insanity," by virtue of
which defendants would be turned over to medical experts for
treatment. Thus White hoped to make "scientific" use of the very
sympathy that Pound identified with the sham of the "insanity
dodge" and the unwritten-law acquittal. According to White, mod-
em psychology and jury trial could be made to go hand-in-hand in
this second-best manner.
This tour de force argument for unrestrained testimony to the
jury found little support in interwar writings. White's 1923 pre-
scription for reform remained sui generis and one wonders whether
343. Pound, supra note 155, at 239.
344. See PouND, supra note 128, at 125-28.
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he himself had produced it only as a reductio ad absurdum. None-
theless, White's stress on the enactment of vengeance and on jury
psychology left its mark on the post-Poundian era. White produced
an account of criminal justice based upon allegedly universal and
deep-seated human motivations rather than upon Pound's relatively
local history of the socio-political struggle among individuals and
between the individual and the state in mainly the Anglo-American
tradition. White's account by no means entirely displaced Pound's,
but as a rival theory it garnered as much support from criminolo-
gists and legal scholars as did Pound's more tepid sociological
jurisprudence.
B.
Pound's account in Criminal Justice in America contributed little
to resolution of the fundamental issue of criminal responsibility;
with the important exception of his commentary on the legal in-
sanity defense, Pound had said nothing new in his lectures on the
relationship between the jury and responsibility. Yet in the short
term his work remained influential: it carried forward the basic ten-
ets of his sociological jurisprudence and it provided a concrete,
American historical context for the problems that White and others
of a similar persuasion tended to universalize. Pound thereby pro-
vided tools that other commentators - particularly those who fo-
cused on responsibility - could put to good effect.
Sheldon Glueck was among the most important of those com-
mentators. Although he was essentially a behavioral scientist,
Glueck possessed a law degree and, by virtue of Pound's sponsor-
ship, was soon to join the Harvard Law faculty.345 Glueck both
brought the behavioral science perspective into the legal academy
and attempted to achieve the media via to which Pound appealed in
his "Summary" to the Cleveland study. Glueck also drew inspira-
tion from White's recent work. His 1925 book, Mental Disorder
and the Criminal Law,346 was at once a stunning synthesis of the
345. Glueck emigrated to the United States from his native Poland in 1903, and became a
naturalized citizen in 1920. In that same year, Glueck received an A.B. from Georgetown.
TWo years later he earned his LL.B. and LL.M. degrees from National University Law School
in Washington, D.C., and in 1924 he received his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard.
Glueck taught criminology in the Harvard department of social ethics for four years before
joining the Harvard law faculty in 1929. TWo years later he became a full professor and he
was named the Roscoe Pound Professor of Law in 1950.
346. S. Samn.oN GLuEcr, MENTAL DISORDER AND Thm CRmuNAL LAW. A STUDY IN
MEDICO-SOCiOLOGICAL Jupus RuDENc (1925); see also S.S. Glueck, Ethics, Psychology and
the Criminal Responsibility of the Insane, 14 J.C.L.C. 208 (1923). For an excellent discussion
of Glueek's ideas, see Tighe, supra note 6, at 382-435. Tighe's account is far more compre-
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insights of his elders and an original contribution to the legal in-
sanity debate. The originality of his work can easily be missed, for
Glueck was the paragon of the balanced, pragmatic, common-sense
scholar. Although in the 1930s he moved toward a more determin-
ist stance, I seek to capture him as of 1925, when he attempted to
shore up Pound's sociological jurisprudence by converting Pound's
consciousness of freedom into something like a true free-will-based
position.
Glueck's important study recommended reforms of the legal in-
sanity defense that worked within the basic structure of the AICLC
proposal but incorporated a series of judicial instructions embody-
ing the view that the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of the
human mind were interdependent.347 Glueck believed that this ap-
proach to avoidance of the rigid and unscientific cognitive test
would allow for more accurate jury responses, although he fully rec-
ognized that the jury would never be a scientific institution. But
that hardly made the jury system second best.348 From Glueck's
perspective - at least as of the mid-1920s - science could go only
so far. Indeed, Glueck sought to breathe life into the traditional
legal position on the question of the relevance of free will to crimi-
nal responsibility. He effectively glossed the ideas of those jurists
more commonly associated with legal orthodoxy, and, by applying
the principles of mentalist psychology, he took those ideas to a new
level of sophistication. It is not easy to pin down what Glueck
meant by human freedom. He tended to circle round the concept,
referring alternately to one and then another state of human con-
sciousness. He focused on the problem of moral responsibility
more than on human freedom and remained ambiguous about just
how the former depended upon the latter. We may briefly trace his
steps.
hensive than my own; she effectively places Glueck in relation to the movement for reform of
the legal insanity defense. I agree with Tighe that Glueck believed that "man's choices and
actions in life were both free and determined." Id. at 393. I have sought to expose Glueck's
struggle to make sense of this view.
347. GLUmCK, supra note 346, at 118-22, 264-66.
348. Id. at 465-66.
Taking it all in all, the jury of laymen from all decent walks and stations of life, provided,
always, that honest and intelligent men do their share of jury service, is as good a device,
in our opinion, as could be evolved, for the difficult task of arriving at conclusions on the
basis of frequently conflicting testimony. A jury of experts is not pliable enough men-
tally for the quick and, on the whole, efficient group mind process.., for experts are
liable to be dogmatic, too onesided, each clinging to those theories borne out by his own
particular experience ... less tolerant of the views of others.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Glueck began with a description of the subjective notion of re-
sponsibility, which "arises from the general opinion, based upon
life's experiences, that a person possessed of the ordinary human
faculties to an apparently normal degree is capable of acting, and
therefore, must, and is by us expected, to act according to an ac-
cepted, socially required standard of morality."3 49 Of such a per-
son, Glueck continued, "we say that he has a free will... that in the
ordinary affairs of life, he is able to choose the good and avoid the
evil. 3 °50 But is this illusory? Glueck conceded that humans could
hate, love, forgive, and attribute blame, all without a belief in
human freedom.35' But
[tihey do these things because, on the one hand, their innate, instinc-
tive nature prompts them to it, and, on the other, their intelligence
and experience teaches them that most human beings have some ca-
pacity for purposive, creative activity, albeit under the influence of in-
nate, psycho-physical dispositions, or 'instincts', and their emotional
accompaniments, or 'motives.' . . . If, therefore, we would use the ex-
pression 'freedom of will' at all, let us employ it - as some writers of
the Mentalist School of Psychology do - as describing man's capacity
to act with consciousness of purpose, albeit on the basis of his instinc-
tive nature.352
We are left with a definition of responsibility that is obtained em-
pirically from observations of human behavior. Glueck's approach
to freedom and responsibility was pragmatic, grounded in our com-
mon practical beliefs and in our experience of ourselves and others.
It appears that Glueck not only allied himself with the mentalist
school, against the "modem radicals," but that he believed that pur-
posive conduct in fact involved choice and creativity in the sense of
"some self-direction." In his next pass, however, he sided with the
mentalist school over the behaviorist school on strictly instrumental
grounds, critiquing behaviorism's failures: "It is difficult to see, on
the other hand, how, under a purely behavioristic (mechanical-
materialistic) conception of the human organism, there is any room
for belief in even a shred of free, self-directive, purposive, and to
that extent responsible, activity. '3 53
Glueck's faith in the criminal trial jury seems to have been pre-
mised upon a belief that, when properly instructed as to the deter-
minants of nonresponsibility, the jury was relatively well-suited to
349. Id. at 89.
350. Id. at 89-90 (citation omitted).
351. Id. at 93-94.
352. Id. at 94 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
353. Id- at 96.
June 1995] 2021
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2021 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
respond in terms of the presumptions of the law, the practical wis-
dom of mankind. Here, however, Glueck produced a somewhat
different account of responsibility, for he now took account of the
psychology of responsibility that characterized society at large. The
fit between the presumption of the law (and of mentalist psychol-
ogy) and the common social instinct, reflected in the "group mind,"
the jury, was bound to be inexact. With education, the progress of
reason, that fit would improve. Glueck melded his approach to re-
sponsibility with a description of social psychology that had much in
common with White's. He appears to have attempted to harness
White's insights to his own less deterministic views. The result was
a justification for jury trial that overlapped White's at points, but
that departed from it in critical ways.
At the outset of Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, Glueck
asserted that men possessed the capacity for purposive action, even
self-direction. In his reprise, he reiterated his view that "[t]he pres-
ence of mechanism does not mean that human beings have not
some spark of capacity for consciously and creatively guiding their
conduct in conformity with legal sanctions, '354 once again seeming
to commit himself to an objective conclusion about human behav-
ior. Glueck presented this view as a response to deterministic
behaviorists, but then dismissed this debate over free Will as largely
irrelevant.
But, as we have repeatedly said, it is our belief that praise and blame,
the urge to hurt in retaliation, the instinct to self-protection, - these
are all concepts that have their tangible illustration and sanction in
the psychology of human nature; and, similarly, society's right to self-
protection is found in group psychology, in the primitive urge of the
group to maintain itself against those inimical acts of individuals that
threaten its very existence. This psychological basis of responsibility
is primary; the rest is mere addition, refinement, sublimation, and
rationalization. 355
This appears to give away the store, but Glueck was prepared to
argue from the "psychology of human nature" - even from the
"primitive urge" - to a concept of responsibility that accorded
with the presumption of "educability," 356 by which he meant that if
the offender "was able to profit by experience to a more or less
normal degree, then he is responsible both morally and to the
group, for violating the laws of the group. '357 The test for educabil-
354. Id. at 444-45.
355. Id. at 445.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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ity depended, of course, on what the "offender's life history and
mental examination disclose. '358 But does this mean merely that
the individual could be affected by the threat of punishment, or in-
stead that the individual possessed a capacity for actual self-
direction? Taken as a whole, Glueck's work seems to imply the
latter.
For Glueck announced two important principles of justice:
First, the primary right of society to social protection; second, the
recognition of the personality of the offender.35 9 Those principles
brought together the many strands of his thinking on criminal jus-
tice. Sounding like White, he noted the dangers that attended the
first: "particularly atrocious acts stir the group mind, as they do the
individual, with hatred, disgust, fear, and a deep sense of outrage,"
forcing "Justice into a m6salliance with Vengeance. '360 Glueck ar-
gued that "some toll must be paid to revengefulness and the desire
for blood. This is one of the inherent weaknesses [Pound] in all
social institutions; and only the solvent of liberal education [Pound
again] can aid in its reduction. '361 And here we have the link to the
second principle: We have a "duty to suspend judgment upon the
actor until we have made an effort to examine into the 'natural his-
tory' of [the defendant's] act."'362 Why? Because "[o]ur anger soon
cools when we learn that a certain offender really could not have
avoided the act."'363 But what does this mean?: When we come to
believe he could not? Or when we learn he actually could not?
Glueck seems to have meant the latter - in fact to have believed,
though he never proved, that sometimes one could, and sometimes
one could not, have "avoided the act." True responsibility - and
the group's (presumably, the jury's) assessment thereof - de-
pended upon the defendant's capacity for purposive action, on
some degree of "self-direction." Whereas White imagined a jury
process that allowed for empathy in the context of totally determin-
istic premises, Glueck envisioned a jury-based determination along
lines that complied with, or at least could be understood in terms of,
traditional notions of responsibility.
Glueck believed that "fulfillment of all these purposes" required
resort to "modem scientific instrumentalities" and to the "more or
358. Iat
359. Id. at 446.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 447.
362. Id.
363. Id. (emphasis added).
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less conflicting social interest in the general security, on the one
hand, and the social interest in the welfare and opportunity for free-
dom of individual self-expression, on the other."36 Here, Glueck
sounded like and cited Pound, whose sociological jurisprudence -
really, social engineering - he sought to exemplify. Glueck's inte-
gration of Pound's sociological jurisprudence and White's psychol-
ogy of vengeance was masterful rhetorically, if woefully bereft of
philosophical rigor. While superficially Glueck seemed to track
White more closely, adding only a much deeper psychology of free-
dom, the relationship to Pound's work is intriguing. Like Pound,
Glueck pushed the abstract doctrine of free will to the side. Unlike
Pound, however, Glueck seems to have treated the freedom he as-
sociated with conscious purposive action as an "ultimate reality,"
even though it might appear to us to be a close relative of Pound's
"conscious ego" or the mere consciousness of freedom. Nonethe-
less, whatever internal incoherence Glueck's mid-1920s theory of
responsibility might have possessed, its translation into specific
terms of group judgment - of jury behavior - filled a critical gap
in Pound's account. More important, Glueck's adoption of his en-
tire scheme - even if one takes the underlying concept to be deter-
ministic in nature - was itself an act of "sociological
jurisprudence." Pound's work exhibited a superficial form of prag-
matism, a Progressive-Era functionalism. Glueck revealed a deeper
philosophical pragmatism that took Pound's notion of the con-
sciousness of - or "claim" to - freedom a further step, that coor-
dinated it with group psychology, and that sought to ground justice
and responsibility on the overlap among actual capacity of self-
direction, the objective fact of "educability," and the social desire to
seek retribution. What was most attractive and ultimately influen-
tial in Glueck's account was the protean aspect of his thought. It
was open to adaptation to a degree that White's was not. It had,
more than anything else, the ring of common sense.
C.
The conversation of the mid- and late-1920s that White and
Glueck helped to initiate soon dissolved into a cacophony of discor-
dant voices. The debate over criminal responsibility, to which the
issue of free will was central, had increasingly become conflated
with the debate over the goal of penal intervention: was it cure of
the defendant, protection of society, or both? Little wonder that
364. Id. (citation omitted).
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Pound, who had long before noted the disagreements among the
new scientists, as well as between scientists and jurists, resolved to
remain above the fray. Safely ashore, out of the dangerous cur-
rents, dominating the littoral: so stood Pound. Not so his erstwhile
colleague, Northwestern's Dean Wigmore, the first President of the
AICLC, and, you will recall, chair the Institute's Modem Criminal
Science Series Committee that, in 1911, had called for a scientific
approach to the causes and treatment of crime.365 Flush with en-
thusiasm, the committee had endorsed individualization on a treat-
ment model, never even hinting at a purely social-defense
perspective - utilitarian, scientific-positivist, or otherwise - nor,
for that matter, even referring to the goal of deterrence. The latter,
no doubt, figured as an important aspect of "penal or remedial
treatment," but it was "remedial treatment" that seemingly re-
flected the spirit of the General Introduction.36 By the mid-1920s,
however, Wigmore's own emphasis had fallen upon the goal of de-
terrence: he now pointedly distinguished the "point[s] of view" of
"remedy or repression," which "[i]n recent years . . . have been
dimly seen to be destined to lead to more or less conflicting conclu-
sions and results."367 For Wigmore, among the results was the
adoption of more or less conflicting language regarding human
freedom.
The occasion for Wigmore's entry into the post-1923 conversa-
tion was a symposium on Judge John Caverly's sentencing Richard
Loeb and Nathan Leopold to life imprisonment, rather than execu-
tion, on grounds of their youth, for their confessed slaying of Rob-
ert ("Bobby") Franks in 1924.w Wigmore protested that "the
365. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
366. See General Introduction, supra note 105, at vii.
367. John H. Wigmore, The Relation Between Criminal Law and Criminal Psychiatry, 16
J.C.L.C. 311 (1925).
368. A Symposium of Comments from the Legal Profession, in The Loeb-Leopold Mur-
der of Franks in Chicago, May 21, 1924, 15 J.C.L.C. 395 (1924-25) [hereinafter Symposium].
For the hearing before Judge Caverly, see ALviN V. SELLERS, T-m LOEB-I.opoLD CASE,
wrrH ExcEmrrs FROm THE EvnmcE oF TmE ALmNms AND INCLUDING THE ARGUNmNTS
TO ma CoURT By COUNSEL FOR TE PEoPLE AND TiE DEFENSE (1926). On July 21,1924,
Clarence Darrow, representing Leopold and Loeb, withdrew his clients' pleas of not guilty
and entered pleas of guilty. Under Illinois law, the punishment for murder ranged from 14
years in the penitentiary to death. If the defendant were found guilty by a jury, then they
would determine the sentence; if the defendant pled guilty, then sentencing would be fixed
by the court. Darrow entered a guilty plea in order to avoid a jury's outrage, and to gain a
forum at which time the defense could "'offer evidence as to the mental condition of these
young men [and] to show the degree of responsibility they had'." Id. at 11.
At the sentencing hearing, Darrow called a number of psychiatrists to testify as to the
defendants' mental condition. The psychiatrists testified, inter alia, that Leopold was a "para-
noid personality perhaps developing into a paranoid psychosis." Id. at 24 (testimony of Dr.
Bernard Glueck). Loeb suffered from a "disordered" or "split" personality. Id. at 23 (testi-
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reports of the psychiatrists called for the defense, if given the influ-
ence which the defense asked, would tend to undermine the whole
penal law."'369 He attacked the psychiatrists' views as "sheer Deter-
minism," which implied that "[t]here was no choice for us, because
all human acts are predetermined .... -370 Wigmore alleged that
psychiatrists believed that determinism would "eliminate moral
blame, and therefore eliminate penal consequences." 371 This, Wig-
more stated, was a mistake - and one that even the early Positivist,
Ferni, had recognized: "The measures of the modem penal law,"
said Wigmore, "are not based on moral blame, but on social self-
defense. When there is a weed in your garden, and you cut it down,
you do not do this on any theory of the moral blame of the weed,
but simply on the theory that you are entitled to keep weeds out of
your garden."372 Wigmore's central point was that "the kingpin of
the criminal law" was deterrence theory373 and that the psychiatric
approach would "lessen the restraints on the outside class of poten-
tial homiciders.''374 "Society," Wigmore claimed, "is entitled to use
appropriate measures to repress antisocial acts. Society's right of
self-defense is equally valid even when the human weed was prede-
mony of Dr. Bernard Glueck). Leopold and Loeb were in the grip of a peculiar "king-slave
compulsion" in which "[e]ach boy felt inadequate to carry out the life he most desired unless
he had some one else in his life to complement him, to complete him. Leopold, on the one
hand, wanted a superior for a companion. Loeb, on the other, wanted some one to adulate
him for a companion. The psychiatric cause for this is not be to found in either boy alone,
but in the interplay of their two personalities caused by their constitutions and experiences."
Id. at 30-31 (testimony of Dr. H.S. Hulbert).
Judge Caverly sentenced Leopold and Loeb to life in prison, with the recommendation
that they never receive parole. Caverly acknowledged the impact of the medical testimony
stating that:
[T]he careful analysis made of... the defendants and of their present mental, emotional,
and ethical condition has been of extreme interest and is a valuable contribution to crim-
inology. And yet the court feels strongly that similar analyses made of other [defend-
ants] would probably reveal similar or different abnormalities. The value of such tests
seems to lie in their applicability to crime and criminals in general. Since they concern
the broad questions of human responsibility and legal punishment, and are in no wise
particular to these individual defendants, they may be deserving of legislative but not of
judicial consideration. For this reason the court is satisfied that his judgment in the
present case cannot be affected thereby.
Id. at 319-20. Caverly eventually grounded his decision to incarcerate the defendants on
their youth, stating that "the court believes that it is within his province to decline to impose
the sentence of death on persons who are not of full age." Id. at 321.
369. Symposiun, supra note 368, at 403.
370. Id. at 404.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 401.
374. Id. at 402. Wigmore's views regarding the importance of deterrence are stated more
fully in John H. Wigmore, The Judge's Sentence in the Loeb-Leopold Murder, 19 ILL L. REV.
167 (1924) [hereinafter Wigmore, Judge's Sentence]. See also John H. Wigmore, Juvenile
Court vs. Criminal Cour4 21 ILL. L Rv. 375 (1926) [hereinafter Wigmore, Juvenile].
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termined by nature and environment to do just what he did."375
Wigmore cautioned that a deterministic theory could excuse, not
just serious crimes, but all deliberate breaches of the law.3 76
Finally:
It is an excellent thing that these scientists have had their day in court
thus publicly, because their theories have been going about in books
and articles and have begun to affect public opinion. It is time that
the issue be squarely faced in the open, before the whole administra-
tion of the penal law is undermined. Let public opinion look into the
literature on-this subject, and learn to discard that false sympathy and
dangerous weakening that is apt to arise on first acceptance of the
biopsychologic doctrine of Determinism.3 77
Wigmore's comments drew a response from Dr. H.I. Gosline,
Director and Chief Psychiatrist of the Dallas Child Guidance Clinic,
who declared that the deterrence theory was wrongheaded because,
even if it deterred in the short run, it
does not cure, because it only represses, and because it dams back and
causes to fester in the body politic .... Of course [the psychiatric
view] is Determinism (with a capital "D," as our good friend spells it).
But the psychiatrist, who is the determinist, is going to do much more
for "social self-defense" than the "measures of modem penal law"
now do.3
78
Gosline argued that psychiatrists did not beg indulgence for danger-
ous criminals, but humane treatment, which in many cases meant
psychiatric care.379 This, he asserted, would mean that "most of
them would stay for life - there would be very little more of this
three to five year business"; that, he concluded, would be the
"greater deterrent to crime. '380
Wigmore's response to Gosline was somewhat heated. Under
the "Cure theory," as Wigmore termed it:
Morality has gone to the bow-wows, and [the] community has passed
into a state of drab, cool, materialistic unmorality which would make
Life a chill, scientific graveyard and laboratory combined. Let the
sociologists speculate as much as they will on the primitive origin and
375. Symposium, supra note 368, at 404.
376. Id. at 405.
377. Id. Perhaps Wigmore also had Clarence Darrow in mind. Darrow was a "popular-
izer" of determinist ideas; even worse, he made them accessible to jurors. It seems likely, at
any rate, that Wigmore had concerns about the impact of the new science on jurors. See
CLARENCE DARuow, C mm: ITs CAUSES AND TREATENT (1922).
378. H.I. Gosline, Letter to the Editor, The Loeb-Leopold Case Again, 15 J.C.L.C. 501,
504-05 (1924-25).
379. Id. at 505.
380. Id.
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evolution of the Moral Conscience. The great fact remains that it
IS 381
Wigmore repeated his claim that the psychiatric approach ad-
dressed the individual offender but failed to deter the "outside
mass." 382 Moreover, he posited, that approach was "suicidal. '383
He imagined Dr. Gosline "face to face" with a "thug": "What is
Dr. Gosline going to do about it now? 'Let me cure you, my sick
fellow'? Why, before our worthy doctor has a chance to utter the
sentence, the thug will fill him fatally full of lead."'384 The "Cure
theory," Wigmore concluded, should be "restricted" to "the very
limited and feasible field of, say, juvenile offenses, until it can
demonstrate its right to a safe and gradual enlargement. 38 -5
Wigmore's invective had been intended, no doubt, for White,
who had testified for the defense in the Loeb-Leopold case as a
preeminent representative of the psychiatric point of view, a role he
played with relish.386 But where Wigmore was sardonic, White was
condescending. His review of Glueck's book is a case in point.387
White greeted Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law with a mix-
381. John H. Vigmore, Comments on Dr. Gosline's Comments, 15 J.C.LC. 505, 507
(1924-25). It is difficult to resist the observation that, for Wigmore, the 1920s were indeed
the "bow-wows" period.
382. Id. at 508.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. See Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Law and the Psychologists, 16 YALE L. REV.
678, 689-90 (1927). Hutchins commented:
One of our leaders [/., Wigmore] has lately repudiated the efforts of social scientists to
aid us in dealing with crime and punishment, saying that we can determine the preven-
tive effect of jail sentences, fines, and executions by searching our own hearts; no statis-
tics are necessary. Yet his own masterly treatises [on the law of evidence] show on every
page that after searching our hearts for centuries we have utterly failed in the hunt: its
result has been a mass of conflicting rules, of metaphysical doctrines, of methods of
concealing the truth now sanctioned in our courts.
Id. at 689-90.
Hutchins noted that: "To say that, when the psychologists have anything to offer, the law
is ready for them is not enough. If we of the legal profession wait until the psychologists have
something to offer us, we may never have it offered." Id. at 689. It is not clear whether
Hutchins was referring to Wigmore's commentary on the Loeb-Leopold proceedings or to
comments by Wigmore on a different occasion.
386. See John H. Wigmore, To Abolish Partisanship of Expert Witnesses, as Illustrated in
the Loeb-Leopold Case, 15 J.C.L.C. 341 (1924-25). Wigmore complained that the "voluntary
adoption of the endearing, attenuating epithets 'Dickie' and 'Babe' to designate the defend-
ants reflects seriously on the medical profession. The whole evil of expert partisanship is
exemplified in this action of these eminent gentlemen." Id. He claimed they were "adopting
epithets calculated subtly to emphasize the childlike ingenuousness and infantile naivity of
the cruel, unscrupulous wretches in the dock." Id. White, the first witness for the defense,
employed these "epithets." See SELLERS, supra note 368, at 15-18. White, of course, was a
strong proponent of nonpartisan expert witnesses.
387. William A. White, Book Review, 35 YALE L.J. 779 (1926) (reviewing GLUECK, supra
note 346).
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ture of congratulation and caution. It is not clear that he correctly
assessed the true purport of Glueck's project, which he appears to
have taken as a tactical concession on the question of human free-
dom as well as on the matter of insanity-defense procedural
reforms.
It comes as little surprise that White termed Glueck's recom-
mendations for reform "conservative." 388 At the same time, White
deemed Glueck's book to have "the double advantage of being
written by a lawyer who has a humanistic point of view. '389 He
continued (with Wigmore in mind?):
This humanistic point of view is not needed in order to get over sug-
gestions in line with it to the physician. He is accustomed to it; but
the lawyer is by profession and tradition almost without it and he will
not be nearly so apt to pay attention to recommendations coming
outside of his profession.3 90
White attributed Glueck's "conservative" strategy to his being a
lawyer and suggested that Glueck intentionally eschewed "radical"
ends in favor of moderation.391 "Whichever method of procedure is
advocated, the conservative or the radical," White conceded, "is
probably a matter of temperament almost entirely. '"392 Perhaps re-
flecting on his own recent book, White concluded that "there seems
to be no way of telling when to advocate one and when the
other. ' 393 White nonetheless felt compelled to respond to Glueck's
lengthy discourse on responsibility in frank terms:
The reviewer is rather inclined to believe that we can never solve the
question of responsibility, about which so many of the pages of this
book are written.... [R]esponsibility is a conclusion based upon a
feeling attitude rather than upon an intellectual one. It is a rationali-
zation of the jury's wishes.... The fact that it is a fiction may or may
not be significant.... Perhaps a more important question is whether
as a fiction it has or has not survived its usefulness.... Society is not,
or I might perhaps better say should not be, interested in responsibil-
ity but only in social assimilability. The simple thing which I have
always advocated is to do away with all these inquiries into responsi-
bility, insanity and the like, and merely remove anti-social offenders
from society and keep them as long as they remain anti-social.3 94
388. Id. at 780.
389. Id.
390. Id.,
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 780-81.
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Of course, White had faute de mieux fashioned his own compro-
mise two years earlier, imagining a process through which the jury
- properly informed by psychiatric experts - would make the in-
quiry that was constitutionally required. As we have seen, how-
ever, White's vision of this process was consistent both with an
entirely deterministic perspective - on that he would not compro-
mise - and with rejection of the vengeance motif.395 Nonetheless,
he clearly believed that his preferred reform program would meet
the requirements of retribution and general deterrence: for the
"herd," long-term incarceration and treatment would serve roughly
the same ends as incarceration and punishment. Like Gosline,
White almost certainly assumed that most serious offenders would
be confined for longer periods than was the case under current sen-
tencing practice; they would undergo a "constructive scheme of so-
cial therapeutics, '396 and the problem of release by psychiatric
experts of sane but antisocial offenders whom juries had found not
guilty by reason of insanity would be avoided altogether. But these
effects were incidental; cure through "treatment" was the true goal.
White noted that this was also Glueck's intention; he evidently con-
sidered Glueck's concept of responsibility a mere buying of time
until society was ready to dispense with that particular "fiction." 397
For White, "responsibility" and "vengeance" were correlatives, and
he mistakenly read Glueck to think the same. White termed his
own views "radical": he was well aware that they flew in the face of
constitutional protections and the juristic theory of responsibility.
The reforms for which both pure social-defense enthusiasts and
treatment-oriented psychiatric experts campaigned found favor
among some legal academics, who nonetheless recognized them as
too radical to be implemented. John B. Waite of the University of
Michigan, for example, referred to
yet another theory of the objective of criminal prosecution which is
coming to the fore and, consummation devoutedly to be desired, may
some day be adopted. This theory is, that prosecution seeks no pun-
ishment at all, but that it aims to ascertain those who have shown
themselves presumably unfitted to mingle in society, with the object
that they may thereafter be segregated from society either forever, or
until such time as they become fitted for readmission .... But this
theory is wholly inconsistent with present practices, is at variance with
395. Id. at 781.
396. WrErm, supra note 322, at 168.
397. Id. "[Fliction" was, of course, White's term.
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the judicial point of view, is a criminological and penological rather
than a legal theory and cannot properly be here considered.398
Unfazed by such warnings from even the more receptive of legal
academics, White carried the campaign against the judicial point of
view into the heart of the enemy camp in August, 1927. "Law and
medicine," White stated at the annual meeting of the American Bar
Association in Buffalo, share common aims, but "have come to talk
as it were different languages"; "they have thus far been unable to
get together largely because they do not understand each other. ' 399
Many in his audience may well have felt that they understood each
other only too well, but White, who had begun by noting the impor-
tance of the fact that the ABA had "set aside a session to be de-
voted to psychiatry, ' '4°° proceeded to lecture his lawyerly audience
as though it was yearning for instruction on where it had gone so
wrong.
At the center of White's criticism of the practices of the criminal
law was his observation that "the vengeance motive... still func-
tions but under a disguise, namely the disguise of deterrence, which
makes it seem like something else. '40 1 Thus lawyers might say -
and believe - that the law looked to the welfare of society rather
than to the punishment of the morally culpable offender,4 2 but
they only deluded themselves. Everything pointed to this conclu-
sion: the language of the law; the nature of trials; the failure to
examine each individual offender in a detailed fashion; the prevail-
ing approach to penology. The claim that the end of the law is sim-
ple deterrence, and not vengeance, was a mechanism familiar in
psychiatry: "[T]raditional beliefs and methods of procedure.., in
order to be retained are given the odor of sanctity .... - 4 03 White
398. John Barker Waite, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Liability, 23 Mc- L. REv.
443, 454 (1925). Waite's position is, in fact, difficult to pin down. Leaving aside theories that
he deemed premature (though "devoutedly to be desired"), he adopted the view that even in
(or especially in) a deterministic world, nearly all people could indeed be determined in their
behavior by the fear of punishment and applied this perspective to his analysis of the irresisti-
ble impulse test. Id. at 470-71. As to the "desired" theory, Waite seems to have stood some-
where between White and Wigmore. Wigmore's deterrence-based view was premised on
punishment, in the social defense, if not on the basis of retribution. It certainly went beyond
mere "segregation" of the offender. White favored "segregation," but on the basis of a the-
ory that does not seem to reduce to what Waite termed a purely "criminological and peno-
logical" view. For a discussion of Waite on some of these points, see Hovenkamp, supra note
6, at 572-74.
399. William A. White, Need for Cooperation Between Lawyers and Psychiatrists in Deal-
ing with Crime, 13 A.B.A. J. 551, 551 (1927).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 554.
402. Id. at 552.
403. Id at 554.
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went so far as to characterize the convicted offender as a
"scapegoat":
He is an individual whose personality has been built up in a way to
explain the crime with which he is charged, and of his personality only
the more superficial things ever get into the picture. In fact it be-
comes necessary to build up such an artificial personality if the emo-
tion of vengeance is to be loosed against him. If one really knew the
personality of the average criminal, how pitifully inadequate it was to
cope with the situation in which he found himself and how logical and
understandable his conduct under all the circumstances of the situa-
tion really was, it would be very difficult to get oneself into a state of
mind that permitted the severity of punishment which the law often
requires.404
White was careful to remind his audience that he endorsed society's
right to segregate dangerous antisocial actors, which meant "largely
... doing away with fixed sentences. '405 In counseling the "elimi-
nation of punishment as a vengeance motive," he justified "its re-
tention only if used for definitely constructive ends for conditioning
conduct. '406
White's speech drew a mocking response from Wigmore. In an
editorial in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,407 Wig-
more noted the psychiatrists' "favorite attitude": "Punishment is
mere revenge, atavistically perpetuated in our law; all that mere ter-
minology should be abandoned."''4° Had psychiatrists studied the
philosophy of the criminal law they would have learned that it was
no longer based on revenge. Wigmore listed its five purposes: to
"treat the committer - thus if possible to cure or improve him"; to
"segregate the committer - so as to protect possible other victims";
to "reaffirm publicly the moral code for the community"; to
"frighten other potential committers of similar deeds"; and to "sat-
isfy occasionally the crude public demand for revenge - this in
those few cases only where there would be danger of lynching if
courts did not act."40 9
Reiterating his point that deterrence was aimed, not at the indi-
vidual who has already committed a crime but at the large unar-
rested public, Wigmore scornfully adjured his intended audience -
404. Id.
405. Id. at 555.
406. Id.
407. John H. Wigmore, Doing Away with "God and Other Religious Tenninology," 18
J.C.L.C. 493 (1928).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 493-94.
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"Search your own memory, Mr. Psychiatrist!"410 - to consider why
they did not speed, or why they did not follow through on the
thought that they might try to bribe a policeman who stopped them
for speeding. "It was the Deterrence theory working on your nor-
mal and respectable mind ... deep .down in your Freudian sub-
psyche. It was Fear! It was Deterrence!"411
Nothing Wigmore said on this occasion was necessarily inconsis-
tent with a determinist perspective. He equated the "moral code"
with the "moral emotions of conformity to the social principles of
good and bad," but he adduced no particular basis for these.412
Rather, Wigmore attacked psychiatrists generally, and White in
particular, whose charge that vengeance functioned under "the dis-
guise of deterrence" infuriated him; it also indicated to him that
White did not truly believe in holding antisocial offenders for so
long as necessary to cure them as a general deterrent. Wigmore
must have read White to mean that the law looked only to revenge,
hence only at the "committer," and he overlooked the possibility
that White thought society at large would learn a lesson from the
"conditioning" of offenders until they were cured. In light of Wig-
more's diatribe of three years earlier, however, it is tempting to
think that Wigmore also objected to the psychiatrist's call for effec-
tive decriminalization, believing that such a perspective under-
mined special and general deterrence, not least because it destroyed
the true basis of the "moral code," the belief in free will.413
410. Id. at 494.
411. Id. at 494-95.
412. Id. at 493.
413. Wigmore affirmed the importance of belief in the "moral code" in Wigmore, Juve-
nile, supra note 374, at 376:
[Social workers and the psychiatrists] are going wrong. They are... virtually on the way
to abolish criminal law and undermine social morality.... Every day, in a thousand
American courts, the judge is voicing the law, which says in thunder tones that go far
beyond the courtroom walls: "Thou shalt not kill; for killing is wrong. Thou shalt not
steal; for stealing is wrong. Thou shalt not cheat; for cheating is wrong." And the rest of
the Commandments. The courtroom is the only place in the community today where the
moral law is laid down to the people with the voice of authority. The churches do not do
it. The clubs do not do it. Public opinion has no concrete and authoritative organ. The
court alone does it, through the criminal code.
But the social workers and the psychologists and the psychiatrists know nothing of
crime or wrong. They refer to "reactions" and "maladjustments" and "complexes."
In a later editorial, Wigmore returned to the theme of deterrence; one must distinguish be-
tween those who are deterrable and those who are not. One school of psychiatry ("a loud
and powerful one") viewed "all crime [as] analogous to a disease ... and that therefore the
penalties of the criminal law are psychologically futile." John H. Wigmore, Better Not Park
Therel You're Liable to Get Pinched, 22 J.C.L.C. 5, 6 (1931). This school fails "to reflect on
the psychology of the normal person - those who constitute 99% of the population." Id. Of
these persons,
Some... are so made that they would execute this anti-social self-will sometimes only.
And some persons are so made that they would execute this self-will every time. That is,
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Wigmore's response to White drew its own response from the
former Columbia Law School Dean and veteran criminologist,
George Kirchwey.414 Kirchwey described Wigmore's editorial as "a
vastly amusing exercise in logomachy," but opined that "it may be
doubted if he was entitled to all the fun he got out of it."415 For "if
punishment under whatever name survives, whether for the avowed
purpose of deterrence or, as Dr. White would have it, as 'a defi-
nitely constructive' means 'of conditioning conduct,' will it not still
and with the same effect teach the lesson that the way of the trans-
gressor is hard?" 416
There was, however, more to the disagreement between Wig-
more and White. Kirchwey allowed that
we can sense a profound conflict of policy [moving beneath the "top-
most froth of" their "thought."] The slogan of modem penology is
the individualization of punishment - a parlous doctrine, fons et
origo of the hopes and fears that underlie the controversy. Everyone
accepts the doctrine in principle as a matter of justice and of social
expediency. Applied, as the principle, for the most part, has been,
casually, sentimentally, ignorantly, it has nevertheless been accepted
as a necessary mitigation of the stem justice of the law. But what will
become of the stern justice of the law when the principle of individual
treatment comes to be applied intelligently, systematically, in all
cases?4
17
Kirchwey insisted that "Dr. White and his fellow psychiatrists" aim
at just such a goal; moreover, he supposed that they might "end by
persuading us all - all of us, at least, who have the courage to face
the facts and the intelligence to apprehend them - that there is no
they would if a motive still more powerful did not come in to restrain them, viz., the fear
of the law's penalty.
Il Wigmore's language is consistent with the view that the "selfish will" is a biological or
psychological fact. The argument, then, was merely one between determinists, or between
the concept of "disease" and the concept of "anti-social" behavior. Without the "moral
code," life would be dangerous. Why, however, would it be any more "drab, cool, [or] mate-
rialistic"? See Wigmore, supra note 381.
414. George W. Kirchwey, Punishment and Other Penal Terminology, 19 J.CL.C. 6
(1928). [Kirchwey's contribution appears to have been untitled; the title I have supplied
appears, in fact, to have been supplied by the journal's editor as a column header under
which Kirchwey's comments were placed.] Kirchwey spent the early part of his career prac-
ticing law in Albany, and then teaching at the Albany Law School and eventually Columbia
University, where he was the dean of the law school from 1901-10. During this period he
became interested in rehabilitationist penology, was elected to the New York Prison Associa-
tion's executive committee in 1907, and served on the New York State Commission on Prison
Reform from 1913-14. Kirchwey was temporary warden of Sing Sing in 1915. Retiring from
Columbia in 1916, he joined the New York School of Social Work the following year and
served as the head of its department of criminology from 1918-32, when he retired.
415. Id. at 6.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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crime without its extenuating circumstances and no criminal who is
not, in a real sense, the victim of his fate."418 "At any rate," he said,
"it will spare us the sentimentality which goes side by side with the
cruelty of the present system."419 Kirchwey understood - or per-
haps merely chose to gloss - the psychiatric perspective as a form
of social defense, and this he thought a good exchange for the pres-
ent system of individual responsibility. "We may hope to embody
in practice John Dewey's pregnant maxim: 'Causes are not ex-
cuses.' "420 Kirchwey concluded his response to Wigmore with a
clear endorsement of White: "This may be cold-blooded, it may not
be 'justice,' but it should be far more effective as a social policy than
our present system of 'justice tempered with mercy.' "421
Shortly after Kirchwey's brief note appeared, Pound took the
stage once more, this time to deliver the main address at the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, Science and Legal Procedure (1928).42
While nothing in the lecture proves definitively that Pound was
aware of the interchange between Wigmore and White, it was rele-
vant to White's address to the legal profession the preceding year in
several ways. The paper was vintage Pound. It reveals his hostility
to the idea of "the vicious will," once again historicizes the emer-
gence of will theory, and says nothing about deep-seated retributive
urges.423 In it Pound returned to the theme that characterized his
earliest work and that, I believe, largely conditioned the tenor of his
subsequent writings. Echoing the perspective of Sheldon Amos, to
which he had accorded prominence in his 1903 Outlines,42 Pound
instructed his audience:
We may not expect to have a system of criminal justice far in advance
of what the public can and will understand and believe in. We must
make the demands of science clear and familiar to the public before
we may, in deference to science, tear down much to which men are
accustomed or build up much that is new.425
Science, Pound said, was advancing rapidly and in a state of flux.
This made it "difficult to make an adjustment of legal conceptions
and legal institutions and legal practices to scientific knowledge...
which will at once be intrinsically sound and commend itself to pub-
418. Id. at 7.
419. I&
420. Id.
421. Id. at 7.
422. Roscoe Pound, Science and Legal Procedure, 8 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY 33 (1928).
423. Id. at 38-39.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
425. Pound, supra note 422, at 36.
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lic understanding. '426 Pound reminded the psychiatrists that "most
people were brought up with certain ideas about criminals which
speak from the society of the past," by which Pound meant "a pio-
neer or rural society."427 He now alleged that even the great
Progressive-Era advances in'-penal science and institutions had
come before "the public had ... [been] taught what such things
mean."428 The result, Pound said, was "a reaction in the last decade
which threatens to do not a little injury to some of these new de-
vices and to retard greatly the development of others." 429 Pound
stressed his life-long vision of the law's imperative: in the interests
of "certainty, uniformity and equality, to do in the next like case
what it did in the one before."430 Thus, he said, Aristotle had noted
the great difference between the legal and medical practices: in
law, the method of trial and error was greatly limited; if medicine
followed the law, the physician would be required to "prescribe
from a book, designated by the state, and according to rules laid
down in that book."431 Experimentation of the sort expected of
physicians is precluded for trial judges by the needs of "the general
security. '432
Was Pound replying to White's critique of "the present system,"
with its short list of remedies and stereotyped conceptualizations of
behavior? Perhaps; but he came little closer than he had in 1922-23
to addressing the difficult questions of vengeance and responsibil-
ity, and their relationship to principles of penology. When, at the
close of his address, he turned to the problem of individualization,
he stressed the importance of the role of the judge over that of the
behavioral scientist.433 This reaffirmed his belief that the tradi-
tional principles of political liberty that governed the law would,
even in an enlightened and reformed system of criminal justice,
continue to limit science's encroachments on jurisprudence. Pound
426. Id. at 36-37.
427. Id. at 37.
428. Id.
429. Id. Pound sounded the same note a year later
Men have come to fear that in our zeal to secure the individual life we may relax thehold of society upon the anti-social, impair the fear of the legal order as a deterrent upon
anti-social conduct, and'release habitual offenders prematurely to resume their warfare
upon society. On the other hand, it has seemed to threaten the security of the individual
life by committing too much to the discretion of administrative officers.
Roscoe Pound, Foreword, 42 HARv. L. REv. 297, 298 (1929) (introducing Sheldon Glueck
and Eleanor T. Glueck, Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice).
430. Pound, supra note 422, at 36.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 47.
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thus continued to straddle the domains of the traditional common
lawyers and the new behavioral scientists, invoking the latter's cen-
tral claim but tempering it with a gradualism that would shield the
former from the drastic consequences of determinism's full victory.
A man for more seasons than most, Pound achieved only the sem-
blance of a coherent, practicable program, satisfying himself that
his principles of gradualism would hold in place the conflicting
urges of the day; self-consciously shielding his chosen profession
from the dangers of the looming abyss. His recognition in 1928 that
the growth of penal science had occasioned a divide between scien-
tific ideas and the understandings of the common man occasioned
an important partial retreat from the cover of bifurcation. The
principles of sentencing should not, he now counseled, depart too
radically from those of the traditional assessment of guilt.434
Within months of Pound's address to the American Psychiatric
Association, Judge Benjamin Cardozo spoke in somewhat different
terms to the New York Academy of Medicine.435 Cardozo dis-
cussed New York Governor Alfred Smith's 1928 legislative
message, in which Smith recommended that the New York Crime
Commission study the reform put forward by many "students of
criminology": "that [in Cardozo's words] the whole business of sen-
tencing criminals should be taken away from the judges and given
over to the doctors. Courts, with their judges and juries, are to find
the fact of guilt or innocence. '436 Smith had endorsed such a re-
form, which, of course, aligned him more closely with Glueck than
with Pound.437 Cardozo, himself, remained agnostic about the pro-
ject,438 which, in itself, placed him well beyond Pound, who relig-
iously guarded the bench's control over sentencing. He registered
agnosticism as well about the deterministic premises of some re-
formers439 but that, he said, did not "detract from the fullness of
[his] belief that at a day not far remote the teachings of the bio-
434. Id. at 37. It is difficult to say just how strongly Pound felt about this. In his Preface
to CimcNAL JusnrcE IN AM ERIA, dated November 7,1929, Pound noted that "[iln the years
that have intervened [i.e., since 1923] much has happened, but little, I think, to change the
main lines of the picture or important details." See PouND, supra note 128.
435. Benjamin N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, Address Before the New
York Academy of Medicine (November, 1928), in BRI JTn' N. CAnnozo, LAw AND LrrER-
ATURE AND OTHER EssAYs AND ADDREssES 70 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1931).
436. i at 79.
437. Id. at 79-80.
438. Id. at 84. ("I have no thought in all this to express approval or disapproval of the
project of withdrawing from the court the sentence-fixing power.").
439. Id. ("One may see a wise reform there without acceptance of the creed that virtue
and vice are not spiritual essences, but high-sounding synonyms for the hormones of the
body.").
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chemists and behaviorists, of psychiatrists and penologists, will
transform our whole system of punishment for crime."440 In the
then and there, though, Cardozo cited Glueck's view that humans
had" 'some spark of capacity;for consciously and creatively guiding
their conduct in conformity with legal sanctions,' "441 and endorsed
the view, similar to Wigmore's, that punishment was necessary to
deter both "the man who is criminal at heart" and "others who in
our existing social organization have never felt the criminal impulse
and shrink from crime in horror."442 He concluded this section of
his address to the members of the Academy of Medicine in terms
that resonated with the language of Speranza and Pound:
The methods, the humane and scientific methods, that have thus pre-
vailed will spread to other fields. This is your work, I am persuaded,
as much as it is ours. Your hands must hold the torch that will explore
the dark mystery of crime - the mystery, even darker, of the criminal
himself, in all the deep recesses of thought and will and body. Here is
a common ground, a borderland between your labors and our own,
where hope and faith and love can do their deathless work.443
Were they consoled? Was Cardozo?
Precisely at this moment, Pound's prot~g6 and quasi-fellow-
legal-traveler, Glueck, began the journey that was to move him
ahead of Pound and Cardozo - on the road to the behaviorist
abyss. Glueck did not entirely renounce his concept of human free-
dom; but he now began the task of severing the question of free will
from the domain of criminal justice. In 1928 he proceeded only so
far as to emphasize the importance of the sentencing stage, which
would be dominated by the personnel and principles of behavioral
science.4 " In 1930, at the moment of publication of Pound's in-
creasingly backward-looking Colver lectures, Glueck reaffirmed his
faith in bifurcation, perhaps seeking to assure his behavioral-
science colleagues that the fact-finding process would, in practical
effect, serve only to determine that an offender had committed the
440. Id. at 86.
441. Id. at 88.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 94-95.
444. Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. REv. 453, 475
(1930). Glueck also stressed the importance of differentiating the "guilt-finding phase" from
the "treatment (sentence-imposing) feature of proceedings." Id. His article both struck a
note that appears to rebut White - "No thoughtful person today seriously holds this theory
of sublimated social vengeance," id. at 456 - and explicitly endorsed White's view that
"[tihe criminal thus becomes the handy scapegoat...." Id. at 458; see supra text accompany-
ing note 356.
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act, for which the appropriate form of "treatment" would later be
determined.445
Some six years later, Glueck moved a crucial step further along
the way from law to science.446 Whjle reiterating his belief in
humans' capacity for purposive behavior,44 7 he now conceded that
"society has not yet invented an instrument for diving into a man's
mind and determining the exact capacity for self-direction, self-
control, and selective introjective power that he or the fictional
'reasonable' man of the law possesses." 448
More to the point, Glueck now argued, a criminal act indicated
that the actor had at that moment lacked such a capacity:
Thus the criminal act occurring at any given time is the outcome of
constitutional and acquired personal and social forces. It shows that
the individual's power of resistance, or self-guidance, or selective
choice and introjection of bits of the environment, has been overbal-
anced by the strength of the other circumstances.449
Glueck concluded that for all criminal cases, not just those involv-
ing insanity, these overmastering forces could be discovered and
taken into account during the second stage of the process. Glueck
made it clear that under his proposed scheme the jury would still
determine the mental element of the crime; but the sentencing
function, "different in methodology and aim, '450 should be "en-
trusted to a tribunal to be composed, say, of a psychiatrist or psy-
chologist, a sociologist or educator and the trial judge."451 Almost
all the way from law to science but not quite. While renouncing the
relevance of free will to the problem of criminal responsibility
Glueck had nonetheless maintained the jury for determination of
guilt, which from the jury's point of view might well involve the
presumption of human freedom. Even as a scientist, Glueck had -
wittingly or otherwise - vindicated the true imperative of the law
through a consciously-embraced prescription for formal bifurcation
of the criminal process.
A full three decades later, in his memoir of Pound of 1965,
Glueck enlisted him as a full fellow-traveler on the journey to a new
445. Sheldon Glueck, Significant Transformations in the Administration of Criminal Jus.
tice, 14 MENTAL HYGIENE 280, 297 (1930).
446. SHELDON GL.ECIC, CRE AND JusTIcE (1936).
447. Id. at 180.
448. Id- at 181.
449. Id. at 180.
450. Id. at 225.
451. Id. at 226.
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system of criminal jurisprudence.4 2 If Pound actually ever made
the trip, as opposed to envisioning such a system in prospective
terms, he never said so in his writings. But Glueck's views on what
his colleague of thirty years "probably" thought as of the 1920s
must be considered in the light of the fact that in 1925 he had him-
self produced an elaborate defense of the orthodox concept of jury-
based determination of criminal responsibility.
452. Glueck, supra note 129, at 22-23.
It is probable that Pound's practical position on the role of the substantive criminal law
in a society of advancing scientific knowledge and humanitarianism was to regard the
objective of the proof of "guilt" as a strictly technical legal one, without any necessary
implication of moral guilt. This would lead to the ascertainment of legal liability under
existing methods of trial before the traditional criminal court; but once the legal status
had been determined, the defendant would be turned over for sentence and determina-
tion of a correctional and treatment plan in the individual case to a board of specially
qualified experts in the behavioral disciplines, presided over by a judge. Always, there
would be careful legal protection of the convicted offender against arbitrary treatment
and for the purpose of prescribed periodic review of the case to determine progress and
to guarantee release from legally controlled custody when the offender had sufficiently
improved in attitude and predictable future behavior to be no longer reasonably deemed
a threat to society.
Id.
It is worth noting Glueck's observation in the same passage that Pound "recognized the
ethical element in law." See supra note 313. Glueck's remarks here might reflect Pound's
views as they developed after 1930. Pound's earlier views remain murky on the problem of
guilt-assessment, though his rejection of free will might be taken to imply the scheme Glueck
outlines. My main point is that Pound never discussed the implications of such a transforma-
tion of the trial and certainly, as of the 1920s, would have consigned that transformation to
the distant future. As to sentencing, Pound jealously guarded the position of the judge. The
"board of specially qualified experts" presided over by a judge was Glueck's idea, though he
might over time have brought Pound around to it. See supra note 451. As to a completely
open-ended period of "legally controlled custody," nothing in Pound's pre-1930 writings
clearly adopts this essentially positivist, treatment-based social-defense-based position. Per-
haps Pound thought that society would eventually reach the point where such a procedure
would be safe, but the impression Pound leaves is that parole, even on the strictly reformist
principles outlined by Glueck, should function to release an offender short of an otherwise
fixed maximum. All in all, Glueck's speculation seems plausible but more akin to what he
himself espoused than to what Pound - given his more traditional common-lawyer's stance
on political liberty - seems to have been able comfortably to accept.
If anyone knew what the post-1930 Pound really thought, it ought to have been Glueck,
but Glueck's 1965 essay provides little sense of the early Pound and none at all of Pound's
development. Understandably, Glueck described Pound in general terms, never really at-
tempting to explain him. Glueck might have underestimated Pound's intuitive resistance, on
due process grounds, to the kinds of reform that Pound's views on free will seemed to imply.
He did not make sufficient room for Pound's very powerful endorsement of the conscious-
ness of freedom and thus failed to appreciate the tensions in Pound's (at least pre-1930)
criminal jurisprudence. He did not assess the full importance of the fact that Pound was led
by his historical approach to view both the concept of free will and the "retributive theory"
as, largely, aspects of the American "democratic" spirit, hardly a sound foundation for holis-
tic solutions to the deep problems of criminal justice. Finally, Glueck appears to have been
misled by Pound's optimism about the eventual accommodation between law and science
into mistaking a fundamental inability seriously to face the future for a merely pragmatic
decision to leave the future to others. In short, whatever Pound became (or was willing to
agree with in private), the Pound of the Progressive Era was a more complicated, more inter-
esting, and more skeptical figure than Glueck captured in his otherwise effective tour
d'horizon of Pound's contributions to criminal justice studies.
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D.
Whatever the virtues of the differing attempts of White and
Glueck to resolve the longstanding problems of freedom and crimi-
nal responsibility, their 1923-25 contributions had clearly com-
menced an era of greatly heightened concern within the legal
academy regarding the implications of the new sciences for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. Over the several following decades,
legal academics became more active participants in the ongoing de-
bate over criminal responsibility, moving outward from their long-
standing contribution to the problem of reforming the insanity
defense. In doing so, they participated in an exchange with behav-
ioral scientists - including the new cadre of deterministic criminol-
ogists453 - that produced the first returns from the endeavors for
which, in their differing ways, Speranza and Pound had called.
The jurists' side of the early years of this exchange - from 1923
to 1939 - thus witnessed vigorous debate over the aims and pur-
poses of the criminal law, including, at long last, focused legal-
academic discussion of the relevance of the concept of free will to
the problem of criminal responsibility. It saw, too, the first truly
historically informed analysis of the doctrine of mens rea,5 4 an ex-
amination of the practice of prosecutorial discretion against the
background of the decades4ong increase of guilty pleas and decline
in recourse to jury trial;455 an enterprising study of the role of jury
nullification of overly harsh sanctions in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century England;456 and a vitriolic attack on the retribu-
tive idea of punishment that speculated about the eventual recourse
by society to benign "elimination" of incorrigibles in the name of
the social defense.457 The influence of some of these and of yet
453. Perhaps the most important foundational work of this new "school" was Suther-
land's Criminology. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAD, CRMINIOLOGY (1924). Sutherland's book was
followed almost immediately by studies by, Barnes, Gillin, and Parsons. See BARNES, supra
note 289; JOHN L. GmLN, C;RIMOLOGY AND PENoLoGY (1926); PARSONS, supra note 289.
Of the numerous books of the 1930s, Nathaniel Cantor, Professor of Criminology at the
University of Buffalo, produced two of the more significant and the more thoughtful. See
NATHANIEL F. CANTOR, CRIM, CRIMI3NALS, AND CRIMINAL JUSnCE (1932); NATHANIEL F.
CANTOR, CRImm AND Soc=rn. AN INTRODUCTION TO CRuIMINOLOGY (1939). The "ex-
change" between the new criminologists and legal scholars is well exemplified in Cantor's
books and numerous articles. I plan to deal with Cantor at length in a study of developments
from the late 1920s to the Second World War.
454. Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974 (1932).
455. RAmOND MOLEY, Pouncs AND CRIMNAL PROSECUTION (1929).
456. JEnomE HALL, THEFr, LAW AND SoCIETY (1935).
457. JomN BApaR WArm, CRMINAL LAW IN ACTION 318 (1934) ("Without rancor or
animosity, not as revenge or retribution, but solely as a necessary measure of public safety,
we shall effectively and permanently eliminate them by death.").
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other strands of the legal-academic writings of the day left its mark
on what became for a time one of the true foundation-stones of
modem American criminal jurisprudence, Wechsler and Michael's
1937 article, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide.4 58 That study
largely fashioned a finesse of the traditional free-will problem and
adopted a social-defense-based approach to deterrence, though it
by no means utterly excluded the Progressive ideals of individuali-
zation and rehabilitation. Wechsler and Michael's contribution
achieved a depth, a degree of internal coherence, and a clarity of
overall system that contrasts markedly with Pound's corpus of crim-
inal-justice scholarship. This contrast existed partly because Pound
wrote before the theoretical groundwork had fully developed;
partly because he thought that society was not ready for a major
departure from its "hold-over" habits of belief and action; and
partly because he took relatively little interest in the substantive
law. But it existed largely, I suspect, because Pound never fully ac-
cepted the implications of what he termed the rout of the free-will
doctrine for the traditional juristic approach to political liberty and
the claim to human freedom. Pound invoked the new sciences and
readily recognized, even claimed to welcome, their role in the fu-
ture of criminal jurisprudence, but he never could bring himself to
imagine what that future would look like. He rejected retributivism
and said much else that could have led in the direction of one or
another genre of the "social defense." But something - perhaps
his particular form of belief in the human spirit, or his way of un-
derstanding old Progressive values, or his own brand of worldly
wise common sense - kept him from ever openly endorsing that
potentially stark penal theory, much less coming to terms with its
increasing prominence in scholarly circles in the mid-to-late 1920s.
As a result, Pound's Progressive account of the state of criminal
justice in America soon began to show its age. Indeed, not so long
after publication of his lectures in 1930, the final chapter, "Criminal
Justice Today," had, so to speak, become history, and the preceding
458. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. 1 &
2), 37 COLUM. L REv. 701, 1261 (1937). Wechsler and Michael drew attention (id. at pt. 2,
1262-63 & n.7) to the modem positivists' mistaken belief that classical theory had been based
solely on retributivism. Both schools, they claimed, had shared deterministic social defense
premises - save for the Kantians and Hegelians within the classical school. The classical
school had mainly looked to deterrence; the modem positivists to incapacitation and refor-
mation; the penal theory of both, according to Wechsler and Michael shared deterministic
premises. The popular and widespread belief among lawyers, as well as the public at large,
was to the contrary. Perhaps because they focused on the underlying presumption of free
will, Americans thought about responsibility and punishment in retributive terms. Pound
was by no means attacking a ghost.
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historical chapters - masterful by any measure and all the more
impressive when it is considered that Pound had worked on Ameri-
can criminal justice history in relative isolation - were left to
gather dust. Sic transit: the legal and behavioral science writings of
the mid-20s and beyond tested, as never before, the possibilities for
a true integration of the insights of the new sciences with those of
law, politics, and history. They tested, too, Americans' resourceful-
ness in interpreting the place of the crime problem in modem soci-
ety, as well as in assessing the place of the conceptualization of
criminality in modem social, political, and legal thought. The re-
sults - as we now know only too well - bore out Pound's predic-
tion that "there will be much experimenting, some fumbling and
much dissatisfaction." 459 But all of that is a story for another day.
EPILOGUE
We well know how central the problem that Speranza addressed
in Medico-Legal Conflict remains to our law - and, more gener-
ally, to our lives. For most of us, whether we are always or only
occasionally conscious of it, the search for a "pacificator" goes on.
Just as the bifurcation of the legal process persists, so also does the
division within our minds between the competing urges to explain
causally and to affix blame, in the strong sense of criminal responsi-
bility. From the Progressive Era forward, the rhetoric of the social
and psychological causes of crime have vied - in the law, in the
media, in ourselves - with the rhetoric of, and ineradicable belief
in, human freedom. This ceaseless battle is only partly contained by
the view that, though determining factors exist, they are typically
not all-encompassing: that we - and those whom we blame -
have the wherewithal to resist, even if we lack the ability to draw
the line between the resistible and the irresistible.
As has been the case for generations and perhaps centuries, we
sometimes reflect these uncertainties in our tendency to soften the
rigors of the sanctions to which we subject those whom we judge. 60
459. Pound, supra note 266, at 588.
460. For a particularly effective evocation of this theme, see LLOYD L. WEn-REB, OEDI-
Pus AT FENWAY PA=X WHAT RIGHTS ARE AiD WHY Tamn AE ANY 40-55 (1994) [here-
inafter WINREB, OEnipus AT FENWAY PARK]. Weinreb states that "Human responsibility is
a structural fact of our experience. By 'structural fact' I mean a proposition that cannot be
contradicted without altering the nature of our existence, not merely in some concrete partic-
ular(s) but in a fundamental way, making it a different experience entirely." Id. at 45. He
then deftly notes the ways in which we also order our experiences in accordance with the
natural world, stating that (with respect to criminal responsibility): "In practice, we often
split the difference, our uncertainty whether the person is truly responsible at all mitigating
the punishment." I&. at 54. Weinreb concludes:
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Doubts about the reality of criminal offenders' autonomy have
sometimes played a role in the movement to abolish, or greatly re-
duce the reach of, the sanction of capital punishment.461 Those to
whom it seems equally irrational "merely" to incarcerate an of-
fender on the basis of criminal responsibility may be partly ap-
peased by the thought that the chief goal of imprisonment is
rehabilitation. Punishment is then viewed as at least largely benign
and responsive to the deterministic aspect of human life. This
maintains the bifurcated regime of the criminal law but brings a
needed peace of mind.
On the very long view, we have grown increasingly aware of the
fragility of our own autonomy and increasingly concerned that pun-
ishment conjoin a great deal of cure for "illness" with a moderate
degree of deterrence and retribution. But up close, the path of
ideas about criminal justice has hardly been linear. It has been,
rather, either subject to brief moments of atavism or downright cyc-
lical. We are, as I write, at an especially tense moment - and a
lengthy one at that: for several decades now, the ideal of rehabilita-
tion has been under significant pressure.462 To some extent we have
responded to the observation that the indeterminate sentence does
not work. Our calls for fixed sentences and our critique of rehabili-
tation are thus premised in part on the view that a return to older
ways is fairer to those we hold responsible and even accords them a
greater degree of human dignity. To some extent, too, we simply
express our anger, and our natural fears of crime. Not least, how-
ever, we seem increasingly captured by the notion that we have
gone too far in the direction of absolving one another of personal
responsibility. It seems entirely plausible that the due-process and
The antinomy of freedom, the opposition between the natural order and the moral or-
der, is complete and unavoidable. As an idea of reason, freedom is not within our grasp.
If abstract reason thus fails decisively, there remains an issue that is all the more press-
ing: how within our experience the antinomy is resolved. For, perforce, it is resolved.
Id. at 55. Weinreb focuses in this book on the "resolution" of the "antinomy" with respect to
rights. (He develops his own thoughts on the relationship between the freedom issue and
criminal responsibility in LLOYD L WENREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUsricn 184-265 (1987)
[hereinafter Wma, RE, NATURAL LAW AmCD Jusr=cn]). My own brief and selective commen-
tary notes some of our lay and professional legal practices (I dare not term them "resolu-
tions") with respect to criminal responsibility. In that regard, if one were to seek
"resolutions," in the sense of philosophically defensible propositions - as distinct from a
description of mainly unselfconscious practices - one might well begin with recognition of
the "antinomy of freedom" that Weinreb outlines. I hardly know where such a quest would
lead, beyond the belief (which I hold) that "splitting the difference" is a step - currently, far
too small a step - in the right direction.
461. GREEN, supra note 14, 267-317, 378-79, 382.
462. The classic account of the rise and "decline" of the ideal of rehabilitation remains
ALLm, supra note 6.
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equal-protection based arguments for fixed sentences and for
guidelines that ensure that such sentences will not vary from judge
to judge reflect a desire to strain out, to a large degree, considera-
tion of background "causal" factors that "led" to the crimes for
which the fixed and fair sentences are imposed. If so, theories of
will once again come to the fore; the recrudescence of pre-Progres-
sive-Era ideas trades on an endorsement of the dignity of the indi-
vidual and attention to personal responsibility, so that the resulting
approach to sanctions owes nothing - apparently - to a modem
version of the theory of incapacitation solely in the social defense.
Within the legal world of bench, bar, and academy, as in society
at large, the traditional and fundamentally unstable view prevails:
Wharton's pact with the angels survives, albeit often in an attenu-
ated form. Nor have the values associated with the traditional view
altered: political liberty, human dignity, and freedom of the will
remain intertwined. Perhaps Professor Kadish has put the matter
as well and wisely as anyone:
Much of our commitment to democratic values, to human dignity and
self-determination, to the value of the individual, turns on the pivot of
a view of man as a responsible agent entitled to be praised or blamed
depending upon his free choice of conduct. A view of men "merely as
alterable, predictable, curable or manipulatable things" is the founda-
tion of a very different social order indeed. The ancient notion of free
will may, in substantial measure, be a myth. But even a convinced
determinist should reject a governmental regime which is founded on
anything less in its system of authoritative disposition of citizens.
Whether the concept of man as responsible agent is fact or fancy is a
very different question from whether we ought to insist that the gov-
ernment in its coercive dealings with individuals must act on that
premise.463
If indeed we "ought to insist .... " we ought also to expect that
tensions within the law, and within ourselves as we act out the law's
imperatives, will be with us to the end.
In the academy, to be sure, neo-realist analyses and critiques
have exploded long-standing orthodoxy: the legal designations of
"free" and "unfree," hence guilty or innocent under the criminal
law, have been portrayed as conclusions determined by political,
social, or psychological circumstances, much in the same way that
findings of proximate cause, duty, or a meeting of the minds were
portrayed by the realists three-quarters of a century ago. More-
over, the very distinction that legal scholars typically draw between
463. Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 287 (1968)
(quoting H.L.A. HART, PuNsmENT Am RESPoNSIBILITY, 182 (1968)), reprinted in SAN-
FORD H. KADISt-, BLAME AND PUNISHMENr. ESSAYS IN TE CRIMINAL LAW 65,77 (1987).
June 1995] 2045
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2045 1994-1995
2046 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1915
free will and determinism has sometimes been derided as a false
dichotomy between "denatured choices."'464 The law, some seem to
suggest, should instead look to the role of culture - to prevailing
standards of behavior, and to the beliefs that surround behavior,
and, especially, to the interaction of "self" and culture - in estab-
lishing appropriate guidelines for the attribution of criminal respon-
sibility. It is not always easy to decipher the perspective on the
freedom issue that accompanies this approach. One is tempted at
times to think that, here, yet another form of determinism appears
as one of the innumerable forms of compatibilism that the modem
mind has constructed in its determined search for a place to stand
and to judge. However that may be, it is important to note that the
new academic stances - neo-realist, critical-legal, or postmodern
- remain largely theoretical accounts of the nature of law and of
human behavior. Their application in practice might be evidenced
at the margins as they come to influence the minds of some judges,
lawyers, and penologists. But given their inevitable distance from
our current politics, they are even more foreign to society at large
than were the ideas of fin de si~cle criminal anthropologists and in-
ter-war realists, especially with regard to the core issue of personal
responsibility - the assessment of criminal guilt.465
464. Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Schol-
ars, 63 CoLo. L. REv. 521,543 (1992). Weisberg supplies cogent observations on some of the
issues I am briefly addressing here.
465. It remains unclear where the extensive and illuminating academic discussion of the
free-will issue regarding criminal responsibility - the "conversation" of recent decades -
will lead. I make no attempt to provide a guide to this vast literature. In addition to Vein-
reb, see WEnq., NATURAL LAW Amf JusTicE, supra note 460; WEnqREB, OnEDnus AT
FENWAY PAiuc, supra note 460, and Nussbaum's splendid article, see NUSSBAUM, supra note
25, some of the relevant works, by legal scholars, behavorial scientists, and philosophers, are
noted in the important contributions of John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the
Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEo. L.J. 2045
(1988); Mark Kehnan, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 591 (1981); Weisberg, supra note 464; PosNe, supra note 25, at 161-86; Meir Dan-
Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 -ARv. L. REv. 959 (1992).
In his challenging account, Judge (and Professor) Posner notes the congruence among a
behaviorist approach, the goal of deterrence, and what we normally think of as a free will
based framework of substantive rules. POSNR, supra note 25, at 161-96. Judge Posner
doubts that recognition of our pervasive behaviorist assumptions will much affect the way we
think and act in everyday life:
A behaviorist metalanguage will not sap people of their sense of moral responsibility
.... Philosophers who believe in determinism behave in their personal lives just like
other people. If freedom is an illusion, it is one of those illusions ... that we cannot
shake off no matter what our beliefs or opinions are. And there is no mystery about the
survival value of the illusion (if that is what it is) of freedom, and thus no mystery about
why it may be hard-wired into our brains. The feeling of freedom forces us to act delib-
erately, in the sense of gathering as much relevant information as possible concerning
the pros and cons of alternative courses of action before we act.
Id. at 178. As my own quite tentative comments suggest, I believe that behaviorist ideas have
indeed produced deep and widespread tensions. It remains to be seen whether Judge Posner
will succeed in his attempt to allay such tensions through his own particular form of rational
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For the most part, as we well know, academic concern with the
mysteries of human free will remains just that: academic. In our
more public capacities, if not always in our teaching and theorizing
in print, we mainly indulge the presumption that underpins the law.
As a group, we may express more skepticism about free will than
other elements of the legal caste, and so might, like some of our
predecessors, endorse, inter alia, broader definitions of legal in-
sanity, but - perhaps out of allegiance to the consciousness of
human freedom - when we act in the real world we are, most of us,
not so very far from society at large. Like Pound, we leave the
working out of the most difficult problems to the future. We play a
role defined for us by our culture and our psychology, as genera-
tions of legal academics have before us and as those that follow
probably will as well. This is a particularly influential role. To be
sure, it is only one of many guideposts for our culture at large, and,
no doubt, politicians and religious leaders, among many others,
send signals that have greater impact upon greater numbers, so far
as the affirmation of human freedom is concerned. But as per-
ceived guardians of the rules and underlying theories of the law, we
hold a special place. If we are a relatively small part of the legions
whose destiny it is to reinforce faith in human freedom - political
liberty as well as free will, I ought to add - the work of our partic-
ular cadre is nonetheless relatively significant.
The current widespread obsession with personal responsibility,
it should be noted, reflects a reaction not only against this century's
increasingly deterministic rhetoric regarding the causes of criminal
behavior, but also against what are taken to be the deterministic
assumptions that pervade the welfare state generally. These as-
sumptions relate both to noncriminal and criminal concerns, as gov-
ernment initiatives affect existing concepts of just deserts in
distributive justice, regarding, inter alia, property and contract, as
well as in retributive justice, the traditional domain of the criminal
law. Progressivism is carried forward, but it is also under profound
attack across the spectrum of political and social thought. In this,
our politics have produced a macrocosmic reflection of the micro-
cosmic experience within each of us.
discourse. His discussion has much to offer as an "external" account of both the law and of
human behavior. From an "internal" perspective - either of the condemner or the con-
demned (to take the most extreme case) - self-consciousness about the possibility that the
consciousness of freedom is "hard-wired" might prove unsettling. This suggests that the na-
ture and degree of "punishment" (if we punish) ought to bear significant relation not only to
the goal of deterrence, but also (as perhaps Judge Posner would agree) to our uncertainties
about human behavior.
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But who is "us"? Society as a whole is deeply divided between
the heirs to Progressivism and those who have now rejected, or who
never accepted, its message for criminal justice. Disagreements on
responsibility not only track, in the large, religious, social and other
alignments, but are also, of course, internal to those and other per-
spectives, including the recent movements along racial, ethnic, and
gender lines. This is not the place for a rehearsal of the
multifaceted role of the free-will-determinism issue in modern
American society. Nor - even if it were - am I well-suited to
undertake such a task. I want only to say that the issue is still very
much with us and that, with respect to criminal justice, we are more
conflicted than ever. Conflicted to the point that our attitudes defy
generalization. The main direction of our present thought and be-
havior depends entirely on the eye of the beholder. If we tend to
speak with greater confidence about main directions in the past,
that may well be due to the increased perspective that a historical
view affords. Which is to say that we know very little about the past
and too much about the present.
About the inscrutable present we might nonetheless venture
some final commentary along the lines marked out by our discus-
sion of Speranza and Pound. Speranza was an American lawyer,
but at the start of his career he looked at American law from the
outside, with ties to, and an understanding of, the continental tradi-
tion, and with the sympathies of the scientist. Pound was well inside
the common law tradition, albeit - early on - among its more
progressive spirits and trenchant critics. Pound's brand of Progres-
sivism propelled him to the forefront of the academy, but it also set
limits to his worldview and to his understanding of the relationship
of law to behavioral science. It engendered a certain confidence
and even complacency as it focused his gaze on overall social func-
tionalism rather than on specific human motivations. I have illus-
trated that tendency in Pound partly in terms of his understanding
of the role of the jury. In 1909 he saw ad hoc jury law-finding as at
least in part a useful and progressive antidote to the rigidity and
old-fashionedness of the law; by 1920, he mainly saw it not only as
anachronistic, but also as dysfunctional in a society that had, across
the Progressive years, indulged in the rhetoric of rational decision-
making and institutional coordination.
From our own perspective, the optimism of the Progressive Era
and of Pound's majestic account seems a mite naive. And the irre-
ducible problem of human freedom thus looms all the larger. The
story of the post-1925 period - as yet untold - has an ending with
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which we are familiar. On the most fundamental issue, that of
human accountability, we have made little progress. This is re-
flected as much as anywhere in our own thinking about the jury,
which is, to be sure, more complex than was Pound's. We are still
to great extent history-bound, although for us history includes the
rights revolution of the post-World-War-il era and the dramatic de-
velopments in participation on juries of women, and Blacks, and of
many ethnic groups that formerly were not represented. But our
perspective on the jury is also characterized by our awareness of the
impact, subconscious or otherwise, of some of the newest forms of
"science" on those who serve. We do not often focus on the phe-
nomenon of bifurcation, as such, but our instincts about what jurors
may appropriately take into account reveal conflict about long-
settled, formal divisions of power. In truth, the rhetoric of deter-
minism is now so pervasive that we cannot fully understand the role
of the jury without taking account of the fact that we sometimes ask
that institution to resolve an issue on which we are deeply divided,
not only between groups but also within ourselves. We alternately
condone or condemn a particular jury that at least seems to have
applied some notion of mitigated responsibility to which the law
does not formally give recognition. Sometimes we recognize how
contradictory we are in this regard; sometimes we do not.
In thinking about the relationship between the criminal trial
jury and the duality of our responses to those whose actions dis-
please us - our tendencies to blame or to explain away - we
ought to recall that the jury is both constrained by legal rules and a
plaything of social forces. That relationship has, therefore, taken a
variety of forms: At times the jury has been relatively resistant to
expression of doubts about human freedom; at others it has allowed
their expression fairly freely. Even when jurors or members of soci-
ety at large have expressed such doubts, they have usually done so
in the spirit of recognizing in a particular case an exception to what
they perceive in general as valid rules regarding responsibility.
Thus, when the jury has gone outside the rule of law, it has often
fortified the presumption of human freedom by providing a release
point where otherwise that presumption might have been called
into doubt. In this fashion, the jury has at times functioned as a
legitimator at the trial stage, just as some substantive doctrines have
done against the background of the unprovable premise that under-
lies our traditional theory of criminal responsibility.466 That has not
466. NoRRm, supra note 14. Norrie's important book deals with the legitimating function
of free-will-based rules of law, but does not focus on the question whether juries sometimes
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necessarily been anyone's intention, any more than we are neces-
sarily selfconscious about the way we - in our private lives -
shore up our own blaming instinct by giving way in particular in-
stances where insistence upon blame might lead us to suspect,
rightly or wrongly, that there is always something rationally in-
defensible about that insistence.
The legal constraints within which juries operate can, of course,
be understood as reflections of the interests of authorities in hus-
banding the power to withhold or to grant release from the rules of
responsibility on their own terms.467 But that does not do full jus-
tice to the long history of the jury's power to find, or to nullify, the
law. The English bench has at times encouraged juries to play that
very role, at times sought to set distinct but far from total limits on
that practice, and at times attempted to eliminate it altogether.468
On the American side, the story has been - and remains -
equally complex. From yet another perspective, limitations upon
the jury have often reflected attention to the rule of law as a gen-
eral matter and have been only incidentally related to, though they
may have had significant impact upon, the tensions regarding re-
sponsibility that I have been discussing.
Finally, jury nullification in cases involving the issue of human
autonomy bears an important relationship to jury nullification in
so-called political cases. In the latter, the jury is often in the posi-
tion of affirming human freedom: even where the jury is mainly
registering opposition to a particular law, the defendant who is
thereby treated mercifully is sometimes thought to have challenged
that law on the basis of deep moral beliefs, of his or her own free
will. This is the tradition of jury latitude that was long the back-
bone of the jury law-finding doctrine and it remains central to the
modem jury nullification debate.469 Social and legal recognition of
play this role. For an excellent review of Norrie's book, see Nicola Lacey, Abstraction in
Context; 14 OxroRD J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (1994).
467. This is the general tenor of Norrie's position. NoaRM, supra note 14.
468. GRiEEN, supra note 14. It is, of course, possible to construe the "encouragement" to
which I refer as itself an aspect of the long-range strategy of the ruling classes to maintain
their hegemony. I have portrayed judicial thought and behavior in eighteenth-century Eng-
land - historiographically, an embattled terrain - as in part conditioned also by widespread
social mores regarding the sanction of capital punishment. Id. at 267-317. These mores, too,
I suppose, can be viewed as aspects of culture that reflect the hegemony of the ruling classes.
But so too can they be understood as reflections, in institutional practices, of deep-seated
attitudes that have not been successfully coordinated "from above." Who has ruled whom, in
particular contexts, remains a perplexing question for every historian of criminal justice, and
not least for historians of the criminal trial jury.
469. Id. For an excellent study of the modem nullification problem, see JEFFRY An.
RAMSON, WE, rsr Juny. TmE JuRY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994).
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the legitimacy of this form of jury behavior - or even mere tolera-
tion of its occasional manifestation - cannot help but fortify jury
nullification where the jury disaffirms human freedom, most notori-
ously, in some cases where the defendant has raised a legal insanity
defense. But also, more generally, in routine criminal cases, where
juries have sometimes responded intuitively to what might be
termed commonplace social constraints upon freedom of thought
and action. There has never been, in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, an effective separation between arguments for jury-based law-
finding in these very different kinds of cases.470 The age old prac-
tice of freedom-disaffirmance, in its most general forms, has traded
on the longstanding tradition of freedom-affirmance in cases raising
the question of political liberty, and vice versa. Indeed, the writings
of Speranza and Pound reflect the interchange between these types
of cases in differing, but related ways.
I have, on another occasion, alluded to an important aspect of
the relationship among the English criminal trial jury, law reform,
and the problem of responsibility that we do well to keep in mind as
we attempt to situate Pound in relation to our own time and
place.471 The reform of sanctions in the early Victorian era may
have been undertaken in part as a reaction to the tendency of jurors
to give weight to the social conditions that produced crime as they
searched for reasons to nullify the capital sanction for what they
viewed as less than the most heinous offenses. Here, the interests
of political and legal authorities in maintaining the integrity of the
orthodox theory of responsibility mixed with their interests in de-
terrence and in simple humanitarianism. The reform of sanctions
then combined with ongoing property qualifications for jury service
and with the development of a culture of deference to the bench to
produce over time a self-restrained English criminal trial jury.
Some early-twentieth-century American critics of the criminal trial
jury, including Pound, drew lessons from the English experience
and sought to make over the American trial in the image of its Eng-
lish counterpart. But not all such critics shared the same agenda.
Among the common lawyers, Pound was, if not unique, something
of an odd man out.
Pound wrote about the sources of the extensive powers of the
American jury at some length. For the most part, he situated the
jury within the history of political liberty. With respect to human
470. For a discussion of this issue on the English side, see GR.N, supra note 14, at 349-
55.
471. Id. at 383.
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autonomy, he stressed, as we have seen, jury-based acceptance of
the frontier urges of vindication of honor - the assertion of indi-
vidual liberty - rather than jury-based recognition of the social
and psychological constraints upon human freedom. Pound favored
a more limited role for the jury, but not in order to shore up the
orthodox common-law theory of criminal responsibility. Rather, he
deemed jury-based law-finding dysfunctional precisely because,
whether it was progressive or retrogressive, it was relative to a the-
ory of responsibility that was itself irrational. Pound sought to hus-
band for the bench the powers that the positivists sought to reserve
for scientific experts, and like the positivists, he did so in the name
of substituting a new theory of responsibility for the orthodox free-
will-based theory of common law criminal jurisprudence.
Pound's hopes for a true melding of law, science, and morals
came to naught; even he could not squarely confront the implica-
tions of the sermon he preached. The positivist program relative to
a new applied theory of criminal responsibility has largely col-
lapsed. Orthodoxy has prevailed, albeit amidst the heightened ten-
sions produced by the rhetoric regarding the causes of criminal
behavior that the positivists boldly set in motion and the Progres-
sives furthered in their own more tentative fashion. This is the situ-
ation in which modem American society, including the institution
of the criminal trial jury, now finds itself.
We are confronted daily with evidence that seems to confirm
Pound's insistence upon a particular form of American exceptional-
ism (our "frontier attitude") regarding the intensity of our attrac-
tion to individual rights, the frequency of our resource to violent
self-help, and the depths of our suspicion of the state. What Pound
deemed an unhealthy, "held-over" attachment to will theory proba-
bly strikes some as Americans' ongoing embrace of the deepest
truth, others as recourse to a useful belief (conducive both to the
preservation of political liberty and the cultivation of a sense of per-
sonal well-being), and still others as too great a rejection of what -
like it or not - we already know about the nature of our selves.
Among even these last there may be some who nonetheless believe
that an appropriate balance between the "religion" of free will and
the "science" of determinism is struck in the rituals by which we
now live. And among these rituals are the practical and symbolic
aspects of jury-based determination of guilt - in some cases, of
punishment - in accordance neither with pure legal abstraction
nor with supposed scientific precept, but, as we are wont to say,
with the "common sense" and the "conscience of the community."
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Perhaps as testimony to this perspective, the phenomenon of bi-
furcation of the criminal process has developed increasing promi-
nence. In capital cases, to take a leading, though admittedly exotic,
example, the sentencing stage in most states is left in the hands of
the jury, so that the same persons first assess guilt on the basis of
the limiting terms of the law of evidence and then, if they convict of
capital murder, sometimes reassess it (de facto) in the context of
affixing punishment in light of information that, had it been before
them at the trial stage, might have led them to a different result.
The ad hoc aspect of lay decisionmaking has been harnessed to the
process at sentencing - the potentially more "scientific" stage - a
turn of events that would have appalled Pound even as it might
have pleased the Speranza of 1901. Decisions must not only be
made, they must also be lived with. So, too, must incoherence be
lived with, and - evidently - its lessons allowed to temper our
judgment as we, case by case, see fit. Not only with respect to the
marketplace wherein Professor Dawson traced the history of eco-
nomic duress, but in the domain of criminal justice administration
as well. Perhaps there more than anywhere. For it is one thing to
observe academically that we can't prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was a free agent; it is another actually to
have to pass judgment upon persons who society has agreed must
be held responsible - indeed, who are said to have a right both
with respect to human dignity and as against overweening political
authority to be conceived of as personally responsible. The result-
ing tension can be very great, and the ritual of judgment is some-
times no less than an act of faith. One feels a certain truth - shall
we say, a certain consolation? - in the observation that, after all
(let Speranza's words be my last): "Law is one of the Humanities."
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